Report to: Police Authority

Agenda item: 4

Date: 4 August 2016

Subject: Performance Review Committee

                   update, Quarter 4

Sponsor: Committee Chair

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For: Information

1.   Purpose of paper

1.1   To provide an overview of the main business done at the quarter 1 Performance Review Committee (PRC) meeting.

2.   Matters arising: PRC approach to oversight of EDHR matters in 2016/17

2.1   The Committee was reminded of the legal duties for the Force and Authority, under the Equality Act 2010, in relation to its roles both as both an employer and a service provider.

2.2   Oversight of the requirements as an employer fell within the remit of the People and Standards Committee. The service delivery element should continue to be reported into PRC. It was necessary for the PRC to be able to demonstrate awareness and oversight of how the various statutory duties were being met and in particular that in delivering policing services victims and offenders were being treated fairly. Work was ongoing with respect to identifying EDHR data around victims and offenders and there was a need to address gaps in the data.

3.   Q1 Performance Report

3.1   At the end of quarter 1, BTP was not yet achieving any of the 7 National Policing Plan targets, and was achieving 10 out of 32 Sub-Divisional targets.

3.2   The PRC received an overview of performance in quarter 1. Notifiable crime had increased by 10% compared to the same period last year

however it was noted that there was still a low risk of crime, with 14 crimes per million passenger journeys in 2015/16.

3.3 The main crime increases were around violence against the person, sexual offences and shoplifting. There had been a reduction in thefts of cable and plant equipment; Op Drum, which was part of the Force's 90 day plan to tackle cable theft, had contributed to this reduction. There had also been a reduction in cycle theft; Ops Lock and Wiggins had resulted in engagement with the public, and the handing out of bike locks where appropriate, with the aim of preventing cycle thefts. Also highlighted were Op Shepherd and Op Vanguard, which involved late night patrols to prevent anti-social behaviour around stations.

3.4 There was, in quarter 1, a 5% increase in police-related lost minutes, compared to the same period last year. There was a 1% reduction in primary lost minutes. Reactionary delay, however, was up by 9% and continued to be a challenge.

3.5 It was highlighted that as the number of lifesaving interventions had increased there had been a reduction in the number of suicides. As part of Op Avert, officers were patrolling at high risk locations and the Force felt they were making some positive interventions.

3.6 The committee received an overview of the spread of delay caused by a complex fatality in B Division East. The delay minutes initially had most effect on the more local routes, but the impact of the reactionary delay quickly spread across the country and persisted long after the initial incident had been resolved. BTP had the ability to quickly respond across the country. It was suggested that an animation showing the spread of delay and subsequent effects on the rail network would be a useful tool when communicating with the industry. It was suggested that it would be useful to present this to the full Authority, and then with stakeholders and some of the media.

3.7 The passenger confidence rating, of 76.55%, had fallen compared to the results of the previous National Rail Passenger Survey (NRPS), which showed a 78.71% rating. It was noted that this reduction had also been seen for many of the other confidence factors so this result was consistent with an overall downturn in passenger satisfaction.

3.8 There was a discussion about the potential indexing of performance data. The Force had started to do this; it was reporting on crimes per million passenger journeys and had started to normalise the disruption data. Members recognised that there needed to be a discussion within the wider Authority about how it wanted its data presented.

3.9 There was a discussion about the reporting of BTP's planned operational activity in order to meet the Policing Plan targets. It was

noted that the Authority approved the 2016/17 Policing Plan on the basis that the PRC was presented with an action plan outlining activities to achieve the targets by this meeting, and that a plan through to March was required. The PRC was informed that a detailed plan to quarter 1 had been reported to the previous PRC meeting, however, this was to be followed up outside of the meeting.

3.10 There was a discussion around how strategic changes to the railways were being considered by the Force and Authority. It was queried whether a strategic risk review was required. It was suggested that the changes could be considered as part of the Governance Review

4. Diversity and Inclusion update

4.1 Members noted that there had been an increase in recorded hate crime. The Force had launched a national hate crime campaign in 2014-15; this was the first such campaign launched by BTP for several years and could have resulted in an increase in confidence in the reporting of these offences. Most of the increase in recorded hate crime was driven by racial hate crime offences; there had also been an increase in reported transgender hate crime.

4.2 National Police Chiefs Council (NPCC) had reported that since the EU referendum there had been a 57% increase in recorded hate crime, but this was not matched by BTP's figures, which had shown a 14% rise over the same period. It was not yet possible to identify if there had been an increase in offences linked to recent events in Orlando.

4.3 BTP had been very visible at London Pride and the Force was using every opportunity to promote its work around improving confidence with respect to hate crime. Since the new Mayor of London, Sadiq Khan, had been elected, the Mayor's office had provided a lot of input around hate crime and BTP had been communicating with them

5. Report on data quality

5.1 The PRC was informed that BTP was one of the leading Forces with respect to compliance with the National Crime Recording Standards (NCRS). There was an issue around the identification and recording of repeat and vulnerable victims, but the overall standard of BTP's crime recording was good and improving.

5.2 Internally the Force was struggling around the reporting of crime data at a local level. This was around the accurate allocation of crimes locally then aggregating crime reports up to station level; however, one further fix was required to correct this. Issues had been encountered with the Train Operating Company (TOC) crime reports

for the same reasons, but this had temporarily been rectified by producing reports manually.

5.3 The Committee was informed that the Force was working with the BTPA Executive with respect to the accuracy of TOC allocations and that there was confidence that the checking and correcting of crime records would be completed as soon as possible.

5.4 It was reported that stop and search data was a key part of the Best Use of Stop and Search Scheme (BUSSS). There had, however, been some Niche related issues around the reporting of this data and there was a backlog in recording. Out of 1,800 records, there was a backlog of 33; this would be completed by Friday 22 July. Officers were capturing the data but there had been some IT related technical issues in order to get these records onto Force systems which would be corrected; the Force planned to update the Police.uk website by the week commencing 25 July.

6. Operational deployment – Trafalgar overview and impact

6.1 The PRC received a presentation on Op Trafalgar and its impact. It was highlighted that, prior to Op Trafalgar, patrol assets would be briefed prior to their patrol and they would then self-determine where they would then go; Op Trafalgar replaced this with an evidence based core patrol strategy.

6.2 The Committee noted that there had been a mixed reception about Op Trafalgar at the Rail Delivery Group. Some felt that it was too focussed on retail crime others were more supportive and had started to influence the patrols locally. As an example BTP had an analyst funded by South West Trains, who were adopting Op Trafalgar for their rail staff on revenue protection duties and there were also opportunities for BTP and operator staff to deploy alongside each other using the model.

6.3 It was highlighted that although retail crime had informed hotspots in some locations, this was not the case everywhere. For example at Birmingham New Street station, 3 out of 10 hotspots were for retail crime. Where there were short-term spikes in crime or anti-social behaviour it was expected that, while some officers would be tasked to Op Trafalgar, some would be tasked in response to these spikes when needed.

6.4 The PRC was informed that Op Trafalgar had moved on from its initial approach as a simple crime reduction strategy, and had become a complete patrol strategy. The Force wanted officers to be inquisitive of what is going on around them and there was a balance to be struck between officers using their own judgement and Op

Trafalgar patrol. Officers were increasingly able to feed back into the process if they felt that patrolling a location was not adding value.

6.5 Following the implementation of Op Trafalgar at Birmingham New Street there had been an increase in calls for service but crime was down. At Leicester there was support from East Midlands Trains staff, and there had been a substantial reduction in crime. The top crime reductions at Leicester included public order and cycle offences, and were not solely focussed on shoplifting.

6.6 Members were supportive of the evidence based approach, but noted that there still seemed to be work to do to gain the confidence and buy-in of some officers. While they understood the science behind Op Trafalgar, officers now needed to see the results of it in order to give it their complete support.

7. Recommendations

7.1 Members to note the content of this report.