Assessment Report

Governance Review

British Transport Police Authority
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Document Control

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Objective and scope

To review the BTPA systems in place for governing BTP and the BTP systems in place for internal governance to enable the Accounting Officer and Treasurer to discharge their legal and statutory duties, and make appropriate recommendations for their improvement.

The review should consider the following:

1. Ensuring the systems take account of and are consistent with the statutory requirements of the Authority and Force

2. Ensuring these reflect the national scale and significant business operations of the Force and Authority

3. Identifying whether the system of governance in place ensures appropriate direction and oversight of statutory responsibilities and are in line with best practice for a public sector and policing organisation of this size

4. Reviewing the management and reporting of information to ensure that the BTPA has full and complete access to the necessary objective evidence for assurance and decision making

Additionally the review should:

5. Identify areas of duplication, and make recommendations to clarify roles and responsibilities and on where efficiencies can be made

6. Consider whether relevant individuals responsible for internal governance have the necessary skills to fully discharge all aspects of their governance responsibilities in an effective and appropriate manner

7. Review the systems in place for ensuring that the Authority has adequate oversight of the BTP's management of its officers and staff, and the organisation's culture and values, and has the ability to provide an appropriate challenge to the BTP on these issues

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Context - relationships

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
Summary of findings

To review the BTPA systems in place for governing BTP and the BTP systems in place for internal governance to enable the Accounting Officer and Treasurer to discharge their legal and statutory duties, and make appropriate recommendations for their improvement.

The Authority and Force take into account relevant statutory requirements, but the governance systems could be strengthened to systematically ensure they continue to do so.

The governance systems reflect the national scale and business operations of the Force and initiatives are underway to strengthen internal controls and make better use of technology. However, we have concerns whether (a) factors external to the Force are systematically scanned for and anticipated, (b) Force personnel have bought into and are ready for the pace/scale of the changes and (c) opportunities for collaboration are systematically explored and considered.

The policing activities of the Force are in line with practices adopted by Home Office forces. The Authority falls short when compared against Board/Committee Effectiveness best practice. Both the Authority and the Force fall short on risk management, project/programme management and financial reporting best practice.

The management and reporting of information needs to improve. The mistrust over data appears to have created a vicious circle of seeking more data that challenges the Force to collate and turn is too dense to be easily understood.

There are opportunities to reduce the burden of reviews undertaken by the Force and make them more effective. The Code of Governance will need to be updated to reflect the demarcation between the BTPA Treasurer and BTP FD should the role become permanent.

People have appropriate skills relating to internal governance but there are questions over capacity and experience.

Although a defined set of values are being embedded across the Force, the Authority does not appear to be being measuring their impact.

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Consideration 1

Consideration: Ensuring the systems take account of and are consistent with the statutory requirements of the Authority and Force.

Conclusion: The Authority and Force take into account relevant statutory requirements, but the governance systems could be strengthened to systematically ensure they continue to do so.

Findings

- A Framework Document forms the agreement between the Secretary of State and the Authority regarding how the Authority will operate. A Code of Governance defines how the Authority intends to comply with the statutory duties in the Railways and Transport Safety Act 2003 (The Act) and the Framework Document. There is a letter of delegation describing how the Chief Constable delegates his authority.

- A Business Manager in the Authority executive 'horizon scans' emerging legislation/guidance and advises relevant committees where changes to policies of the Authority and Force may need to be considered.

- The activities of the Authority are generally consistent with the intent in the Framework Document and Code of Governance (e.g. composition/activity of committees, budget setting, annual report, accounting officer responsibilities, triennial review). However, the committees could be more disciplined and more focused on risk (See Consideration 3).

- The Strategy is fixed for five years, whereas the Framework Document requires a rolling three year Strategy. A change to funding assumptions (RPI to Zero) without a corresponding change to Strategy may indicate lack of challenge regarding use of resources. 3 years of 5 year strategy currently remain.

- There isn't a common view regarding the decision-making of the Authority in relation to the Operational Independence of the Force (although it is reflected in the Code of Governance).

- A review of the Code of Governance is overdue as are several of the policies.

Recommendations (for the Authority unless otherwise stated)

- Ensure the Framework Document, Code of Governance and associated policies are reviewed and updated regularly. Ensure the Code of Governance references the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 for areas that supersede the 2003 Act.

- Develop and agree guidelines regarding the governance boundaries relating to operational independence using the Policing Protocol as a reference point (The Act: S.24). Ensure members, the executive and COG are fully aware of the guidelines.

- Be explicit about the resources being applied to achieve the outcomes sought in the strategy, annual plan and the Strategic Policing Requirement (The Act: S.50 and S.52[2]).

- Obtain agreement to have a five-year strategy or ensure the approach is consistent with a 3-year rolling strategy.

- Hold regular formal reviews of whether the strategy should change in response to external factors (The Act: S.55). Establish mechanism to remit governmental risks affecting strategy to DfT.

- Ensure the reports from the Chief Constable are focused on the main threats, risks and harms that the Force should be addressing (The Act: S.56).

- Consider how Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary could be commissioned to inspect areas of highest risk for the Force and include this as part of the annual Audit Plan (The Act: S.63)

- DfT to consider appointing two new members (to provide headroom on minimum numbers)

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Consideration 2

Consideration: Ensuring these {systems} reflect the national scale and significant business operations of the Force and Authority

Conclusion: The governance systems reflect the national scale and business operations and initiatives are underway to strengthen internal controls and make better use of technology. However, we have concerns whether (a) factors external to the Force are systematically scanned for and anticipated, (b) Force personnel have bought into and are ready for the pace/scale of the changes and (c) opportunities for collaboration are systematically explored and considered.

Findings

- The Force is undergoing a transformation that has a centralising theme (eight divisions to three, Force-wide systems, Force-wide functions) which is consistent with other Home Office forces. However, the workforce is not fully bought-in to the change and fear their loss of autonomy will stifle locally led improvements and innovation. Furthermore, the Force is undergoing a demand profiling exercise to gain uniformity across the sub-divisions which is proposing to change the shift patterns of most personnel. We question the Force's ability to sustain the proposed scale of concurrent change.

- It is not evident that external factors affecting the national scale and business operations of the Force are systematically considered. E.g. we found little reference to reviews of the prospect of further devolution, Infrastructure Policing, the Bowe/Shaw review of NR etc. Of the fourteen risks in the Strategic Risk register only three are external risks.

- It is not evident the degree to which collaboration opportunities with other Forces or public service bodies have been considered as a means to strengthen or make more efficient the Force's business operations.

- The level of delegation to the Chief Constable is greater than that of comparator organisations (when adjusted for scale).

Recommendations

- Introduce a rigorous approach to environmental scanning by the Authority and the Force for threats and opportunities and embed this in the governance systems.

- The Authority should satisfy itself that current external factors have been sufficiently considered and are factored into the Strategy and Plans. For example:
    - Plans to deal with increased devolution (e.g. Smith review);
    - implications of national infrastructure policing proposals; and
    - the opportunities for efficiency and effectiveness that might be secured through greater operational and back-office collaboration (noting the possible need for assistance regarding VAT ruling).

- The Authority should satisfy itself that the scale and pace of change the Force is undergoing is achievable. Specifically
    - that the leaders at all levels/divisions in the Force understand and are committed to delivering the intended benefits; and
    - that the Force has the capability to implement the change

- Align the scheme of delegation to those adopted by comparable organisations (unless there is a justifiable reason to differ).

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Consideration 3

Consideration: Identifying whether the system of governance in place ensures appropriate direction and oversight of statutory responsibilities and are in line with <u>best practice</u> for a public sector and policing organisation of this size

Conclusion: The policing activities of the Force are in line with practices adopted by Home Office forces. The Authority falls short when compared against Board/Committee Effectiveness best practice. Both the Authority and the Force fall short on risk management, project/programme management and financial reporting best practice.

Findings

- Policing practice is generally in line with policing guidelines from the Home Office.
- The Board/Committee structure and member appointments are in line with other public service organisations of a similar scale (e.g. number of members, days per annum, number of committees etc). However, the Authority falls short on:
  - Regularly reviewing Board effectiveness
  - Inducting members and assessing/developing them (especially as the prescriptive nature of the Act means several members come from an executive rather than non-executive background)
  - Discipline regarding conduct of meetings (e.g. consistency of papers that clearly explain their purpose and intended response, consistency of minutes, consistency of recording and reviewing actions, missing minutes on website)
  - Balance between setting strategy and holding to account
- We found numerous risk registers in use across the Force and Authority, which lacked consistency and alignment. They do not align to the top 3 risks offered by each of the members during interviews or a report from the Chief Executive regarding key concerns. We did not find records/explanation of the basis for risk estimates (impact/likelihood). We did not find many instances of boards/committees having risk at the forefront of their review.
- Management reporting of financial information (consideration 4) does not align to CIMA guidelines on best practice.

Findings (continued)

- Project/programme management practice is improving (e.g. adoption of 5-cases model) but only at an individual project/programme level but there isn't a force-wide view of all the projects/programmes how they interact and how they collectively contribute to delivering the Strategy and objectives.

Recommendations

- Establish consistency of board/committee papers, minutes and action tracking. Be clear in meetings to confirm at the end of each debate what decision have been made or actions raised.
- Set out a timetable for board/member assessments and link development to their individual needs.
- Strengthen risk management by adopting Management of Risk (MoR) principles (or equivalent) as recommended by Managing Public Money. This starts with the Board defining its risk appetite and risk strategy. It needs to define DfT role in responding to remitted risks.
- Strengthen project/programme management by aiming for P3M3 level 3 maturity (or equivalent). The Force should consider enhancing the PMO to provide Portfolio Management capability and transform SIB from being an uber-Projects Board to a Portfolio Board with a focus on contribution to strategy and targets.
- Adopt CIMA guidelines on financial reporting

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Consideration 4

Consideration: Reviewing the management and reporting of information to ensure that the BTPA has full and complete access to the necessary objective evidence for assurance and decision making.

Conclusion: The management and reporting of information needs to improve. The mistrust over data appears to have created a vicious circle of seeking more data that challenges the Force to collate and turn is too dense to be easily understood.

Findings

- We did not observe data being re-cast other than for purposes of tailoring to its intended audience. Where this was done in consultation with or at the request of the audience feedback indicates it is improving assurance and decision-making (e.g. performance dashboard).

- We did not observe data being manipulated to mask performance. However, we noted that BTP finance reports are against adjusted budgets rather than baseline budgets, which can inadvertently mask performance. The use of crime data as the basis of the charging model does not appear to affect the recording of crime.

- BTPA exec/members receive data they request and there are cases where they attend Force boards to gain first hand confidence. However, they do not have direct access to the all the BTP systems and meetings (outside of the boards).

- The independent review of the charging model found it to be fundamentally sound provided the source data is accurate. Recommendations from the review are being implemented and there is general consensus that data recording is improving. The systems being implemented will help (e.g. Niche) so long as underlying behaviour continues to improve (e.g. hours being booked to a default code not used by the charging model)

- Board and Committee reports are sometimes too detailed/lengthy, too many in number, may differ in format from one review to the next, lack insight (e.g. trending analysis, comparison against baseline), are not provided sufficiently timely to enable reasonable review and contain too much jargon/abbreviations.

Recommendations

- Each committee should identify its information needs to enable it to fulfil its terms of reference. The committees should work with the Force to ensure the information is presented in a format and style appropriate for the audience (and as public records accessible by the public) and provide insight (e.g. trends, baselines). The information should also satisfy the members that the control environment for the source data is reliable. Reference to the CIMA standards for management reporting (Consideration 3) will help.

- Adopt a risk based approach to assurance to focus scrutiny on those areas requiring most attention. This would prioritise the activities of the Authority to assist them in securing an efficient and effective police force. The BTPA exec should be able to observe BTP meetings (in addition to the BTP Boards) as part of this risk based approach to assurance.

- The Force should continue the work on integrating the Force systems, which will in time reduce the degree of manual gathering and processing of data. Priority should be given to initiatives that automate and integrate data (e.g. Payroll and Finance integration). BTPA exec should have direct access to these systems.

- Formalise the approach to have an annual 3rd Party review of the Charging Model (model quality, data quality, alternatives) to improve confidence from the PSA holders. The Board should provide an audit trail of evaluating alternatives).

- Identify and establish a means for predictive analysis of impact from projects on PSA holders fees (cause-effect).

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Consideration 5

Consideration: Identify areas of duplication, and make recommendations to clarify roles and responsibilities and on where efficiencies can be made.

Conclusion: There are opportunities to reduce the burden of reviews undertaken by the Force and make them more effective. The Code of Governance will need to be updated to reflect the demarcation between the BTPA Treasurer and BTP FD.

Findings

- The number and nature of BTPA committees is in line with comparable organisations. The survey indicates that the members are clear what each committee is for. However, we observed occasions where committees to go 'off topic'. (see Consideration 3 re discipline).

- The number and nature of Force meetings appears excessive. We observed numerous cases of duplication across reviews, e.g. Finance Review, Programme Board and SIB all reviewing project finances and seeking assurances over year-end position. Some Force meetings are lengthy (all day) and attendees may be present for the whole meeting in cases where partial attendance would be adequate. Several of the Force boards are maintaining their own information set which is duplicating data (e.g. list of projects and their status).

- The Code of Governance provides clear demarcation between the role of the Chief Exec and Chief Constable, which is consistent with Government guidance. Both indicated the need to clarify the Accounting Officer responsibility (Appendix B).

- The Code of Governance provides clear demarcation between the role of the BTPA Finance Director (Treasurer) and the BTP Director of Capability and Resources and Head of Finance. It is clear in the code that when either are in attendance of BTP or BTPA meetings in what capacity they attend.

- The Force has appointed an interim FD with a view to appointing a permanent one. It is undecided whether this will become permanent, and if it does how it would relate to the Treasurer or whether it could be combined with the Treasurer role.

Recommendations

- Guidelines regarding Operational Independence (See Consideration 1) will help avoid areas of duplication between the exec and the Force leadership.

- We believe that efficiencies will come from improving the management information used by BTPA committees rather than changing the committee structure, therefore we do not recommend any changes to the current arrangements. Additionally, existing board/committees will benefit from having members with Technology and Policing/Security experience rather than having committees specific to Technology or Security.

- The Force should clarify the purpose and relationship of each of the Force boards, committees and reviews. In particular SIB should act as a Portfolio Board focusing on ensuring the suite of projects/programmes are able to deliver the Strategy and leave performance reviews to their respective project/programme boards (see Consideration 3 and 6).

- Update Code of Governance to include the demarcation between BTPA Treasurer and BTP Finance Director, should it become permanent.

- Review Additional Accounting Officer Memorandum in context of comparators for opportunities to improve clarity.

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Consideration 6

Consideration: Whether relevant individuals responsible for internal governance have the necessary skills to fully discharge all aspects of their governance responsibilities in an effective and appropriate manner.

Conclusion: People have appropriate skills relating to internal governance but there are questions over capacity/experience.

Findings

- The Chief Officers Group are experienced professionals both from a policing and leadership perspective. The Chief Constable has a Diploma in Company Direction and is seeking to gain Chartered Director status. However, until the appointment of the interim FD, COG did not have anyone with finance qualifications.

- Leadership training in progress which includes governance/control.

- There are concerns raised through interviews that too much "goes through" the Director of Capability and Resources, which raises questions regarding capacity to effectively discharge internal governance responsibilities (e.g. he owns 12 of the 14 strategic risks). This is compounded by the ACC vacancy.

- Force Headquarters includes a team dedicated to providing assurance reports to BTPA and DfT. The team seems appropriate in size and experience.

- The PMO comprises only 3 people and much of the internal controls relating to projects/programmes is 'work in progress'. The PMO only covers those projects/programmes that report to SIB (approx 30) and not those done within divisions or functions.

- Internal controls have increased over time in an additive (not integrated) way.

- Many of those responsible for leading large/complex programmes do not have equivalent experience of doing so outside the Force. They have appropriate qualifications but lack practical reference of what 'good governance' looks like.

- Risk management practice is weak and indicates a skills gap (Consideration 3).

Findings (continued)

- The BTPA exec feel they are lacking IT/Technology expertise in order to fulfil their governance duties.

- The inability to provide up to date HR data that aligns to Finance data indicates skills gaps remain relating to internal controls (as also noted by Frith)..

Recommendations

- The Force should continue with its leadership development initiative and extend it to include the leadership role in establishing and maintaining internal controls.

- The Force should make more use of the Chief Supers to ease the capacity concern. Consider giving them more exposure to BTPA committees.

- The Force should improve the skills of those leading major/complex projects and programmes. Consider broadening their experience though reference visits and participation in membership organisations such as the APM.

- The Force should increase the capacity and capability of the PMO and consider extending its remit to include all projects/programmes across the Force.

- The Force should identify and implement a streamlined end-to-end control process without duplication. A controls 'amnesty' would help identify the extent to the additive controls currently in place (See Consideration 5).

- The Authority should ensure the exec has access to IT/Technology expertise, whether through advisors or through additional role(s).

- The Force should ensure COG has finance expertise.

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Consideration 7

Consideration: Review the systems in place for ensuring that the Authority has adequate oversight of the BTP's management of its officers and staff, and the organisation's culture and values, and has the ability to provide an appropriate challenge to the BTP on these issues.

Conclusion: Although a defined set of values are being embedded across the Force, the Authority does not appear to be being measuring their impact.

Findings

- A lot of effort has been put into the development and ongoing embedment of the behaviours expected within the Force (VITAL). The survey responses indicate these are well understood and adopted. However, survey respondents and interviewees also indicated confusion as to how VITAL related to the values/behaviours defined in the Strategy and the Code of Ethics. VITAL is not (yet) being used as part of selection process for new recruits.

- Although there has been an employee survey, we did not find evidence of BTPA monitoring the embedment or effect of VITAL or the Code of Ethics.

- We observed that actions arising from Internal Audit reports are given sufficient prominence by the Force and their progress is monitored (e.g. overtime)

- We observed a good degree of challenge by members at board and committee meetings. However, we observed numerous instances of members accepting promises or confidence statements in response to challenges rather than requesting evidence to verify the statements (this also happens at Force level). There is a perception by BTPA that the Force attempts to placate rather than embrace challenge.

- Survey responses and interviews identified that middle/senior management feel the culture can be punitive. Several stated that the difficult targets made them feel like they were failing. Left unaddressed this could inhibit the adoption of the values being sought. Note, we did not observe punitive leadership behaviour.

Recommendations

- Regularly monitor and review the level of embedment and effect of VITAL and the Code of Ethics.

- The Force should continue to embed VITAL, but clarification and communication is needed regarding how it relates to policing standards, particularly the Code of Ethics.

- The Force should ensure that centralising functions does not inadvertently lead to centralising control (which is contrary to wish to increase empowerment).

- The Force should work with middle/senior management to address the root-cause of the unintended perception of a punitive culture.

- The Authority and the Force should assess impact of over-challenging targets and whether targets ought to be re-set.

- The Authority and the Force should establish the discipline of following up challenge with verification (See Consideration 3)

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SWOT

Strengths	Weaknesses
– Ambition – Burning platform accepted – Evidence-based culture in the Force – Capable individuals – Positive direction of travel – e.g. new systems – Delegation – getting things done – Risk aware (but not risk managers) – Facilitative role of Chief Exec and Authority personnel	– Volume of change and capability to deliver – Vacancies/recruitment delays – Strategy out of date – Additive internal controls has led to over-control – Manual processing of data – Risk and project management – Little verification of action progress - "promise" "confident" – Sector skill focused, not wider skills focused, e.g. risk management/ system thinking
Opportunities	**Threats**
– Infrastructure policing – take the lead – College of policing – exploit police leadership initiative – New technology, e.g.. Use of mobile data as a proxy for charging – Better use of BTP senior officers (empowerment) – Streamline committees and decision making bodies – Committee can procure expertise	– Infrastructure policing – be led – Funding pressures on PSA holders – Devolution – understanding timing and impact government initiatives – Devolution – addressing national v local variations, eg. Taser – A devolved NR could mean 9 customers instead of 1 – Nationally, an increase in crime and new types of crime – Having less than 11 members – Culture: negative feedback and over scrutiny/request for too information much could breed defensive actions by BTP

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Requests from Force personnel

We asked what each interviewee would do if they had a magic wand….

Streamline recruitment process.

COG to walk the talk. They don't follow the behaviours

Remove contradiction between approval process and getting things done

Streamline Governance
Less meetings
Fewer layers
Clarity of ToR
Clarity over information needs

X12 people

Portfolio view
Joined up approach
Business Cases aligned to strategy
A strategic PMO
Financial insight for decision-making not just reporting

Less central control
More local empowerment

X4 people

X6 people

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Summary of Key Recommendations

DfT

- Ensure the Framework Document reflects latest and upcoming legislation.
- Agree mechanism to respond to remitted governmental risks.
- Consider appointing two new members to reduce risk of being below the minimum and to expand the skill set of the Authority members (Technology and Policing).

Authority

- Ensure the Code of Governance and associated policies are reviewed and updated regularly. Include demarcation between Treasurer and FD (if permanent). Include agreement to vary from rolling 3 year strategy to a five year strategy.
- Be more rigorous with scanning external factors and ensure these are reflected in Strategic Risks. Review strategy given changing external factors and assumptions.
- Establish consistency of board/committee papers, minutes and action tracking. Use CIMA best practice to define information needs. Be clear in meetings to confirm at the end of each debate what decision have been made or actions raised. Establish discipline of following up challenge with verification.
- Set out a timetable for board/member assessments and link development to their individual needs.
- Regularly monitor and review the level of embedment and effect of VITAL and the Code of Ethics.

Force

- Work with middle/senior management to address the root-cause of the unintended perception of a punitive culture.
- Adopt CIMA guidelines on financial reporting
- Strengthen project/programme management by aiming for P3M3 level 3 maturity (or equivalent). The Force should consider enhancing the PMO to provide Portfolio Management capability and transform SIB from being an uber-Projects Board to a Portfolio Board with a focus on contribution to strategy and targets.
- Continue with its leadership development initiative and extend it to include the leadership role in establishing and maintaining internal controls.
- Hold a controls amnesty across the Force in order to identify a streamlined end-to-end control process without duplication.
- Continue to embed VITAL but care needs to be taken regarding how it relates to policing standards, particularly the Code of Ethics .

All

- Strengthen risk management by adopting Management of Risk (MoR) principles (or equivalent) as recommended by Managing Public Money. This starts with the Board defining its risk appetite and risk strategy. It needs to define DfT role in responding to remitted risks.
- Develop and agree guidelines on the governance boundaries regarding operational independence, using the Policing Protocol as a reference point.

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Appendix A - the assessment approach

- We used Outperform's ISO9001 accredited assessment approach.

- Note that for this assessment the *Briefing* and *Submitting* activities were excluded.

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Appendix B – Summary of Assessment Records

- We reviewed 250+ documents from DfT, BTPA and BTP
- We surveyed 138 personnel from BTP and 10 members of the BTPA
- We interviewed 49 people
- We observed 15 events

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Appendix C - BTPA Members Survey

Average by Theme

Note: Scores range from -3 (strongly disagree) to + 3 (strongly agree)

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Appendix C - BTPA Members Survey

Highest Scoring Responses

Question	Score highest to lowest
I understand my role in the board	2.7
The organisation's objectives are very much at the centre of what we do	2.3
All board members act in an open and honest manner	2.3
The Chair (past and present) Chief Exec and Chief Constable are passionate advocates for the organisation	2.2
Board/committee members are allowed and do challenge each other constructively	2.2
I understand my role on the committees I'm appointed to	2.2
Debate is allowed to flow and conclusions reached without being cut short or stifled due to inappropriate time constraints etc	2.1
As a board we are clear what the purpose of the board is	2.0
As a board we are clear what the purpose of each committee is	2.0
As a board member I feel able to say openly what I am thinking and feeling and express my doubts, uncertainties or lack of understanding of an issue.	2.0

**Note:** Scores range from -3 (strongly disagree) to + 3 (strongly agree)

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Appendix C - BTPA Members Survey

Lowest Scoring Responses

Question	Score lowest to highest
Sufficient team building and social time is planned in to allow an effective cohesive team to be formed at board level	-1.6
At the end of each board/committee meeting we discuss the outcomes and reflect back on decisions made and what worked well, not so well etc	-1.2
There is a formal annual appraisal of board effectiveness each year which takes into account my views, external views and is evidence based	-0.6
The Chair (past and present), Chief Exec and Chief Constable work effectively together and respect one another's roles	-0.3
The board has made a conscious decision regarding how operational it wants to be	-0.3
I believe that the balance between strategy and operational management is right	0.0
Time spent in meetings is appropriately split between strategic and operational matters	0.0
The board actively engages with staff to gain a clear understanding of their needs and concerns	0.0
The agenda is appropriate in relation to the balance of strategic and operational matters	0.1
Where performance is off track we are quick to respond and tightly performance manage the issue until back on track	0.1

**Note:** Scores range from -3 (strongly disagree) to + 3 (strongly agree)

Appendix D - BTP Force Survey

**Note:** Scores range from -3 (strongly disagree) to + 3 (strongly agree)

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Appendix D - BTP Force Survey

Note: Scores range from -3 (strongly disagree) to + 3 (strongly agree)

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Appendix D - BTP Force Survey

**Note:** Scores range from -3 (strongly disagree) to + 3 (strongly agree)

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Appendix D - BTP Force Survey

**Note:** Scores range from -3 (strongly disagree) to + 3 (strongly agree)

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Appendix D - BTP Force Survey

Note: Scores range from -3 (strongly disagree) to + 3 (strongly agree)

Appendix D - BTP Force Survey

Bottom 7	Myself	My peers	My manager	My staff
Acts on business opportunities and applies commercial expertise	2.20	1.38	1.97	0.97
Challenges the status quo to improve service delivery	2.22	1.68	2.00	1.45
Uses all problems as a learning opportunity, avoiding blame	2.27	1.53	2.04	2.01
Identifies risks and records analysis to aid decision-making	1.94	1.94	2.28	1.73
Exceeds stakeholder expectations	1.94	1.94	2.03	2.02
Identifies and acts on opportunities for innovation	2.39	1.68	2.09	1.79
Responds positively to challenge	1.97	1.97	2.28	2.03

Top 7	Myself	My peers	My manager	My staff
Actively listens to others point of view and considers what is said	2.59	2.16	2.36	2.32
Shows a commitment to continuous improvement	2.56	2.24	2.44	2.41
Champions the importance of people	2.68	2.20	2.44	2.46
Works with industry colleagues to resolve issues and minimise disruption to the railways	2.45	2.44	2.47	2.42
Promotes confidence in BTP and the police service, providing reliable and consistent quality of service	2.68	2.36	2.52	2.47
Demonstrates accountability for own actions	2.81	2.33	2.53	2.51
Treats everyone with respect and dignity	2.86	2.63	2.64	2.60

Note: Scores range from -3 (strongly disagree) to + 3 (strongly agree)

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Appendix E – Context: The role of DfT

- The Secretary of State for Transport has various powers defined in the Act
  - Appoint members
  - Approve appointments of senior officers and ex-gratia payments
  - Review BTPA performance
  - Intervene if necessary
- The Rail Executive (also known as the Sponsorship Team) is a small team, responsible for
  - Rail Strategy
  - BTPA sponsorship
  - ORR sponsorship
- Although BTPA/BTP is funded by industry, their accounts are consolidated into the DfT accounts. Therefore the Sponsorship team is responsible incorporating their returns.

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Appendix E – Context: The Authority

- 11 to 17 members, appointed by DfT. The composition of the members is prescribed in the Act.
- Chairman (new one just appointed)
- Full board meets 7 times a year
- Committees and working groups meet at varying frequencies
  - Finance Committee
  - Appointments and Remuneration
  - Audit & Risk
  - People & Standards Committee
  - Performance Committee
  - Policing Plan working group
  - Strategy & Planning working group
- 10-12 people in the executive team which comprises
  - Chief Exec (who is also the Accounting Officer)
  - Treasurer
  - Business Managers (for Policy, Strategy, HR)

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Appendix E – Context: The Force

- A Chief Constable (who is an additional Accounting Officer)

- A Deputy Chief Constable

- Three Assistant Chief Constables (ACCs), one being vacant

- Three Divisions (A, B, C) and Each Division has a Commander (Chief Super)

- There is a Director responsible for most non-policing functions (e.g. HR, IT etc)

- A new Interim Finance Director has just been appointed.

- There is a Letter of Delegation issued annually describing how the Chief Constable delegates his authority to BTP personnel and the governance/control arrangements associated with this delegation.

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Appendix F – Additional Analysis

1. Delegation comparators
2. Comparison of risks by source
3. Comparison with CIMA guidelines on financial reporting
4. Comparison with P3M3 maturity model for project management
5. Comparison with International Framework for Good Governance in the Public Sector
6. Survey/Interview comments linked to Considerations
7. Analysis of Operational Independence guidelines

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This engagement will be an advisory or consulting engagement, being one that employs a professional's technical skills, education, observations, experiences, and knowledge of the consulting process. This is an analytical process that typically involves some combination of activities relating to: objective-setting, fact-finding, definition of problems or opportunities, evaluation of alternatives, development of recommendations including actions, communication of results, and sometimes implementation and follow-up. It is agreed that our procedures will not constitute an audit or review as conducted in accordance with International Standards on Auditing (UK and Ireland) issued by the Financial Reporting Council or any other auditing standards, the objective of which would be the expression of assurance. Accordingly, we will not express such assurance. Our work will be based primarily on internal management information provided to us by the Client Party and will not constitute substantive or verification procedures (unless doing so is expressly included in the scope of our Services). It is acknowledged that if we were to perform additional procedures or perform an audit or review in accordance with generally accepted auditing or review standards, other matters may come to their attention that would be reported upon.

Only you can determine what is sufficient for its purposes and what areas our report is to cover and the extent of verification or other checking underlying them are adequate for your and we make no representations in this regard. The substance of our advice will depend, of course, upon the results of the above procedures.

Matters specifically excluded

For the avoidance of doubt we accept no responsibility for the following matters and we shall not report on them:

*   issues of law (including, without prejudice to the foregoing, validity and effectiveness of contracts, licences, title deeds including those for property, investments and stock, encumbrances, compliance with relevant laws and regulations and all matters relating to product liability);
*   the commercial or technical merit of the products or services of the Client Party or on the market for it, other than as covered above. You will obtain recent third party information to substantiate these matters;
*   any regulatory or environmental exposures of the Client Party upon which we are reporting or the adequacy of the systems for identifying and/or controlling such exposures;
*   the appropriateness or sufficiency of the Client Party's insurance arrangements;
*   specialist industry advice;
*   current market values of property and stock;
*   the arithmetical accuracy and integrity of any financial models underlying projections.

You should consider obtaining expert advice in relation to these areas.

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