



BRITISH
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POLICE

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Strategic Risk Register

Audit and Compliance
Strategic Development Department
24 November 2015

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Publication History

Date	Version	Author	Changes
November 2015	Version 1.0	Risk Management Coordinator	Initial publication
November	Version 2.0	Risk Management Coordinator	Register updated following review by DCC Hanstock and Integrity and Compliance Board

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Appendix 1 – The Risk Assessment Process

1. Introduction and Background

Risk assessment is a capability which underpins the work of the British Transport Police. The assessment of risk contained in the Strategic Risk Register lays the foundation for the development of work to prevent, mitigate respond to and recover from the recorded risks.

The British Transport Police Strategic Risk Register is made publically available to assist stakeholders and the travelling public in understanding the significant challengers currently facing the British Transport Police.

Just because a risk is included in the Strategic Risk Register does not mean that it will happen, or that the impact would necessarily be as serious as the description provided. However, British Transport Police base our response, through planning on “reasonable worst case scenarios”, informed by historical and scientific data, modelling and professional expert judgement of both the likelihood and impact of a risk on the register.

Each risk is assigned a score for impact and likelihood. Impact is ranked from Limited (1) to Catastrophic (4) and likelihood by how likely it is to happen in the next five years. There two scores are combined to give an overall risk rating.

The British Transport Police Strategic Risk Register is designed to provide a summary of the current position for the main risks affecting the Force. British Transport Police operate a system of risks registers for Divisions and Sub-Divisions and Portfolios and Headquarters Departments.




2. British Transport Police Strategic Risk Register – High Level Summary

IMPACT	SR87 – Loss of Funding from Network Rail for CCTV	SR86 – Finance Review	
		SR88 – ISP – Command and Control	SR80 - Funding for Suicide Prevention and Mental Health Team
		SR76 - Funding for Airwave Replacement - Escalated to BTPA	SR89 – Management of ESMCP Programme
		SR81 - Ability to Address Health and Safety Weaknesses	
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		SR84 - Management of Police Information	
	SR70 - Failure to Deliver PSN-P Compliance	SR41 - Disaster Recovery	
LIKELIHOOD			

3. Navigating the Strategic Risk Register

The British Transport Police Strategic Risk Register currently contains 13 strategic risks.

Each risk is assigned a unique Risk ID which relates to a more detailed and protectively marked, Individual Risk Assessment held on the British Transport Police 4Risk system.



4. Strategic Risk Register – Risks

SR Ref:	Risk Sub-Category (Lead Assessor)	Outcome Description/ Additional Details	Likelihood	Impact	Controls in Place	Last Review
			Risk Rating			Next Review
Risk to external funding of SPMH teams						
SR80	ACC Crime	<p>Withdrawal of external funding for SPMH teams results in the undermining of BTP service provision regarding suicide prevention and mental health. This could ultimately lead to an increase in suicidal activity and related disruption, loss of public confidence and reputational damage for the force.</p> <p>The full value of funding for the SPMH identified in the bid for funding through the MTFP is £703,000. If withdrawn, funding could be lost in April 2016.</p>	4	3	<p>For B Division LUL and NHS England have agreed funding for 2015/16 and we are currently working on the MoU and other arrangements to facilitate the funding.</p> <p>For C Division Funding has been agreed with Network Rail for 2015-16.</p> <p>A submission for SPMH team costs to be included in the Medium-Term Financial Plan is being considered as part of the annual budget process</p>	16 November 2015 Mark Smith, Head of Suicide Prevention and Mental Health
			12 High			November/December 2015 A bid for inclusion of SPMH costs to be included in the Medium Term Financial Plan has been submitted to Finance. Funding for the team has not yet been agreed, and the submission will be subject to a prioritisation exercise against other submissions.
Integrated System Programme – Core Elements						
SR83	ACC Crime	Governance Requirements in relation to the Integrated System Programme delays delivery of the Core Elements of the Integrated System Programme.	2	3	<p>Initial business case approved by Cabinet Office Oversight of ISP by SIB via Highlight Report Governance documentation in place for the project includes: PID, Communication Plan, Control Plan, RAID log, SIB Highlight report, Decision logs, Financial Log.</p>	24 November 2015,
			6 Moderate			Monthly via SIB meetings. The highlight report for SIB on 10 November shows the ISP project as being split into two modules; Core and Command and Control. The status of these are green and red respectively. Following review, DCC

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SR Ref:	Risk Sub-Category (Lead Assessor)	Outcome Description/ Additional Details	Likelihood	Impact	Controls in Place	Last Review
			Risk Rating			Next Review
					Timetabled action plan for implementation of components of Niche to July 2016 with the first elements (Crime and Intel) due to go live on 18 December.	<p>Hanstock has requested the structure of the Strategic Risk associated with this project mirror that of the modules and there be two Strategic Risk entries on the SRR. Cf – SR88</p> <p>The Crime and Intel parts of the system are due to go live on 18 December</p>
Integrated System Programme – Command and Control Elements						
SR88	ACC Crime	Governance Requirements in relation to the Integrated System Programme delays delivery of the constituent projects. These stem from Cabinet Office stipulations that all tender activity is signed off by Cabinet Office at every step. The	3	4	<p>Initial business case approved by Cabinet Office Oversight of ISP by SIB via Highlight Report</p> <p>Governance documentation in place for the project includes: PID, Communication Plan, Control Plan, RAID log, SIB Highlight report, Decision logs, Financial Log.</p> <p>Timetabled action plan for implementation of components of Niche to July 2016</p>	N/A
			12 High			<p>Following review of the SRR entry relating to ISP and the splitting of the project into two modules for SIB reporting. DCC Hanstock requested that a separate risk entry be created for the Command and Control elements of the ISP project. The control elements identified for SR 83 remain in place and further assurance that the project remains on plan and budget has been requested by DCC.</p> <p>The Project team note that an independent review by DCC is to take place imminently.</p>

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SR Ref:	Risk Sub-Category (Lead Assessor)	Outcome Description/ Additional Details	Likelihood	Impact	Controls in Place	Last Review
			Risk Rating			Next Review
Delivery of Mobile Solution						
SR85	ACC Crime	Inability to satisfy governance requirements of DfT and Cabinet Office results in a failure to deliver a mobile platform to support policing in line with the Strategic objectives.	3	3	Approval of Business Case at SIB, BTPA and DfT Governance Documentation on Pandora Project Team in Place	21 November 2015, ACC Newton tbc December 2015. Progress of the Mobile Policing platform is dependent upon Cabinet Office approval of the business case. Once gained, the key concern will be the ability to source and purchase devices in line with the budget and time scale identified in the project.
Devolution of Responsibility for Policing the Railway in Scotland						
SR79	Chief Constable	The Smith Report recommendation suggested that the functions of BTP in Scotland should be devolved. The planned incorporation of BTP Scotland into Police Scotland poses an existential threat to BTP. In addition there is also likely to be a financial impact on HQ functions with a loss of the income from Scotland which would impact on the organisations ability to continue to provide the level of service currently experienced.	3	2	The BTP working group submitted a options paper outlining the three methods by which devolution of the BTP functions in Scotland could be best achieved. The Chief Constable has a programme of meetings with the Cabinet Secretary for Justice in Scotland on a quarterly basis.	24 November 2015 Chief Constable February 2016 No substantial progress expected until the Scotland Bill has completed its passage through Parliament. DCC has requested that a clear narrative setting out BTP's position be established. In addition, DCC is to meet the Transport Minister, Derek McKay on 8 December.

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SR Ref:	Risk Sub-Category (Lead Assessor)	Outcome Description/ Additional Details	Likelihood	Impact	Controls in Place	Last Review
			Risk Rating			Next Review
Funding for Airwave Replacement						
SR76	Director of Corporate Resources	Lack of Departmental support for Airwave Replacement results in unbudgeted costs	3	3	Risk escalated to BTPA Strategic Risk Register	This risk is on the BTPA Strategic Risk Register. An update on progress has been requested.
			9 High			
Management of the Emergency Services Mobile Communications Project						
SR89	Director of Corporate Resources	Significant uncertainty about the forthcoming replacement for the Airwave emergency services network results in an inability to manage the impact on BTP in terms of cost and service coverage	4	3	Home Office leadership of the ESMCP BTP appointment of an internal project lead	This is a new risk entry following review of the SRR by DCC Hanstock. The replacement of Airwave is due to be delivered between 2017 and the end of 2019 with some parts of Great Britain switching to the new network before others. As a national service provider, there is the potential for BTP to have to operate on both the old and the new networks, whether that be with dual use devices or with area-specific devices. A particular cause for concern is London where the scope of the Home Office project does not extend to the underground tunnels of the TfL network.
			12 High			

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SR Ref:	Risk Sub-Category (Lead Assessor)	Outcome Description/ Additional Details	Likelihood	Impact	Controls in Place	Last Review
			Risk Rating			Next Review
Ability to Embed a Comprehensive Approach toward Health and Safety Compliance						
SR81	Director of Corporate Resources: Health and Wellbeing	A review of H&S arrangements across BTP identified a number of areas of weakness. Failure to resolve these within a reasonable timeframe increases the chance of a serious incident or legal action against BTP	3	3	<p>A full detailed register of identified Health and Safety risks held within Wellbeing department including building and people risks</p> <p>Central Health and Safety Committee supported by Divisional Arrangements</p> <p>Health and Safety Policy in place and available to all staff via the Intranet</p> <p>A Team of Senior Health and Safety Advisors: 3 Senior H&S advisors and 1 OH Delivery manager</p> <p>A Strategic Plan to deliver better H&S has been agreed with FEB.</p> <p>Programme of Fire Risk Assessments completed.</p> <p>All generic risk assessments have been converted to template assessments and are in the process of being signed off by local risk</p>	<p>23 November 2015: Nisa Carey, Head of Safety and Wellbeing</p> <p>Following the completion of Fire Risk Assessments for all premises, phase two of the Health and Safety strategy will focus on establishment of the arrangements to implement a programme of internal audits to measure and drive compliance with the strategy.</p> <p>The Wellbeing strategy is due to be published in December 2015. This will include specific provision for dealing with staff suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder, work-related stress, sickness absence and other health and wellbeing initiatives.</p>

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SR Ref:	Risk Sub-Category (Lead Assessor)	Outcome Description/ Additional Details	Likelihood	Impact	Controls in Place	Last Review
			Risk Rating			Next Review
					owners	
Management of Police Information						
SR84	Director of Corporate Resources: Information Management	<p>Lack of MoPI Compliance results in a breach of DPA or a failure to identify police records which should be linked.</p> <p>This results from a combination of how archiving was done historically, by physical records or electronic records on systems which can't be linked. There is also the issue of electronic systems which have inconsistent filing conventions. The difficulties this entails also result in higher storage costs than are necessary</p>	3	2	<p>DfT Approval for ISP Business Case and Project Plan to implement Niche</p> <p>Project subject to oversight by SIB</p> <p>Oversight of data migration issues by Data Migration Group</p> <p>Operation Canberra to address issue of retention and review of physical records within MoPI guidelines</p>	<p>24 November 2015: Helen Edwards, Information Manager</p> <p>23 November 2015 BTP was required to review its compliance with Approved Policing Practice with respect to Information Management. To achieve this, the IM team carried out a self-assessment to identify areas of compliance and areas for improvement which has resulted in the formation of a draft APP action plan.</p> <p>Pending agreement, the key aspects of this plan will result in the renewal of existing Information Management policies and renewal of the existing Information Management strategy as well as build on the implementation of the ISP project which is the subject of two other Strategic Risk entries.</p>

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SR Ref:	Risk Sub-Category (Lead Assessor)	Outcome Description/ Additional Details	Likelihood	Impact	Controls in Place	Last Review
			Risk Rating			Next Review
Disaster Recovery						
SR41	Director of Corporate Resources: Technology	Failure of the back-up site for force applications (disaster recovery) impacts upon BTP's ability to deliver a policing service in the event of the loss of the server room at BTP FHQ.	1	3	Access to the server room is strictly controlled with arrangements in place to protect against thermal cut-outs, fire and interruptions to the power supply.	5 November 2015: Kieran Murphy, Head of Technology
		Failure of applications critical to policing would directly impact on the delivery of policing the rail network across England, Wales and Scotland. Failure of Disaster Recovery arrangements to function in the event of a server outage would likely incur further significant costs.	3 Low		Hot DR arrangements have been developed for the most critical systems and warm and cold arrangements for less important systems. These are supported by a programme of testing. As of 20 November these are: Critical systems: ICCS, Airwave, Voice network, BT Network Hot systems: Command and Control, CJX, PNC Warm systems: FIS, Station Check, Firearms Airwave, Holmes 2, Origin, File Support	Monitored as business as usual

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SR Ref:	Risk Sub-Category (Lead Assessor)	Outcome Description/ Additional Details	Likelihood	Impact	Controls in Place	Last Review
			Risk Rating			Next Review
Failure to Deliver PSN-P Compliance						
SR70	Director of Corporate Resources: Technology	Failure to gain PSN-P accreditation leads to a denial of access to the PSN-P when it becomes available.	1	2	Code of Connection application to National Accreditor was accepted subject to the agreement of a residual risk plan. The threat of disconnection has also been lifted.	5 November 2015 David Willoughby, Embedded PMO, Technology
		(Following accreditation, this risk is awaiting closure dependent on the establishment of the connection to the PSN-P)	2 Low			Monthly by SIB. Closure of risk pending the connection to PSN-P which is expected within the next two months as most police forces are competing for the opportunity to connect.
Scope of Transformation Programme						
SR82	Director of Corporate Resources: Transformation	BTP has embarked upon an ambitious Transformation programme, the scope of which encompasses the whole of BTP.	3	3	Oversight of projects in the 4 strands of the Transformation programme at Service Improvement Board. Project milestones laid out in the Critical Milestones and Dependencies map. Transformation Working Group established to monitor and direct progress of Transformation programme	20 November 2015: Risk entry reviewed by ICB
		This brings with it the risk of failure, whether in whole or in part due both to the complexity of the plan, and due to the potential impact of the Spending Review by Central Government.	9 High			30 November: Changes to risk entry to be approved by Director of Corporate Resources

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SR Ref:	Risk Sub-Category (Lead Assessor)	Outcome Description/ Additional Details	Likelihood	Impact	Controls in Place	Last Review
			Risk Rating			Next Review
Finance Review						
SR86	Director of Corporate Resources: Finance	Failure to resolve issues highlighted in the external Finance Review results in losses to error or fraud	3	4	Project support from Portfolio Management Office Recovery Plan in place with a prioritised list of controls for immediate action DfT and BTPA oversight of remedial plan which is being updated weekly in line with DfT governance arrangements DfT Governance Board chaired by the Director of Corporate Resources	4 November 2015, Francesca Annetta, Head of Finance
			12 High			Reporting of progress through December 2015 to DfT Governance Board
Loss of Network Rail Funding for CCTV						
SR87	ACC Crime: CCTV	Network Rail may not provide funding for Phase V of the CCTV project.	3	3	Bid for funding by Network Rail Contingency plan to bid for funding from capital programme in the event that Network Rail fail to fund CCTV	12 November 2015 Risk reviewed by SIB Capital Board and decision made not to consider funding until Network Rail have made their decision
			9 High			The next review of this risk is expected in December, when Network Rail should have made their decision on funding


5. Risks Not Applicable and Removed

The risk of withdrawal by a Train Operating Company from Enhanced Police Service Agreements (EPSAs) has been removed from the SRR at the direction of the DCC as representing business as usual.

The risk of failing to gain PSN-P accreditation due to a failure to deliver the Virtual Desktop Initiative has been removed from the register following the achievement of accreditation.

Appendix A

The Risk Assessment Process



Impact and Likelihood scoring scales

Likelihood of risk happening in the next 3 year period or lifetime of the Project		
1	Remote	Unlikely to happen within 3 years under normal circumstances, or requires a specific and unlikely chain of events to occur to happen For Project risks, Unlikely to happen within the project lifetime under normal circumstances
2	Possible	Could happen within 3 years under normal circumstances, or will happen within this timeframe unless specific action is taken to counter it For Project risks, Could happen within the project lifetime under normal circumstances
3	Probable	Is likely to happen within 3 years under normal circumstances, or will happen within a year unless specific action is taken to counter it For Project Risks, Is likely to happen within the project lifetime under normal circumstances
4	Probable and Imminent	Is likely to happen within a year under normal circumstances or will happen within the next six months unless specific action is taken to prevent it For Project risks, is almost certain to happen within the project lifetime

Impact Scores for Identified Risks				
	Safety	Reputation	Performance and Service	Financial
1	Minor injury	Minor localised specific Area damage caused by adverse local press coverage	Minimal threat to achieving key objectives, Or slight concerns over Service level in a specific Area	Cost of 5% of department / Area / Project budget incurred or loss of funds to that amount
2	Serious injury	Major localised specific Area but short term damage caused by adverse local press coverage	Significant threat to achieving key objectives, Or Stakeholders express concern at a specific drop in Service level within an Area	Costs of 5-10% of department / Area / Project budget incurred or loss funds to that amount.
3	Single fatality	Major short -term damage caused by adverse National press coverage	Fail to achieve a key objective, Or Stakeholders write or minute their concern over significant drop in service level in several Divisions or Portfolios	Costs of 10-25% of department / Area/ Project budget incurred or loss of funds to that amount.
4	Multiple fatalities	Major damage to reputation cause by sustained adverse national coverage. Possible Resignations	Fail to achieve several key objectives, Or Formal written notification to the Chief Constable of grave concern by stakeholders.	Costs of £5M or more incurred or loss of funds to that amount

Likelihood and Impact ratings are combined to give an overall risk rating which will be between 1 for improbable low impact risks and 16 for almost unavoidable high impact events

Risk Matrix with Criticality Scores (1 to 16): Score = Probability x Impact

←Probability ↑	Probable and Imminent 4	4	8	12	16
	Probable 3	3	6	9	12
	Possible 2	2	4	6	8
	Remote 1	1	2	3	4
	Impact →	Minor 1	Moderate 2	Significant 3	Major 4

High risk 9-16 criticality score
 Medium Risk 4 -8 criticality score
 Low risk 1-3 criticality score



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