

Strategic Risk Register

Audit and Compliance Strategic Development Department 29 February 2016

Publication History

Date	Version	Author	Changes
February 2016	Version 1.0	Risk Management Coordinator	Initial publication
February 2016	Version 1.1	Head of Audit & Compliance	Update
February 2016	Version 1.2	Chief Constable's Office	Update

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Appendix 1 – The Risk Assessment Process

1. Introduction and Background


Risk assessment is a capability which underpins the work of the British Transport Police. The assessment of risk contained in the Strategic Risk Register lays the foundation for the development of work to prevent, mitigate respond to and recover from the recorded risks.

The British Transport Police Strategic Risk Register is made publically available to assist stakeholders and the travelling public in understanding the significant challengers currently facing the British Transport Police.


Just because a risk is included in the Strategic Risk Register does not mean that it will happen, or that the impact would necessarily be as serious as the description provided. However, British Transport Police base our response, through planning on "reasonable worst case scenarios", informed by historical and scientific data, modelling and professional expert judgement of both the likelihood and impact of a risk on the register.

Each risk is assigned a score for impact and likelihood. Impact is ranked from Limited (1) to Catastrophic (4) and likelihood by how likely it is to happen in the next five years. There two scores are combined to give an overall risk rating.

The British Transport Police Strategic Risk Register is designed to provide a summary of the current position for the main risks affecting the Force. British Transport Police operate a system of risks registers for Divisions and Sub-Divisions and Portfolios and Headquarters Departments.



2. British Transport Police Strategic Risk Register – High Level Summary



3. Navigating the Strategic Risk Register

The British Transport Police Strategic Risk Register currently contains 13 strategic risks.

Each risk is assigned a unique Risk ID which relates to a more detailed and prtectively marked, Individual Risk Assessment held on the British Transport Police 4Risk system.

Risk Ref	Risk Owner and Last Update	Cause & Effect	Inherent Risk Priority	Risk Control	Residual Risk Priority	Action Required

4. Strategic Risk Register – Risks

Risk Ref	Risk Owner and Last Update	Cause & Effect	Inherent Risk Priority	Risk Control	Residual Risk Priority	Action Required
SR79 CC1	Risk Owner: Paul Crowther, Chief Constable Last updated 4 February 2016	The Smith Report recommendation suggested that the functions of BTP in Scotland should be devolved. The planned incorporation of BTP Scotland into Police Scotland poses an existential threat to BTP. In addition there is also likely to be a financial impact on HQ functions with a loss of the income from Scotland which would impact on the organisations ability to continue to provide the level	I = 4 L = 3 High (12)	Since the retirement of ACC McCall this risk has now been transferred to the Chief Constable. Engagement continues with all interested parties in the Scottish Government. It is expected that there will be limited movement until the Bill is finally enacted.	I = 3 L = 2 Moderate (6)	Monitor progress of Scotland Bill Chief Constable's Office to June 2016
SR83 CR 16	Risk Owner: Christopher Horton, Superintendent Delegated Risk Owner: John Steel, Project Manager Last Updated: 23 February 2016	Governance Requirements in relation to the Integrated System Programme delays delivery of the Core Elements of ISP. These stem from Cabinet Office stipulations that all tender activity is signed off by Cabinet Office at every step.	i = 3 L = 4 High (12)	Outline business case approved by Cabinet Office Oversight of ISP by SIB via Highlight Report Governance documentation in place for the project includes: PID, Communication Plan, Control Plan, RAID log, SIB Highlight report, Decision logs, Financial Log. Implementation of the Crime and Intelligence modules of ISP on 24 February 2016	I = 3 L = 2 Moderate (6)	Deliver Go Live for Crime and Intelligence System – John Steel, 24 February 2016 Deliver go live for Case and Custody John Steel, 05 April 2016 Deliver Go Live for Command and Control John Steel 31 July 2016

Risk Ref	Risk Owner and Last Update	Cause & Effect	Inherent Risk Priority	Risk Control	Residual Risk Priority	Action Required
SR85 CR 19	Risk Owner: Christopher Horton, Superintendent Delegated Risk Owner: John Steel, Project Manager Last Updated: 23 February 2016	Inability to satisfy governance requirements of DfT and Cabinet Office results in a failure to deliver a mobile platform to support policing in line with the Strategic objectives	I = 3 L = 3 High (9)	Governance Documentation on Pandora Approval of Business Case at SIB and by BTPA. Business Case for Mobile Solution – Discovery Stage approval from Cabinet Office received Project Team in Place	I = 3 L = 3 High (9)	To Complete discovery phase of Mobile Solution. To seek authorisation to continue into the Alpha phase John Steel, 31 March
SR88 CR 21	Risk Owner: Christopher Horton, Superintendent Delegated Risk Owner: John Steel, Project Manager Last Updated: 23 February 2016	Governance Requirements in relation to the Integrated System Programme delays delivery of the constituent Command and Control projects. These stem from Cabinet Office stipulations that all tender activity is signed off by Cabinet Office at every step	I = 4 L = 3 High (12)	Governance documentation in place for the project includes: PID, Communication Plan, Control Plan, RAID Log, SIB Highlight Report, Decision Logs, Financial Log Oversight of ISP by SIB via Highlight Report Timetabled action plan for implementation of components of Niche to July 2016. Business case approved by Cabinet Office	I = 3 L = 3 High (9)	Gain authorisation for the Events Management module from BTPA John Steel 31 March 2016 Deliver Command and Control elements of Niche and handover to Business as usual John Steel 31 July 2016 Implement constituent modules of ISP including Crime, Intelligence and Case and Custody modules John Steel 30 June 2016

Risk Ref	Risk Owner and Last Update	Cause & Effect	Inherent Risk Priority	Risk Control	Residual Risk Priority	Action Required
SR91 CR 22	Risk Owner: Nick Sedgemore Director of Intelligence Delegated Risk Owner: Michael Tagg, Detective Constable Last Updated: 23 Feb 2016	The parent company, ABM, has ceased trading. They are going to leave the computer system working for 18 months. There will be no ability to update. This system holds some of the most sensitive information in the Force and needs to be replaced.	I = 3 L = 3 High (9)	Supplier has given 18 months-notice of cessation of trading	I = 3 L = 3 High (9)	Develop an options paper setting out alternative platforms to support Force requirements in the event that Niche cannot support Michael Tagg 30 June 2016 Identify the extent to which the Niche suite of applications can support the same functions as the Pegasus suite. Michael Tagg 30 June 2016
SR76 DCR 4	Risk Owner: Simon Downey Director of Corporate Resources Delegated Risk Owner: Benjamin Dawson, Staff Officer Last Updated: 26 Jan 2016	It remains uncertain as to whether DfT will agree to sponsor BTP's adoption of the replacement for Airwave which is due to be implemented in 2017. Failure to resolve this will result in significant unbudgeted costs and potential lack of service delivery.	l = 3 L = 3 High (9)	Risk escalated to BTPA Strategic Risk Register	I = 3 L = 3 High (9)	BTP awaiting the outcome of a submission to DfT by BTPA.
SR82 DCR 5	Risk Owner: Simon Downey Delegated Risk Owner: Benjamin Dawson Last Updated: 04 Feb 2016	BTP has embarked upon an ambitious Transformation programme, the scope of which encompasses the whole of BTP. This brings with it the risk of failure, whether in whole or in part.	I = 3 L = 4 High (12)	Transformation Risk Log held on Pandora Oversight of projects in Transformation programme at Service Improvement Board. Project milestones laid out in the Critical Milestones and Dependencies map. Appointment of two new Interim Directors to cover Finance and Procurement, and People and Development, respectively.	I = 3 L = 3 High (9)	Risk entry retained for monitoring purposes

Risk Ref	Risk Owner and Last Update	Cause & Effect	Inherent Risk Priority	Risk Control	Residual Risk Priority	Action Required
SR87 EB 10	Risk Owner: William Jordan Superintendent, CCTV Last Updated: 23 Feb 2016	Network Rail may not provide funding for Phase V of the CCTV project.	l = 4 L = 3 High (12)	Bid for funding by Network Rail Contingency plan to bid for funding from capital programme in the event that Network Rail fail to fund CCTV	I = 3 L = 3 High (9)	Liaise with Network Rail to maximise level of funding available for CCTV Will Jordan by 31March 2016
SR86 FP 5	Risk Owner: Francesca Annetta, Head of Finance Last Updated: 23 Feb 2015	Failure to resolve issues highlighted in the external Finance Review results in losses to error or fraud	l = 4 L = 3 High (12)	Prioritised List of Controls for immediate action DFT Governance Board chaired by the Director of Corporate Resources DfT and BTPA oversight of progress against the remedial action plan in line with DfT governance arrangements	l = 4 L = 3 High (12)	Provide updated version of Finance Review Action plan Francesca Annetta by 31 March 2016
SR81 HS 4	Risk Owner: Nisa Carey Head of Wellbeing Last Updated: 23 Feb 2015	An internal review if H&S arrangements across BTP identified a number of areas of weakness. Failure to resolve these within a reasonable timeframe increases the chance of a serious incident or legal action against BTP	i = 3 L = 4 High (12)	Health and Safety Policy in place and available to all staff via Intranet Central Health and Safety Committee supported by Divisional Arrangements A full detailed register of identified Health and Safety risks held within the Wellbeing department including buildings and people risks Programme of fire risk assessments completed Team of Senior Health and Safety Advisors. 3 Senior H&S advisors and 1 OH Delivery manager Conversion of all generic risk assessments to template assessments to be signed off by local risk owners (OIC Level) A Strategic Plan to deliver better H&S has been agreed with FEB.	I = 3 L = 3 High (9)	Deliver 2015-16 Health and Safety Strategy and report progress to Central Health and Safety Committee. Nisa Carey by 31 March 2016 Agree and Deliver 2015-16 Health and Wellbeing Strategy Nisa Carey by 31 March 2016 Establish arrangements to implement a programme of internal audit to measure and drive improved compliance with the Wellbeing Strategy. Nisa Carey by 31 March 2016

Risk Ref	Risk Owner and Last Update	Cause & Effect	Inherent Risk Priority	Risk Control	Residual Risk Priority	Action Required
SR84 IM 9	Risk Owner: Helen Edwards Head of Information Management Last Updated: 23 Feb 2016	Lack of MoPI Compliance results in a breach of DPA or a failure to identify police records which should be linked. This results from a combination of how archiving was done historically, by physical records or electronic records on systems which can't be linked. There is also the issue of electronic systems which have inconsistent filing conventions.	I = 3 L = 2 Moderate (6)	Oversight of data migration issues by Data Migration Group DfT Approval for ISP Business Case Data quality standards established following the principle of the Golden Nominal Operation Canberra to address issue of retention and review of physical records with MOPI guidelines Project subject to oversight by SIB	I = 3 L = 2 Moderat e (6)	Establish post-Operation Canberra Review, Retention and Disposal protocols, Helen Edwards by 30 June 2016 Establish MoPI compliance reviews Helen Edwards by 31 March 2016 Establish Data Quality team in line with the requirements of MoPI following the completion of NICHE go live and the end of Operation Canberra Helen Edwards by 30 June 2016 Implement Niche (MoPI Compliant Information System) as part of Integrated Systems Programme Chris Horton by 31 July 2016
SR41 IS 1	Risk Owner: Kieran Murphy, Head of Technology Last Updated: 23 Feb 2016	Failure of the back-up site for force applications (disaster recovery) impacts upon BTP's ability to deliver a policing service in the event of the loss of the server room at BTP FHQ. Failure of applications critical to policing would directly impact on the delivery of policing the rail network across England, Wales and Scotland. Failure of Disaster Recovery arrangements to function in crisis.	I = 4 L = 2 Moderate (8)	Access to the server room is strictly controlled with arrangements in place to protect against thermal cut- outs, fire and interruptions to the power supply. Hot DR arrangements have been developed for the most critical systems and cold arrangements for less important systems. These are supported by an on- going programme of testing. Hot DR arrangements have been developed for the most critical systems and warm and cold arrangements for less important systems. These are supported by a programme of on-going testing. As of 20 November these were: Critical systems: ICCS, Airwave, Voice network, BT Network Hot systems: Command and Control, CJX, PNC Warm systems: FIS, Station Check, Firearms Airwave, Holmes 2, Origin, File Support	I = 3 L = 1 Low (3)	Review Technology support programme for DR for 2016-17 Scott Phillips by 31 March 2016

Risk Ref	Risk Owner and Last Update	Cause & Effect	Inherent Risk Priority	Risk Control	Residual Risk Priority	Action Required
SR70 IS 17	Risk Owner: Tim Saunders, IT Programme Manager Last Updated: 23 Feb 2016	The Gap Analysis to understand work required to achieve PSNP accreditation is underway. This work will set the "as is" IT Landscape and determine work required on that landscape to achieve accreditation if BTP choose to undertake substantial modifications to the IT landscape during accreditation assessment this may jeopardise successful accreditation.	I = 3 L = 3 High (9)	Order form for the replacement for the CJX completed. Acceptance of Code of Connection application subject to the agreement of a residual risk plan It has been agreed that all Business cases be referred to the PSNP project before presentation at SIB to determine potential impact on PSNP accreditation.	I = 2 L = 2 Moderat e (4)	Complete changeover to PSN Tim Saunders 31 March 2016
SR89 IS 22	Risk Owner: Tim Saunders, IT Programme Manager	Significant uncertainty about the forthcoming replacement for the Airwave emergency services network results in an inability to manage the impact on BTP in terms of cost and service coverage	I = 3 L = 4 High (12)	Home Office leadership of the ESMCP BTP Appointment of an Internal Project Lead	I = 3 L = 4 High (12)	Develop an Outline Business Case for Revenue costs attached to delivery of ESMCP Monitor developments within the Home Office ESMCP programme to ensure early identification of risks and issues which could affect BTP Tim Saunders by 31 December 2016
SR90 IS 23	Risk Owner: Kieran Murphy, Head of Technology Last Updated: 23 Feb 2016	BTP has disputed payment milestones with its supplier in relation to the Virtual Desktop Initiative. Until this is resolved there is the possibility that the supplier contests the dispute and is awarded all of the relevant costs.	I = 2 L = 3 Moderate (6)	BTP are seeking independent legal review of the disputed payment milestones to the supplier BTP have proceeded with alternative methods, after re-timetabling the project, to ensure delivery by end of calendar year	I = 2 L = 3 Moderate (6)	Outcome of legal review. Manage contact with the supplier following the raising of a dispute on payment milestones Matthew Hyde by 31 May 2016


Risk Ref	Risk Owner and Last Update	Cause & Effect	Inherent Risk Priority	Risk Control	Residual Risk Priority	Action Required
SPMH 1 and 2	Risk Owner: Mark Smith Head of Suicide Prevention and Mental Health Last Updated: 23 Feb 2016	Withdrawal of external funding for SPMH teams results in the undermining of BTP service provision regarding suicide prevention and mental health. This could ultimately lead to an increase in suicidal activity and related disruption, loss of public confidence and reputational damage for the force.	I = 3 L = 3 High (9)	LUL and NHS England have agreed funding for 2015/16 and we are currently working on the MoU and other arrangements to facilitate the funding.	I = 2 L = 2 Moderate (4)	Confirm details of 2016-17 funding for SPMH team Mark Smith by 31 March 2016
SR92	Risk Owner: Paul Crowther, Chief Constable Last Updated: 29 Feb 2016	Failure to recruit a third Assistant Chief Constable detrimentally impacts on the Chief Officer Group's capacity to manage performance, manage risk, exercise financial controls and ensure strong organisational governance. This would lead to limited senior stakeholder management capability and a reduced capacity for critical decision making around bomb threat and suspicious items, complex fatalities and critical incidents. The long term resilience and wellbeing of the current Chief Officer Group would be threatened.	I = 3 L = 4 High (12)	Responsibilities and duties will continue to be absorbed by current Chief Officer Group however this is unsustainable in the long term due to the impact on operational performance and welfare of members of the Chief Officer Group.	I = 3 L = 4 High (12)	Discussion at full BTPA meeting on 22 March 2016 following Appointments and Remuneration Committee on 24 February 2016.

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5. Risks Not Applicable and Removed

Appendix A

The Risk Assessment Process



Impact and Likelihood scoring scales

Li	kelihood of ris	sk happening in the next 3 year period or lifetime of the Project
1	Remote	Unlikely to happen within 3 years under normal circumstances, or requires a specific and unlikely chain of events to occur to happen
		For Project risks, Unlikely to happen within the project lifetime under normal circumstances
2	Possible	Could happen within 3 years under normal circumstances, or will happen within this timeframe unless specific action is taken to counter it For Project risks, Could happen within the project lifetime under normal circumstances
3	Probable	Is likely to happen within 3 years under normal circumstances, or will happen within a year unless specific action is taken to counter it For Project Risks, Is likely to happen within the project lifetime under normal circumstances
4	Probable and Imminent	Is likely to happen within a year under normal circumstances or will happen within the next six months unless specific action is taken to prevent it
		For Project risks, is almost certain to happen within the project lifetime

Im	pact Scores	for Identified Risks		
			Performance	
	Safety	Reputation	and Service	Financial
		Minor localised specific Area	Minimal threat to achieving key objectives, Or	
1	Minor injury	damage caused by adverse	slight concerns over Service level in a specific	budget incurred
		local press coverage	Area	or loss of funds to that amount
2	Serious injury	Major localised specific Area but short term damage	UI	Costs of 5-10% of department / Area / Project budget incurred or loss funds to that
-		caused by adverse local press coverage	drop in Service level within an Area	amount.
3	Single fatality	Major short -term damage caused by adverse National press coverage	Stakenoiders while or minute their concern	Costs of 10-25% of department / Area/ Project budget incurred or loss of funds to that amount.
4	Multiple fatalities	Major damage to reputation cause by sustained adverse national coverage. Possible Resignations	Fail to achieve several key objectives, Or Formal written notification to the Chief Constable of grave concern by stakeholders.	Costs of £5M or more incurred or loss of funds to that amount

Likelihood and Impact ratings are combined to give an overall risk rating which will be between 1 for improbable low impact risks and 16 for almost unavoidable high impact events

Risk Matrix with Criticality Scores (1 to 16): Score = Probability x Impact

	Impact →	Minor 1	Moderate 2	Significant 3	Major 4
	Remote	1	2	3	4
←Prob ⁶	Possible 2	2	4	6	8
←Probability →	Probable 3	3	6	9	12
	Probable and Imminent 4	4	8	12	16

High risk9-16Medium Risk4 -8Low risk1-3 of

9-16 criticality score

k 4 -8 criticality score 1-3 criticality score



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