



Report to: Audit Committee
Agenda item: 8
Date: 26 September 2012
Subject: HMIC Inspection Reports
Sponsor: Deputy Chief Constable
For: Information

1. PURPOSE OF PAPER

- 1.1 To provide Audit Committee with an update in relation to Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary's (HMIC) Anti-Social Behaviour (ASB) inspection, Police Integrity 'Without Fear or Favour' revisit and Crime Recording in Scotland.

2. INSPECTION STATUS REPORT

2.1 Anti-Social Behaviour (ASB)

- 2.1.1 The inspection took place in April 2012 and featured a number of elements to the inspection including pre-inspection documentation; interviews with key staff; sampling / listening to calls at the Force Control Room Birmingham; victim survey together with announced / unannounced reality testing.
- 2.1.2 BTP received the draft detailed feedback report from HMIC for a factual accuracy check on 16 June 2012. The final report was received in August 2012 and is attached as Appendix A. BTP has developed an improvement plan, attached as Appendix B, progress against which will be monitored through the Integrity and Compliance Board.
- 2.1.3 HMIC highlighted the following positive activities that BTP undertakes in relation to ASB:
- Call takers were found to be polite, empathetic and victim focused.
 - There were a number of good examples in relation to effective partnerships that address local ASB issues.
 - Neighbourhood Policing Teams (NPT) staff are knowledgeable about their Area, passionate about what they do and committed to providing a high quality service to their communities.



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- Abstraction target rate for NPT officers of no less than 80% is being achieved.
 - National intelligence model is being used consistently to manage ASB performance with good evidence of analysis of relevant ASB data and that it consistently features in tasking and briefing.
 - Good examples of problem solving plans being used; displaying a clear approach with other agencies and passenger focus groups.
- 2.1.4 The main issue relates to the identification of repeat and vulnerable callers and HMIC highlighted the following:
- There is no consistent questioning at the first point of contact to identify repeat and vulnerable callers and the routine and systematic identification of these individuals.
 - There is no risk assessment framework for ASB within BTP which means the level of risk is currently unknown.
 - Where ASB cases are closed on NSPIS there is confusion between the categories of personal, environmental and nuisance.
- 2.1.5 It should be noted, as detailed in the improvement plan at Appendix B, that BTP had already identified the issues in relation to repeat and vulnerable callers. Training has been provided for staff within the First Contact Centre and Force Control Rooms London and Birmingham; a proforma has been added to the NSPIS Command and Control system, whereby call handlers ask questions to ascertain whether a person is a repeat or vulnerable victim. Refresher / follow-up training for supervisors is planned for 17 and 18 October 2012.
- 2.1.6 It is expected that HMIC will re-visit BTP in relation to ASB, although this is yet to be confirmed.
- 2.2 **HMIC Re-visit – Without Fear of Favour**
- 2.2.1 HMIC undertook a re-inspection of BTP in relation to the Police Integrity Review on 5 July 2012. The original inspection took place in August 2011 with the findings published in the HMIC national report 'Without Fear or Favour' in December 2011.



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- 2.2.2 The re-inspection mirrored the full inspection, but focused on assessing the progress made against the main recommendations and 23 sub recommendations from the national report. A copy of this improvement plan can be found at Appendix C. The improvement plan has been updated since the revisit and is monitored on a quarterly basis by the Integrity and Compliance Board.
 - 2.2.3 The format of the re-inspection was a documentation request for both BTP and BTPA, an integrity questionnaire, interviews with key staff and two reality check focus groups.
 - 2.2.4 BTP received brief written feedback, which is attached at Appendix D. This highlighted the progress made since 2011, including the establishment of the Integrity and Compliance Board to progress integrity issues; the review of policies and revised position guidance in relation to gifts and hospitality, media and secondary employment; and the organisation-wide threat assessment and the development of a Strategic Risk Assessment and Control Strategy by PSD.
 - 2.2.5 HMIC is preparing a national report of the findings from all forces which is due for publication in October 2012. The findings from this national report will be amalgamated into the current improvement plan once it is published for monitoring.

2.3 Crime Recording in Scotland

- 2.3.1 The Scottish Audit was undertaken in September 2011, with all Scottish forces auditing their own data. The sample size was taken from one day's data for all forces, with the exception of BTP which audits the data for a week. It should be noted that BTP is the only force that records non-notifiable crime.
- 2.3.2 The information from the audit is as detailed in the table below. The failures amounted to six incidents giving a performance rating of 91% under Test 1 and 98% under Test 2.



Test 1: Has an incident been recorded correctly under Scottish Crime Recording Standards	60 of the 66 logs examined were assessed as being compliant with Scottish Crime Recording Standards (SCRS) giving a compliance rating of 91%. Six logs were assessed as being non compliant with SCRS. The failures consisted of: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• 1 x only addressed part of the allegation and did not address drunkenness and abusive behaviour.• 1 x unclear whether a crime of damage or minor damage (byelaw)• 1 x unclear if threats were made on the railway• 2 x not crimed when they should have been with the unco-operative victim marker been applied in respect of threats and breach of the peace• 1 x over-recording of damage which should have been a Byelaw
Test 2: Is the classification correct	34 incidents which migrated to Test 2 resulted in 41 crimes being raised with all except 1 being correctly recorded giving a compliance rating of 98%. The one failure was reclassified on audit from a damage to a theft

2.3.3 The issues identified in the table above relate to the correct classification of an incident. To ensure compliance with SCRS, Scotland has employed a new Crime Management Unit manager who checks every record for compliance. Additionally, BTP has employed a crime auditor in Birmingham to assist control room staff in the correct closure of messages, who has been in post since April 2012.

2.3.4 The next Scottish audit will take place in October 2012 and will consist of one week's worth of data, but it is expected that BTP will provide one month's data to get a reasonable sample size.

3. RECOMMENDATION

3.1 That members note the update provided in this paper and direct the Performance Review Group to monitor progress against the improvement plans.

Integrity Re-inspection 2012 - Force Feedback

Force: BTP

Date of Inspection: 5 July 2012

Overview – Progress since the last inspection

Since the 2011 inspection visit, BTP has established an Integrity and Compliance Board to progress integrity issues, chaired by the DCC, with Force representation from the heads of PSD, Procurement and HR.

Gifts and Hospitality now have a 'reviewing process' by PSD with 'receivers' having to seek prior approval before acceptance and email through to PSD within 24 hours. BTP is checking the Gifts and Hospitality register against tenders and prospective tenders.

The recently approved ACPO guidance for gifts and hospitality, media and secondary employment is being implemented as policy across the Force.

The Force does have the ability to scan the media and social media for leaks however this needs to be more proactively led by PSD. BTP is drastically reducing its procurement cards from 381 to approx 20. This process is already underway and 38 had been removed at the time of the inspection.

Since the last review PSD has conducted an organisation-wide threat assessment and developed a PSD Strategic Threat Assessment and Control Strategy. The Force has identified areas of risk and has also implemented a 'scored' risk matrix for individuals to allow for a tasking and co-ordination process to be established. The area of proactivity is the greatest change seen since the last PIR and BTP has a well structured and supported Counter Corruption Unit.

Workstream Specific Feedback -

1. Governance and Oversight

- The new Integrity and Compliance Board (ICB), chaired by the DCC, has heads of department representation from Procurement, HR and PSD. This provides a clear accountability structure to manage Force integrity/relationship issues.
- The ICB manages the 'Without Fear or Favour' action plan and reviews all reports from each of the included departments which have all assessed integrity and risk areas within their departments.
- The DCC sits on both the BTPA audit committee and PSD committee. BTP has adopted, as best practice, the PSNI meeting structure - five boards including the ICB. These boards compile exception reports which report up to the executive board for action. This allows risk to be evaluated through the board structure with continuity of the DCC overseeing all department reports.
- BTP has completed a review of all policies and has prioritised policies using the PIR key elements. Standard Operating Procedures and policies have been re-issued as 'position statements'. Social media and Gifts and Hospitality have been amended into this format and emailed out from the PSD intelligence unit to all staff.
- BTP is purposely embedding professionalism and integrity into business as usual. The Force is changing the organisation culture by marketing PSD as a supporting role to help officers and staff as opposed to a challenging department. PSD want to 'drive good behaviour' rather than 'tackle bad behaviour'. Focus groups had seen PSD emails around a wide range of integrity issues along with constant messaging from the Chief Constable on intranet screen savers and briefings. There is an individual performance monitoring system managed by PSD graded A, B or C which requires a line manager response to inform management action/complaints reduction plans. This is enforcing the culture change.

2. Relationships with the media and others

- The Media policy has been refreshed and sent to all staff following the release of ACPO guidance. There is greater focus on media in BTP as the Chief Constable is ACPO lead for media.
- Focus groups knew that media guidance was available and mentioned the use of holding statements attached to incident logs for the attention of operational officers.
- Staff were aware of email advice and screen saver guidance to assist learning. Staff are encouraged to engage directly with the media and will consult for guidance from the press department.
- Two central press officers monitor newspaper and social network sites daily using software. Both national and local media are checked. There have been no media leaks found since the last PIR.

3. Information disclosure

- New guidance has been circulated to all staff to reinforce what is and is not acceptable via emails and intranet. This makes the use of social media for both personal and work use a lot clearer to all staff.
- The Trufflenet review evidenced a positive awareness programme was in place. Out of 443 analysed profiles visible to the public, eight profiles identified themselves as working for BTP, none had any photos relating to the Police, one profile had police related comments and none had any comments that would be construed as inappropriate conduct.
- The ICB has instructed PSD to ensure they can 'drill' into all IT systems and integrity test/ dip sample to proactively check for leaks. PND has been assessed as a particular risk area and this has been prioritised by PSD.
- Currently PSD is unable, through systems audit, to complete real time monitoring of key strokes. Current software 'vigilance pro' is crashing systems. It can currently target individuals and PSD is concentrating resources on high risk areas, i.e. PND and individuals identified as at risk. The software is being reviewed.
- The Area Intelligence Bureaux currently monitor all social media to identify intelligence, crimes and victims and examples were given where social media leaks have been discovered since the last PIR. PSD could utilise this capability in a more proactive manner by working with the intelligence units to identify leaks, specifically notifying the intelligence units to be aware following any high profile or sensitive incidents involving BTP.
- All FOI requests are referred to the media department to provide background and allow contextual information to be fed back to the requester.
- Staff believed there was significant monitoring of staff using social media by PSD and were aware of incidents of misdemeanour through 'lessons learned' published by PSD.
- Staff highlighted confusion in guidance surrounding LinkedIn which they stated is often utilised by senior management. This seemed to fall outside guidance around Facebook/Twitter whereby officers clearly outline their professional qualifications and the fact that they are police officers on the site. Although LinkedIn is a professional networking site, not a social networking site, users can link it to their Facebook profiles.

4. Gifts and Hospitality

- New guidance has been issued on Gifts and Hospitality (G&H) and presumes no acceptance of G&H. This has gone out to all staff as a 'position statement'. If G&H is accepted then guidance states the G&H must always be appropriately supervised prior to acceptance.
- Suppliers have been informed by BTP that the Force does not accept any G&H. Letters have been sent out to those contractors who are repeatedly offering G&H to reinforce that BTP does not accept them. The BTP internet procurement portal clearly states this.
- Staff have not received any formal training but had all received emails from PSD. Staff were aware of the new guidance and understood that declining was the default position, however they still mentioned a threshold of £15 which is not in any of the new

guidance. All were aware of the requirement to record G&H even if declined and were happy that light refreshments during the course of duty was acceptable, which indicates boundaries established.

- There were no G&H shown as being accepted from any media since the last PIR.

Previously departments were 'relaxed' in the completing of the register and entries were updated and authorised retrospectively upon request of PSD on a quarterly basis. The new procedure states that G&H must be recorded locally within 24 hours and the accompanying email to be despatched to PSD at the same time, displaying the authority.

5. Procurement and contracts

- The new policy has been re-issued for procurement guidance and reinforced with the 'no purchase order- no pay' message.
- BTP is currently removing procurement cards from holders having identified the amount held as too many and an area of risk through the ICB. This was identified as a priority at the ICB and an action to reduce cards to two cards per area or department with named individuals was issued. This will lead to approximately 95% reduction across the Force. Senior officers will be given credit cards for expenses to separate personal spend from other procurement.
- A covert account monitoring group has been set up which the head of PSD chairs. This group will scrutinise spend on a quarterly basis by dip sample to check the validity of claims. ICB facilitates oversight and monitoring of procurement and expenses. Reports are now produced to the ICB displaying trends and areas of concern.
- Procurement is tightly controlled; for example the DCC does not have procurement authority. Procurement authority and requisition are completely separated so effectively need 'two keys'.
- Due to awareness and close scrutiny there has been a noticeable reduction in 'retrospective' ordering resulting in a 70% reduction.
- Since the last PIR a cross-reference examination of G&H entries against prospective tenders and current suppliers has been completed by Procurement and PSD.
- A new manual of guidance has gone out to all staff involved in finance containing simple guides and best practice. The Chief Constable has sent out delegation letters to all budget holders and senior managers and training is completed for all procurement officers and budget holders.

6. Additional employment

- No new policy or guidance has been re-issued and this still remains a point of confusion to staff. However BTP is in the process of compiling new guidance.
- A review of the register has been completed by HR and this has resulted in several entries being removed as they are no longer current.
- A handover of the ownership of the procedure is being made from HR to PSD in August. The current procedure of area commanders

being final arbiter is changing and the new process will have the application going to PSD as final arbiter to ensure a corporate approach. This ensures that advice given by PSD is now adhered to whilst previously it was not always being fed back before application was granted.

- Posters have been displayed about private associations.
- BTPA has different guidance as clearly many have other jobs. There is strict adherence to informing the Chair or CEO of any employment or association that may cause a conflict of interest in any area of business and examples were given of declarations.

7. Proactivity

- Since the last review PSD has conducted an organisation-wide threat assessment and developed a PSD Strategic Threat Assessment and Control Strategy.
- BTP has enhanced the Counter Corruption Unit with two additional DCs and recruited an experienced DI from the MPS Counter Corruption command and no cuts are being made. This has the full support of ACPO and BTPA.
- PSD has its own intelligence systems. The confidential reporting line is actively used and recently re-launched. Examples were given of action against reporting.
- A new PSD head has been in post since November which has enhanced capability and has uncovered corruption issues previously not dealt with. OCG mapping methodology has been introduced into the PSD.
- The PSD analyst integrates the OCG mapping 'risk scoring' process into the counter corruption environment. Individuals are triggered to enter this process if any of the following apply: complaints and misconduct amount to two or more in previous 12 months or appearing in top 12 complained of officers within the service, intelligence reports indicate an issue, UPP, inappropriate associations, unmanageable debt or meeting/hearing outcomes. These scores equate to category A high, B medium and C low. Each category has an action plan from the lowest category C- to try and 'rehabilitate' the individual to category A - covert operation. A (mini) T&CG meeting is held comprising of the head of PSD as chair, DCI PSD, organisational learning and head of HR.
- Staff had seen emails and intranet messages circulated by PSD. Occasionally PSD provide input at training days and attend briefings for large operations. Most operational orders will contain reference to integrity issues around standards of behaviour. There is belief by frontline staff that there was significant proactivity by PSD in respect of officers that had come to light regarding potential corruption allegations.
- All contractors go through rigid vetting. Outsourced workers are not included in emails etc, however if intelligence came in that they were suspected of information disclosure or being unprofessional they would have the same resources allocated to deal with them as a BTP staff member.

NATIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS

HMIC Without Fear or Favour

SCT Portfolio Owner: Deputy Chief Constable

Improvement Plan Owner: D/Supt Alistair Lawson

Ref	Recommendation	Due Date	Action Owner	Progress Update	Date of Update
RECOMMENDATIONS FROM NATIONAL REPORT					
1	<p>Forces and authorities institute robust systems to ensure risks arising from relationships, information disclosure, gratuities, hospitality, contracting and secondary employment are identified, monitored and managed.</p> <p>(They should ideally do so on the basis of national standards and expectations – there are no geographical variables when it comes to integrity and there should not be local differences in standards. This work on national standards should be encouraged by the Home Office and promoted by leaders in the Service locally).</p>	31-Aug-12	Head of PSD / Head of SDD	<p>BTP has existing policies concerning:-</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Reporting of Inappropriate and Compromising Associations - Force Information Security - Gifts and Hospitalities - Counter Corruption and Fraud - Business Interest and Secondary Employment - Procurement <p>BTP has reviewed these policies taking account of the recently published ACPO guidance to reduce risks identified in the report, which will ensure clear boundaries and thresholds. Separately BTP is currently undertaking a systematic review of all policies and SOPs. In the interim position statements and employee guidance has been issued throughout BTP in relation to Gifts & Hospitality and Social Media: Personal Use by Officers and Staff.</p> <p>In addition to this BTP is undertaking a review of all intelligence gathering tools focussing on improvement of open and closed sources. Two reports have been submitted, in June and July 2012, in relation to electronic business monitoring systems - Current Software and Potential Solutions. Systems testing is being undertaken to assess the fitness for purpose of current software in relation to PSD requirements with the outcome scheduled for 31 October 2012.</p> <p>BTP has introduced an Integrity and Compliance Board, which meets monthly and is chaired by the Dep identified.</p>	06-Sep-12
2	<p>There should be clear boundaries and thresholds in relation to these matters. Such limits should be consistent and Service wide.</p> <p>(This in effect means identifying a clear message for staff on these issues as to what is acceptable, what is unacceptable and what areas of vulnerability to avoid. ACPO should lead this work in partnership with staff associations and those involved in police governance).</p>		Head of PSD / Head of Media & Marketing	<p>BTP has existing policies concerning:-</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Reporting of Inappropriate and Compromising Associations - Force Information Security - Gifts and Hospitalities - Counter Corruption and Fraud - Business Interest and Secondary Employment - Procurement <p>BTP has reviewed these policies taking account of the recently published ACPO guidance to reduce risks identified in the report, which will ensure clear boundaries and thresholds. Separately BTP is currently undertaking a systematic revision and review of all policies and SOPs, which will be completed by 31 December 2012. Interim position and employee guidance was issued throughout BTP in relation to Gifts & Hospitality and Social Media: Personal Use by Officers and Staff in July 2012.</p> <p>In addition BTP has developed a Statement of Mission and Values, which is an overarching set of values which will provide clear guidance on what is considered acceptable within the Force. The six values, which cover the areas of Integrity & Respect; Commonsense; Trust & Confidence; Determination; Professional and Pride have been agreed by the Strategic Command Team. They will now be embedded in all strands of BTP, including the 2012-15 Strategic Plan, PDR's, training inputs by PSD and operational briefings to ensure they are shared, understood and subscribed to by all employees.</p>	06-Sep-12

Ref	Recommendation	Due Date	Action Owner	Progress Update	Date of Update
3	<p>Training courses should include appropriate input in relation to integrity and anti-corruption. In particular, given the importance of leadership to securing high standards of integrity (a theme which runs through this review), the Strategic Command Course (in January 2012) and the High Potential Development Scheme should encompass these issues.</p> <p>(Chief Constables should review how much effort is being put into briefing their staff on the standards as to what is acceptable, unacceptable and on the areas of potential vulnerability).</p>		Head of PSD / Head of HR	<p>BTP has developed a Statement of Mission and Values, which is an overarching set of values which will provide clear guidance on what is considered acceptable within the Force. The six values, which cover the areas of Integrity & Respect; Commonsense; Trust & Confidence; Determination; Professional and Pride have been agreed by the Strategic Command Team. They will now be embedded in all strands of BTP, including the 2012-15 Strategic Plan, PDR's, training inputs by PSD and operational briefings to ensure they are shared, understood and subscribed to by all employees.</p> <p>Since September 2004, PSD have been providing inputs to all new Police Recruits, Special Police Constables and PCSO's. Inputs have also been provided to CLDP courses, Federation Representatives, Support Groups, PSD Area Champions, Supervisors and CID. In total there have been 2,280 attendees recorded at these training courses. The input has been reviewed and improved over time with overarching themes of Reactive Investigations & Processes and Intelligence & Counter Corruption. Details / examples of the training courses provided by Learning & Development are available if required by HMIC.</p> <p>As of April 2012, a policy decision was made that all PSD inputs will be carried out by a member of the PSD SMT, supported by specialist personnel where appropriate.</p> <p>In June 2012 a revised standard presentation was created which has the following broad themes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Embedding Standards of Professional Behaviour - PSD Organisational Structure - PSD Processes and Procedures - PSD Intelligence Development - Counter Corruption 	28-Jun-12
4	<p>Chief officer teams should review their corporate governance and oversight arrangements to ensure that those arrangements are fulfilling their function in helping promote the values of their force in the delivery of its objectives, and that they are, through their actions and behaviours, promoting the values of the organisation and making sure good corporate governance is seen as a core part of everyday business.</p>		SCT	<p>BTP has developed a Statement of Mission and Values, which is an overarching set of values which will provide clear guidance on what is considered acceptable within the Force. The six values, which cover the areas of Integrity & Respect; Commonsense; Trust & Confidence; Determination; Professional and Pride have been agreed by the Strategic Command Team. They will now be embedded in all strands of BTP, including the 2012-15 Strategic Plan, PDR's, training inputs by PSD and operational briefings to ensure they are shared, understood and subscribed to by all employees.</p> <p>In addition to this the Integrity and Compliance Board will improve governance and oversight on issues that are identified in the report. At the Police Authority level, there is oversight through the Professional Standards Board and Audit Committee.</p>	27-Jun-12
5	HMIC expects the Service to have detailed proposals in the above areas ready for consultation with all relevant parties by April 2012.			N/A	
6	An assessment relating to these matters should be conducted by HMIC by October 2012 to inform incoming Police and Crime Commissioners and Police and Crime Panels.			N/A	

NATIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS

HMIC Without Fear or Favour

SCT Portfolio Owner: Deputy Chief Constable

Improvement Plan Owner: D/Supt Alistair Lawson

Ref

Recommendation

Due Date

Action
Owner

Progress Update

Date of
Update**SUB RECOMMENDATIONS FROM NATIONAL REPORT****Relationships with the Media**

1	Forces should explore options for identifying and monitoring emerging and inappropriate relationships with, and leaks to, the media (Page 29)	31-Aug-12	Head of PSD	<p>This is monitored by PSD as reflected in the BTP policy on Reporting Inappropriate and Compromising Associations. As well as maintaining and monitoring the recorded inappropriate associations, PSD identify and monitor relationships using intelligence gathering tools such as Confidential Anonymous Reporting (CARS), Email Gateways tools and Internet monitoring. PSD has reviewed all intelligence gathering tools including Electronic Business Monitoring and submitted a report with proposals.</p> <p>PSD is raising awareness of CARS through meetings with Area Commanders and inputs at Area Management Team meetings where presentations are being delivered on usage and confidence building.</p> <p>Two reports have been submitted, in June and July 2012, in relation to electronic business monitoring systems - Current Software and Potential Solutions. Systems testing is being undertaken to assess the fitness for purpose of current software in relation to PSD requirements with the outcome scheduled for 31 October 2012.</p> <p>The number of staff within the Counter Corruption Unit (CCU) and Intelligence Unit has been reviewed and two Intelligence Development Officers will commence employment during September 2012. Additionally, officers have been supplied on a secondment basis both internally and from other forces to the CCU.</p> <p>Media and Marketing log the vast majority of calls which come through the press office. There is also media monitoring which is in place which should pick up any mention of BTP.</p>	06-Sep-12
2	HMIC suggests all forces' notifiable association policies include reference to persons who 'undertake paid or unpaid work for the media'. (Page 30)	31-Aug-12	Head of SDD / Head of PSD	<p>The current Reporting Inappropriate and Compromising Relationships SOP mentions the reporting of associations with persons working in the Media Industry. However all policies are currently under review and will in future consider reference within Business Interests and Secondary Employment and/or Media Contact SOPs or guidance.</p> <p>The revised Business Interest and Secondary Employment has been circulated throughout BTP with effect from 19 August 2012. PSD is now responsible for this policy. As part of this PSD has configured Centurion to act as a case management system for all applications. New applications are currently being recorded and previous authorised applications will be back record converted providing a database in relation to Business Interest and Secondary Employment.</p>	06-Sep-12
3	It is HMIC's view that forces and authorities should record all interactions between police employees and media representatives. The time and date of the meeting, brief details of purpose, content and persons involved should be recorded. An appropriate mechanism should be in place to audit these records. (Page 31)		Head of Media and Marketing	<p>This is under review as the force does not want a Media contact database held centrally as it will prove cumbersome and discourage the openness encouraged. However, guidance has been given that all officers need to make a note in their electronic diary when they meet a journalist identifying why and what was discussed. This will provide a searchable audit capability as required.</p>	26-Jun-12

Ref	Recommendation	Due Date	Action Owner	Progress Update	Date of Update
4	In light of such benchmarking, consideration should be given to the development of a national media policy to include appropriate levels of interaction, social interaction and relationships, alongside practical guidance. The policy should be supported by a structured programme of media training and awareness and link into the broader legal and ethical framework and the Service's standards and values. (Page 32)	31-May-12	Head of Media and Marketing	BTP is currently working with the ACPO Communication Advisory Group in developing new national media policy which will be adopted by PSD. BTP will implement the national policy when it is developed and this will be communicated throughout the force. BTP conducts in house media training and will incorporate the need to raise awareness of the ethical and legal position of the force. In practice, all officers are already encouraged to engage with the media with the support of media and marketing. The boundaries, expectations and limitations of any relationship are already covered and would be in line with the HMIC position; the record keeping is new and this will now be built in. Media and marketing actively support officers and it is extremely rare for any contact not to be reported to the department and advice and guidance sought by the officer concerned. Senior officers do not meet with journalists without the press office being aware and usually present.	26-Jun-12

Information Disclosure

5	Forces should consider how best to prevent, monitor, investigate and take action against officers and staff in relation to information disclosure, which should include reference to all other areas of this review and inappropriate associations. (Page 36)	31-Aug-12	Head of PSD	Currently PSD identify and monitor potential information disclosure using intelligence gathering tools such as Confidential Anonymous Reporting, Email Gateways tools and Internet monitoring. PSD has reviewed all intelligence gathering tools including Electronic Business Monitoring. Two reports have been submitted, in June and July 2012, in relation to electronic business monitoring systems - Current Software and Potential Solutions. Systems testing is being undertaken to assess the fitness for purpose of current software in relation to PSD requirements with the outcome scheduled for 31 October 2012. Additionally PSD will increase training and publicity on anonymous reporting techniques with the promotion of reporting of such information disclosure. The number of staff within the Counter Corruption Unit (CCU) and Intelligence Unit has been reviewed and two Intelligence Development Officers will commence employment during September 2012. Additionally, officers have been supplied on a secondment basis both internally and from other forces to the CCU.	06-Sep-12
6	HMIC suggests that all forces need to have a policy in place if they are to be able to effectively protect their reputation through staff use of social networking. (Page 37)	31-Aug-12	Head of PSD	PSD issued guidance on off duty Social Media Usage initially on April 2012, which was forwarded to HMIC as part of the documentation request on 18 June 2012. There has also been an PSD position statement on Social Media Usage circulated around the force on 22 June 2012. The use of Social Media for disseminating BTP information is currently being discussed as part of the new Social Media project, which meets on a monthly basis. Any planned use of Social Media by BTP therefore may have additional guidance or policies. The objectives of the Social Media Project are (1) to maximise the use of digital and social media across operational and organisational functions, and embrace the opportunities it presents; (2) to proactively look across activities for opportunities to use emerging communications, and challenge the way BTP currently deliver services; (3) to actively encourage staff to use social media, building skills and knowledge of how and when to use it, within a framework that places parameters, but trusts staff. Meetings of the Digital and Social Media Project have been being held, the most recent being 5 September 2012. The project works in a cross functional way developing BTP's digital and social media strategy and testing the impact of the strategy on day to day operations through a series of pilots running in a number of Areas, including First Contact Centre, Media & Marketing, Force Intelligence and CCTV. The pilots started in June 2012 and will continue until February / March 2013.	06-Sep-12

Ref	Recommendation	Due Date	Action Owner	Progress Update	Date of Update
7	Forces and authorities need to have a consistent approach to preventing, investigating and responding to information disclosure issues, whether such disclosure is to the press and broadcast media, via social networking or to other third parties. (Page 39)	31-Aug-12	Head of PSD	<p>Currently PSD identify and monitor potential information disclosure using intelligence gathering tools such as Confidential Anonymous Reporting, Email Gateways tools and Internet monitoring. However, PSD will be reviewing all intelligence gathering tools including Electronic Business Monitoring.</p> <p>Additionally PSD will increase training and publicity on confidential anonymous reporting techniques with the promotion of reporting of such information disclosure Guidance is also being developed as part of Values and Standards working group.</p> <p>PSD is raising awareness of CARS through meetings with Area Commanders and inputs at Area Management Team Meetings where presentations are being delivered on usage and confidence building.</p> <p>Two reports have been submitted, in June and July 2012, in relation to electronic business monitoring systems - Current Software and Potential Solutions. Systems testing is being undertaken to assess the fitness for purpose of current software in relation to PSD requirements with the outcome scheduled for 31 October 2012.</p>	06-Sep-12
8	HMIC suggests that the Service needs to adopt a national standard which clearly defines the boundaries of acceptability around gifts and hospitality. This should include recording practices which illustrate both what is accepted and what is declined so that the full nature of the relationship is transparent. (Page 42)	31-Aug-12	Head of PSD	<p>Currently PSD identify and monitor use of Social Networking sites using intelligence gathering tools such as Confidential Anonymous Reporting, Email Gateways tools and Internet monitoring. However, PSD will be reviewing all intelligence gathering tools including Electronic Business Monitoring and will submit a report with proposals by 31 August 2012.</p> <p>Additionally PSD issued guidance on off duty Social Media Usage initially on April 2012, which was forwarded to HMIC as part of the documentation request on 18 June 2012. There has also been an PSD position statement on Social Media Usage circulated around the force on 22 June 2012.</p> <p>The use of Social Media for disseminating BTP information is currently being discussed as part of the new Digital and Social Media project, which meets on a monthly basis. Any planned use of Social Media by BTP therefore may have additional guidance or policies.</p> <p>The objectives of the Social Media Project are (1) to maximise the use of digital and social media across operational and organisational functions, and embrace the opportunities it presents; (2) to proactively look across activities for opportunities to use emerging communications, and challenge the way BTP currently deliver services; (3) to actively encourage staff to use social media, building skills and knowledge of how and when to use it, within a framework that places parameters, but trusts staff.</p> <p>Meetings of the Digital and Social Media Project have been being held, the most recent being 5 September 2012. The project works in a cross functional way developing BTP's digital and social media strategy and testing the impact of the strategy on day to day operations through a series of pilots running in a number of Areas, including First Contact Centre, Media & Marketing, Force Intelligence and CCTV. The pilots started in June 2012 and will continue until February / March 2013.</p>	06-Sep-12
Gratuities and Hospitality					
9	HMIC suggests that this function sits most appropriately within PSDs. (Page 42)	Complete	Head of PSD	This function already sits under the Professional Standards Department at BTP.	22-Jun-12
10	HMIC believes that this simple checklist would allow staff to make an informed spontaneous decision when they are offered hospitality or a gift. (Page 43)	29-Jun-12	Head of PSD	<p>Following receipt of the ACPO Guidance, the Head of PSD has reviewed BTP's position in relation to Gifts and Hospitality. A position statement was reissued to all officers and staff on 26 June 2012 reiterating BTP's position in relation to the acceptance of gifts and hospitality. On 18 July 2012 the Intranet page was updated with the new guidance and the redundant SOP removed to minimise confusion during the change over period. Ensuring the Guidance is compatible with enforcement is rated 'high' on the project that is currently reviewing and revising all BTP SOPs, which will be completed by 31 December 2012.</p>	05-Sep-12
11		31-Aug-12	Head of PSD	<p>This was reviewed by the Head of PSD in line with BTP's approach to Gifts and Hospitality and a position statement was reissued to all officers and staff on 26 June 2012 with clear guidance on what is acceptable using the GIFT mnemonic Checklist as recommended by the HMIC.</p> <p>The Intranet page has been updated with a table to be completed with the required information for submission to supervisors for authorisation prior to a gift or hospitality being accepted.</p>	05-Sep-12

Ref	Recommendation	Due Date	Action Owner	Progress Update	Date of Update
Procurement and Contractual Relationships					
12	HMIC suggests that PSDs and police authorities should work together with chief officers in a more co-ordinated and proactive manner to ensure effective intrusion and oversight of procurement and contractual matters. There needs to be effective monitoring at all financial levels, and this also requires scrutiny of force credit cards and procurement cards where they are used. (Page 45)	31-Aug-12	Head of PSD / Head of Finance	BTP is currently undertaking a review of its 'purchase to pay process' and a paper was presented to the Strategic Command Team on 19 June 2012. The paper, which was approved, recommended the use of controlled catalogues in association with Framework Agreements together with reducing the number of requisitioners and financial approvers for better quality requisitioning and reducing the number of interfaces with suppliers. BTP's Corporate Resources is implementing a major rationalisation of all procurement cards across the force to reduce the number to 2 per Area / Department. Engagement is being undertaken with Area Commanders and Heads of Department to provide details of key locations and individuals where procurement cards should be held. To date there has been a 36% reduction in the numbers of procurement cards. This is one of a number of measures being implemented to focus on low level expenditure across BTP as well as reviewing any related SOPs and policies in relation to procurement, e.g. retrospective orders and splitting of orders. The Integrity and Compliance Board monitors compliance and links established between PSD,	30-Aug-12
13	HMIC suggests that national good practice should be shared and implemented by all forces to ensure a consistent and risk-aware approach to the procurement of goods and services, with standardised checks and balances at different financial levels. We believe that this should include a moratorium on hospitality during tendering processes between police employees, members of police authorities and potential contractors. (Page 47)	31-Aug-12	Head of Finance	BTP is currently undertaking a review of its "purchase to pay process" and a paper was presented to the Strategic Command Team on 19 June 2012. The paper, which was approved, recommended the use of controlled catalogues in association with Framework Agreements together with a reduction in the number of requisitioners and financial approvers for better quality requisitioning and a reduction in the number of interfaces with suppliers. Procurement provides PSD with tender lists for work on an as and when basis, so that checks can be carried out with the Gifts and Hospitality register. PSD has issued an internal note so as to reduce the instances / opportunity of Gifts and Hospitality which has also be published on BTP's website under Supplier Information and Tendering.	30-Aug-12
Secondary Business Interests and Conflicts of Interest					
14	HMIC therefore suggests that the Service develops a decision making model in respect of secondary occupations that is sufficiently robust to address individual risk and organisational reputation, and compatibility with the applicant's role and responsibilities. (Page 50)	31-Aug-12	Head of SDD / Head of PSD	Policy is under review with reference to the ACPO guidance on Business Interest and Secondary Employment / Business Interest which will include a decision making model It has been agreed that the ownership of the Secondary Employment process will move from Human Resources to PSD; this took place in August 2012. The revised Business Interest and Secondary Employment has been circulated throughout BTP with effect from 19 August 2012. PSD is now responsible for this policy. As part of this PSD has configured Centurion to act as a case management system for all applications. New applications are currently being recorded and previous authorised applications will be back record converted providing a database in relation to Business Interest and Secondary Employment. Ensuring the Guidance is compatible with enforcement is rated 'high' on the project that is currently reviewing and revising all BTP SOPs, which will be completed by 31 December 2012.	05-Sep-12
15	HMIC suggests that any force or authority considering such restraint clauses should obtain specialist legal advice first as the consequences for getting this wrong (compensation, injunctive relief, public perception and so on) can be severe. (Page 51)	31-Aug-12	Head of PSD	After the policy review and the new Business Interest and Secondary Employment policy is drafted, consideration will then be made for any requirement in relation to legal advice. The revised Business Interest and Secondary Employment has been circulated throughout BTP with effect from 19 August 2012. PSD is now responsible for this policy. As part of this PSD has configured Centurion to act as a case management system for all applications. New applications are currently being recorded and previous authorised applications will be back record converted providing a database in relation to Business Interest and Secondary Employment. Ensuring the Guidance is compatible with enforcement is rated 'high' on the project that is currently reviewing and revising all BTP SOPs, which will be completed by 31 December 2012.	26-Jun-12
Professional Standards and Proactivity					
16	HMIC suggests that the ACCAG 'practice advice' is published on the 'authorised professional practice site' as soon as possible. (Page 53)	N/A	Head of PSD	This is to be organised by ACCAG and requires no input from BTP.	22-Jun-12
17	HMIC suggests that this is included within the Strategic Command Course and the High Potential Development Scheme. (Page 53)	N/A	N/A	This is a Servicewide recommendation and is not BTP specific.	22-Jun-12

Ref	Recommendation	Due Date	Action Owner	Progress Update	Date of Update
18	HMIC suggests that the corruption lead for each force should be a senior detective who has the skills and experience to lead/supervise investigations and who is in a position to inform and influence force-level decision making. (Page 53)	Complete	Head of PSD	This is currently Head of PSD, who is Detective Superintendent.	22-Jun-12
19	HMIC suggests that consideration be given to subsuming the valuable role currently undertaken by SOCA into the National Crime Agency (NCA). (Pages 53 / 54)	N/A	Head of PSD	This will be organised by National Crime Agency and therefore requires no input from BTP.	22-Jun-12
20	HMIC suggests that all forces should re-evaluate their proactive and covert capability and (where appropriate) consider the use of formal collaborative arrangements. (Page 54)	31-Aug-12	Head of PSD	<p>PSD reviewed all intelligence gathering tools including Electronic Business Monitoring and submitted a report.</p> <p>PSD has already considered full collaboration with City of London Police regarding Counter Corruption however full collaboration was deemed not suitable. Therefore BTP is looking at working towards the establishment of a network of Counter Corruption Units for collaborative arrangements regarding assistance and resource sharing.</p> <p>BTP has approached the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) and a tentative agreement has been reached for an experienced DPS covert investigator to be seconded to PSD for six months to share working knowledge and experience. Currently DPS is support BTP PSD on two covert anti-corruption investigations and a Section 23(1) RIPA agreement is being considered to further this working relationship.</p>	05-Sep-12
21	HMIC suggests that forces consider the use of specialist IT software to enhance their audit and analytical capabilities. (Page 54)	31-Aug-12	Head of PSD	<p>Two reports have been submitted, in June and July 2012, in relation to electronic business monitoring systems - Current Software and Potential Solutions. Systems testing is being undertaken to assess the fitness for purpose of current software in relation to PSD requirements with the outcomes scheduled for 31 October 2012.</p> <p>The number of staff within the Counter Corruption Unit (CCU) and Intelligence Unit has been reviewed and two Intelligence Development Officers will commence employment during September 2012. Additionally, officers have been supplied on a secondment basis both internally and from other forces to the CCU.</p>	06-Sep-12
Governance and Oversight					
22	Integrity is likely to be stronger where there is coordination between organisational issues, policy development, training and cultural change. This should bring greater organisational coherence, reducing opportunities for inappropriate behaviours to develop. (Page 58)	31-May-12	Head of Media and Marketing	BTP has developed a Statement of Mission and Values, which is an overarching set of values which will provide clear guidance on what is considered acceptable within the Force. The six values, which cover the areas of Integrity & Respect; Commonsense; Trust & Confidence; Determination; Professional and Pride have been agreed by the Strategic Command Team. They will now be embedded in all strands of BTP, including the 2012-15 Strategic Plan, PDR's, training inputs by PSD and operational briefings to ensure they are shared, understood and subscribed to by all employees.	26-Jun-12
23	In the new policing landscape it will be important that the role of elected local policing bodies in respect of force integrity (including complaints, misconduct and anti-corruption) is articulated to ensure that there is effective challenge to chief officers. (Page 58)	N/A	N/A	Although BTP is not directly involved in this, there are clear procedures in place in relation to complaints, misconduct and anti-corruption. This is also monitored through the Police Authority at meetings of the Professional Standards Committee and Audit Committee.	22-Jun-12



Inspecting policing
in the public interest

HMIC Inspection Findings

British Transport Police

Anti-Social Behaviour (ASB)

Detailed Force Feedback

Anti-Social Behaviour

HMIC Inspection of British Transport Police

Overview

British Transport Police (BTP) differs from Home Office Forces. BTP does not have a resident population; their community consists of members of the public passing through rail stations and using rail networks, rail staff and members of the public who may work at stations for retail purposes. BTP has set up sound intelligence and data sharing processes with partners and other agencies/organisations. It is using this data in conjunction with their own to analyse hot spots and trends. They also share IT and have partner agency analysts (see 2.4.3) embedded within their Intelligence units. This is giving them a clearer view of ASB issues in comparison to some other Home Office Forces. BTP have well established processes for engagement with partners and other agencies to assist with identifying and solving ASB issues.

BTP does not consistently¹ ask questions of callers at the first point of contact to identify repeat and vulnerable callers – those most at risk of harm from ASB. This means some of these victims may not be getting the extra support they need. Risk assessments are not being completed for ASB incidents. BTP are in the process of utilising a scored risk matrix to assist with prioritising tasking at TCGs, which could be used for risk assessing ASB.

Summary of Key Findings

- Call takers were found to be polite, empathetic and victim focused. They consistently ensured, for example, that the caller had a note of the incident reference number before completing the call.
- Repeat victims and vulnerable victims are not routinely and systematically being identified at the point of contact. Questions are not being asked of the caller. This has been recognised by BTP who have just completed training in control rooms. The NSPIS command and control system does not automatically identify callers previously assessed as repeat or vulnerable (although this could be done to a limited extent manually). Although the call taker is asked to consider vulnerability, there is generally no questioning of the caller to determine this.
- Repeat and vulnerable victims are not considered within the existing performance framework. They are not routinely “tagged” on NSPIS and so are not easily identified. However BTP do monitor overall performance of ASB (not repeat and vulnerable) and this forms part of the monthly performance meeting for senior management.
- A number of good examples were found of effective partnerships that address local ASB issues. These examples involved engaging with Train Operating Companies (TOCs), passenger focus groups and local Independent Advisory Groups (IAGs).
- Neighbourhood Policing Team (NPT) staff across the force are knowledgeable about their area, passionate about what they do and committed to providing a high quality service to their communities.

¹ Consistently means at least seven times out of ten

- Good examples were found locally of joined-up working between, for example, response teams, neighbourhood teams and detectives. Whilst this was generally in relation to crime, there are opportunities to harness this approach in addressing ASB issues.
- Of the 100 ASB incidents reviewed, 42 involved crime. Of those only 31 were recorded as crimes.
- There is no risk assessment framework for ASB within BTP and this means that at present the level of risk is currently unknown. Having a risk assessment would improve the level of service given to those ASB incidents that have been highlighted as posing more risk.
- The force's view of the ASB picture across the country is good. This is because they are utilising partner agencies such as the TOCs data as well as their own to monitor ASB incidents. Their analysts search a wide range of crime and non recorded (byelaw) crime to ensure the varied aspects of ASB are included.
- Where ASB cases are closed on NSPIS, there is confusion between the categories of personal, environmental and nuisance. Out of 100 incidents reviewed by HMIC, 28 were incorrectly classified.
- ASB incidents that relate to local priorities are not identified at the point of report within the control room.
- BTP has set a target for abstractions of NPT officers of no less than 80%. This is being achieved.
- The national intelligence model is being used consistently to manage ASB performance – there is good evidence of analysis of relevant ASB data and ASB consistently features in tasking and briefing.
- There are good examples of problem solving plans being utilised. These are clearly displaying a joined up problem solving approach with other agencies and passenger focus groups. They are only signed off as complete if the PACTs (or originator) agree that the problem has been resolved.

1. Does the force understand its ASB issues and have leadership, governance, policy, and compliance checking to support this work?

1.1 Is there Chief Officer Leadership for ASB, with robust strategic governance in place?

- 1.1.1 BTP have a Chief Officer lead who drives ASB performance. Although this is recognised at superintending ranks and above lower ranks have less awareness of the ACPO lead. The BTP intranet website has had recent coverage of the newly released ASB strategy and this has assisted in raising staff awareness. HMIC did find that NPT officers are committed, motivated and aware of the importance of dealing with ASB. This is monitored by their local managers who in turn are driven by senior managers.
- 1.1.2 The DCC chairs the force monthly performance meetings where ASB features as part of performance management. The ACC TP chairs the Neighbourhood and Complimentary Policing meeting every two months which also monitors ASB performance.
- 1.1.3 ASB features in the policing plan 2011/12, strategic plan 2011-14 and force strategic threat assessments. It is clearly covered in the priority 'promoting confidence in the use of the

railway'. A performance target was set for a reduction in the amount of incidents and also a reduction in the number of incidents in which formal case management plans are undertaken. These are closely monitored by senior management monthly.

- 1.1.4 The force has recently delivered an ASB strategy which sets out and defines what ASB is including personal, environmental and nuisance. This covers a range of recordable and non recordable crime. The strategy highlights the need to focus on repeat and vulnerable victims but does not give definitions. Staff were unclear as to what the definitions were, although they knew of the strategy and were able to refer to it.
- 1.1.5 There is no graded response for ASB. Call handling staff and supervisors decide on response using their judgement. All staff have received training in the National Decision Making Model and it is expected that they will make informed decisions, taking into account all information presented, on how best to respond to the call. Where no police attendance occurs the call taker explains the reasons to the caller. Staff are not fully aware of the importance of ASB within control rooms or contact management, however the ASB strategy is assisting in increasing knowledge and awareness.
- 1.1.6 Although there is no designated 'marketing strategy' for ASB, BTP uses the media and other forms of marketing to both gather information and to feedback to the public. This includes local PACT meetings, newsletters, posters, TV, newspaper, social networks and You Tube.
- 1.1.7 Abstraction is closely monitored with regular dip sampling to ensure the target of 80% is being met. ASB training does occur for new officers as part of basic training but also as part of NPT training. The training focuses upon the NPT officer role and how to problem solve, although not all officers had received this. There are many avenues for problem solving advice including Crime Reduction Advisors, TOC advisors and IAGs, who can assist in problem solving advice. There is a tool box on the intranet however this was not widely used or known about.
- 1.1.8 There is a nominated BTPA lead for oversight of ASB which is discussed in full authority meetings as well as sub-committee meetings. It falls under the 'confidence in using the railways' objective in the policing plan and strategic policing plan'. Members will personally meet with Area Commanders normally once a quarter and will challenge on areas of performance which includes ASB. BTPA displayed a clear knowledge of ASB and the impact it has.

Overall leadership and drive about ASB is displayed at differing levels. BTP staff do take ASB seriously and clearly understand the impact on 'station communities', rail staff and the travelling public. Contact centre and control room staff need to be made more aware of the importance of their role in identifying risk, vulnerability and harm when dealing with ASB. The release of the ASB strategy and recent training should see improvements in this area and BTP have employed a full time Quality Assurance Officer to check progress within control rooms and contact management.

1.2 Does the force have ASB embedded in its performance management regime?

- 1.2.1 There is an ASB delivery plan to monitor the six themes of the ASB strategy and each area reports progress against the themes. However under the ASB Strategy theme 'focus on vulnerable and repeat victims' it is documented that when a report is received a graded response will follow taking into account the risk. HMIC could not find any mention in the delivery plan regarding graded response or risk assessing. The strategy does not give definitions of repeat and vulnerable victims.

- 1.2.2 There is a dedicated lead for the delivery plan and Area Chief Inspectors are held to account through requests for updates at the bi-monthly Neighbourhood and Complimentary Policing Board chaired by the ACC.
- 1.2.3 At the highest level the force manages performance through the monthly force management team meeting, chaired by the DCC. ASB, along with other areas, gets discussed and challenged during part one of this meeting. This does not include measuring performance on repeat victimisation and vulnerability.
- 1.2.4 Areas have fortnightly meetings to discuss and challenge areas of performance that includes ASB. Each area sets its own targets for ASB and is then held to account by the force management team. When performance starts to dip the ACC in charge of Territorial Policing ensures Area Commanders have effective plans to deliver improvement. However, in the absence of readily available performance information this does not include performance in relation to repeat and vulnerable victims.
- 1.2.5 NPTs and Train Operating Company (TOC) staff have received awards recognising their work on ASB. However there was general feeling that ASB achievements are not recognised as much as other areas of policing and no examples of recognition could be given.
- 1.2.6 Analysts fully utilise the NSPIS IT system and intelligence systems to gather information about ASB. This includes searching 'a list' of recordable and non-recordable 'byelaw' crimes. These are all included as ASB and as such inform the intelligence picture and performance measurement process. Of the 100 ASB incidents reviewed, 42 involved crime of those only 31 were recorded as crimes. BTP crime many more incidents than Home Office forces due to their byelaw. Analysts capture third party data from other agencies including the TOCs, ensuring it is placed onto the intelligence system.

Overall BTP have a robust performance management regime in measuring ASB, this is based on the number of incidents recorded and the number of formal case management plans carried out. They are moving to more local based targets and these will include a mixture of 'quantitative' and 'qualitative' targets. BTP are not measuring against risk or repeat and vulnerable ASB.

1.3 Does the force manage ASB problems through NIM processes?

- 1.3.1 The force has worked hard to develop processes to share intelligence with other organisations and agencies. They understand that not having a resident population and being so widely geographically spread causes problems in gathering data and intelligence. They have good examples of data sharing with TOCs and utility companies, and have some Home Office Forces intelligence systems embedded in their intelligence units. PACT meetings and other Home Office Force meetings, held locally, also feed into the BTP intelligence system. BTP have other agency analysts embedded into the Intelligence Fusion Centre. The data and intelligence sharing is more advanced than the vast majority of Home Office Forces. When intelligence reveals hotspots or trends, BTP works in partnership with other organisations. They will jointly own the problem and set jointly agreed targets to measure progress against them.
- 1.3.2 The force intelligence bureaux complete analytical products relating to ASB locally and force wide. They utilise BTP data and third party data from other agencies and organisations. BTP analysts use data on repeat locations and repeat victims to identify hotspots, but this does not include an assessment of the risk posed to victims. An assessment is completed when tasking out resources at the TCGs by the chair, but ASB is not always prioritised by risk level. HMIC note that there is a recently compiled risk assessment for tasking and once this is rolled out this should assist.

1.3.3 Analytical work is carried out at varying levels to assist in informing staff of trends and hotspots as well as informing strategies. Staff utilise the crime mapping tool regularly and this also assists with new officers and staff as they are able to view crime maps and analytical TCG products to get an understanding of issues.

1.3.4 ASB is addressed at local and force level tasking meetings. There is a process to take any issues to tasking meetings and a process exists to escalate them from local to force level.

1.3.5 Allocated tasks are monitored at subsequent tasking meetings.

1.3.6 Although regular briefing of CID officers about general ASB issues does not take place, they are briefed on more targeted operations and problem solving plans. This for example includes them taking part in tackling knife crime operations. They are also able to brief themselves via local briefings and the crime mapping facility. Response officers often attend incidents prior to NPT involvement and, as with CID, they have briefings on more targeted or problematic ASB issues. NPT officers are briefed daily and also brief other colleagues. There is a good working relationship between the teams, assisted by co-located teams in many areas.

1.3.7 Analysts search under many different crime codes on NSPIS and free text on the force intelligence system in order to capture ASB. This ensures recorded crime is captured for intelligence purposes and performance measurement.

Overall there is good use of intelligence to capture and monitor ASB issues across the force. There is excellent use of shared data and intelligence. The force has actively sought what information and intelligence other agencies and organisations have in order for them to get a more complete and holistic view of ASB.

2. To manage both short and long term ASB, does the force have effective systems and processes in place to deal with reporting, response and follow-up contact with complainants?

2.1 At the point of contact, does the force effectively identify and record incidents of ASB, repeat and vulnerable complainants?

2.1.1 Repeat victims are not routinely and systematically being identified at the time of report. Of 100 calls listened to by HMIC, only 10 showed evidence of repeat victimisation being discussed with the caller. All of those 10 involved the caller offering this information rather than being questioned about it. Training has been introduced and improvements have been seen. This is being monitored by BTP. IT systems do not currently assist in the identification of repeat victims although this is being planned for latest version of the NSPIS system. Tags are not being used and at present manual searching has to be completed on names.

2.1.2 Vulnerable victims are not routinely and systematically being identified at the time of reporting. Of 100 calls listened to by HMIC, only 10 showed evidence of vulnerable victims being discussed with the caller. Call handlers are not consistently asking questions to assess vulnerability. The computer system does not display if the victim has previously been classed as vulnerable. Training has been put in place and improvements have been seen. This is being monitored by BTP.

2.1.3 There is no system to identify if an incident relates to local NPT priorities such as on-going operations or Problem Solving Plans (PSPs). Call handlers are not briefed about local priorities.

2.1.4 Although supervisors are expected to dip sample calls this is not happening on a regular basis. BTP have just recruited a quality assurance officer whose role will be checking call handling. Victim surveys are completed centrally and a call-back system has been introduced. Of the 100 incident records reviewed HMIC found evidence of supervisory guidance recorded on only three and evidence of a quality check recorded on only one.

2.1.5 The three codes, personal, environmental and nuisance, have only just been introduced and their use in opening (and closing) incidents is not well understood by operators and call handlers.

2.1.6 Although IT systems from external organisations are not integrated they are easily accessible to BTP analysts. These include Train Operator Company databases, Home Office Force intelligence systems and utility companies' databases.

Overall BTP are not consistently and systematically identifying repeat and vulnerable ASB victims at the point of report. However the force does have other processes within crime recording and intelligence which will identify repeat victims at a later stage. It is noted that training has been completed and improvements should be seen. Tags on the computer system, to identify repeat or vulnerable victims, are not used.

2.2 Does the force respond to reports of ASB in accordance with force policy and adopt a short-term problem-solving approach, with partner agencies where appropriate?

2.2.1 Call handling staff do not receive training regarding ASB. They were aware of the new personal, environmental, and nuisance codes but were not always clear of the meaning.

2.2.2 Call handling staff do not systematically pass information about the history of repeat victimisation or vulnerability to attending staff.

2.2.3 It is unclear if all ASB incidents reported to BTP are being recorded onto the crime recording systems. HMIC spoke to managers from crime recording and contact management and they believed that there may be gaps in ASB recording, for example they were unsure what the process would be if a complainant contacted BTP by letter. There was evidence of ASB incidents reported directly to patrolling staff being placed onto the force intelligence system rather than being recorded as an incident. However, intelligence records included follow up enquiries and results clearly displaying action.

2.2.4 ASB offenders and locations are included in briefings to officers and staff. However repeat victims do not often feature in these briefings. CID and response officers both have access to crime mapping which displays hot spots and there was evidence of this being used regularly. Where appropriate, ASB features on the daily briefing on the intranet and this, again, is regularly reviewed by CID and response officers. Analysts, on occasions, will go out and brief officers on particular issues. All Problem Solving Plans have clear ownership. NPTs have a clear view of ASB issues in their areas and displayed good knowledge of issues and trends.

2.2.5 Analysis is carried out to identify hot spots and trends and these are disseminated via briefings and intelligence products.

2.2.6 A tool kit of potential tactical options to tackle ASB is available on the intranet but it is not widely known about or used.

2.2.7 Short term ASB that is recorded onto the crime system is monitored and both recordable and non recordable incidents are subject to a computerised 'points system' in which all ASB incidents are scored and prioritised. This ensures the monitoring of follow up care, updates

and investigation. ASB issues placed onto the intelligence system are not supervised. Although incident records on NSPIS displayed a low number of supervised entries (out of 100 entries reviewed only 3 showed supervisory oversight), the majority of these incidents were entered on the crime recording system which ensures strict supervision.

Overall BTP records a higher number of incidents onto their crime recording systems than Home Office Forces. These all fall under a prioritised ‘points system’ which ensures compliance and investigation. However processes are not in place for dealing with ASB incidents in a structured manner, from time of report.

2.3 Does the force effectively put in place long term problem solving solutions, with partners where appropriate?

- 2.3.1 Problem Solving Plans are utilised effectively by NPTs. There is a new problem solving database to manage ASB. The force management team tracks progress along with local supervisors. The signing off of plans is achieved through local supervisors and partners. All Problem Solving Plans are referred to the Central Performance Unit at HQ for quality assurance and for closure.
- 2.3.2 Supervisors check and monitor Problem Solving Plans for the duration of the plan. They are also subject to scrutiny during PACT meetings and tasking meetings.
- 2.3.3 Problem Solving Plans are signed off generally by the originator, which is often a PACT meeting. They are then further signed off by the NPT Inspector and sent to the force management team and Central Performance Unit for closure.
- 2.3.4 Minutes of Community Safety Partnership meetings displayed clear ownership of plans and regular updates of progress.
- 2.3.5 BTP do not complete any risk assessments for ASB. Problem Solving Plans do not have risk assessments completed as part of the overall plan.
- 2.3.6 BTP’s communities are far reaching and include the rail staff, retailers within stations, and rail passengers. There are varying degrees of engagement, with understandably more within London and around larger ‘hub’ stations. We found some examples of excellent engagement with communities. There is a National Independent Advisory Group (IAG), and Area IAGs, available for consultation and problem solving. Although BTP engage well with partners and other agencies they do find it difficult to engage with passengers who are on their way through stations. To ensure engagement with passengers they run surgeries at the station and have ‘stalls’ at station concourses. Other ideas are being explored away from the stations for example at local health clubs. They engage with passenger focus groups to ensure their ‘communities’ are engaged. BTP also scan social media and You Tube to ensure they are capturing any passenger issues.

Overall BTP have good medium and long term problem solving methods. There is good engagement with partners and other agencies to assist in solving issues.

2.4 Does the force engage with partners to develop solutions where appropriate?

- 2.4.1 BTP are engaging effectively with a wide range of partners, stakeholders and agencies. They complete joint operations and share agreed targets. There are good examples of where effective shared problem solving has stopped ASB. These include working with Safer London

Transport Team, City of London Police and Network Rail. Within BTP areas they have a TOC lead and BTP lead regarding shared performance indicators.

- 2.4.2 Each NPT runs a PACT meeting which includes local partners and passenger representatives. BTP also sit on several other force local community meetings and Community Safety Partnerships.
- 2.4.3 Information sharing with partners and other organisations is good, and particularly so between BTP and the TOCs, where IT systems are readily accessible to both parties for searching and analysis. Sharing information with Home Office Forces is generally good although some forces are yet to engage as fully as others. BTP have IT systems embedded within their Intelligence Fusion Cell, for example the Metropolitan Police intelligence system. All data received from partners is analysed and forms part of the intelligence considered at tasking meetings.

Overall BTP have established excellent relationships with key partners and organisations to assist in identifying and solving ASB issues.

2.5 Are complainants of ASB contacted in line with their needs to update them on police action taken and to check on their view of progress of the reported incident?

- 2.5.1 Where incidents are placed onto the crime recording system they are subject to a computerised evaluation system. This enables the monitoring of incidents to ensure staff are investigating cases appropriately and updating victims. Supervisors are able to monitor the points system and are held to account for any incidents receiving a red or amber status. Victim care units also update victims. However ASB incidents that are not recorded on the crime recording system are not subject of structured monitoring, for instance those ASB incidents placed onto the intelligence system. HMIC reviewed intelligence reports and found that details of the action taken and results were recorded. The review of calls and incidents revealed a high level of customer focus by call handlers (98 out of 100 displayed good customer care and focus).
- 2.5.2 When a crime record is completed victims wishes in relation to how and when they want to be contacted for updates are detailed within the record. All contact is updated onto the crime record.
- 2.5.3 Victim care units and crime management centres update victims and the points system ensures follow up contact is carried out and recorded on the crime system. However those incidents which are not recorded on the crime recording system do not have a process to ensure follow up contact is conducted.

Overall victim care and updates were apparent for those incidents placed onto the crime recording system. The majority of reported ASB incidents appear to be recorded onto this system as BTP record a far higher number of bylaw incidents. However ASB incidents that do not fall into the crime record category, do not have a structured follow up contact process.

Appendix A

Results Tables for ASB Call Listening:

100 calls were listened to and the corresponding incident records examined. Some of the questions which were asked could not be applied to some of the calls. Any not applicable (n/a) answers have not been counted in the totals below. This means, for some questions, the number in the total box may be less than the total number of calls listened to.

HOW WELL DOES THE FORCE IDENTIFY REPEAT VICTIMS:			
Question	Y	N	Total
1. Have repeat occasions been verbally checked? LF 2.1.1	10	90	100
5. Has anything been recorded on the log to show that an attempt to identify a repeat caller/victim has been made? LF 2.1.1	8	92	100

HOW WELL DOES THE FORCE IDENTIFY VULNERABLE VICTIMS:			
Question	Y	N	Total
2. Has the vulnerability of the victim/caller been verbally checked? LF 2.1.2	10	90	100
2a. As a result was vulnerability identified LF 2.1.2	10	0	10
2b. If identified, what was the vulnerability? LF 2.1.2	Vulnerability Type	Number	Total
	Ethnicity	3	10
	Religion	0	
	Sexual orientation	0	
	Disability	0	
	Age	1	
	Gender	0	
	Other	6	
6. Does the log show all information about vulnerability (and any previous knowledge)? LF 2.1.2	Y	N	Total
	9	91	100

VICTIM CARE:			
Question	Y	N	Total
3. Is the operator victim focused? IC 2.5	98	2	100
13. Does the record show a meaningful timely update/result to the victim? LF 2.5.2	0	96	96

ACTION TAKEN:			
Question	Y	N	Total
7. Has an immediate check for hotspots/local priority area been recorded? LF 2.1.3	0	100	100

Question	Y	N	Total
10. Does the log show that the attending officers have been updated with repeat/vulnerable status? LF 2.2.2	2	81	83
12. Should a crime have been recorded? LF 2.2.7	42	58	100
12a. If a crime should have been recorded, was it? LF 2.2.7	31	11	42

OWNERSHIP:			
Question	Allocated to?	Number	Total
9. Who was the incident initially allocated to for action? LF 2.2.8	Response	80	
	CID	0	
	NPT/SNT	1	
	Other police dept	0	
	Other force	2	
	Other agency	0	
	Other	0	
	None	17	100

INCIDENT QUALITY, SUPERVISION AND CLOSURE:			
Question	Y	N	Total
4. Has there been a proportionate investigation by the operator? IC 2.1	98	2	100
8. Does the incident record reflect the call? LF 2.1.4	96	4	100
11. If attended by response has a comprehensive summary by response been recorded? LF 2.1.4	48	32	80
14. What is the closure code? LF 2.1.5	Correct Closing	Number	Total
	ASB E	0	
	ASB N	2	
	ASB P	0	
	Other	98	100
14a. Is the incident closure code correct?	Y	N	Total
	72	28	100
14b. If no, what should the closure code have been? LF 2.1.5	Correct Closing	Number	Total
	ASB E	0	
	ASB N	12	
	ASB P	0	
	Other	16	28
15. Has the incident been dealt with expeditiously? LF 2.2.7	Y	N	Total
	81	17	98
16. Does the record show evidence of supervisory guidance? LF 2.1.4	3	97	100
17. Does the record show that QA has been undertaken? LF 2.1.4	1	99	100

ANTI SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR IMPROVEMENT PLAN

SCT Portfolio Owner: ACC Territorial Policing & Crime

HMIC Anti Social Behaviour

Improvement Plan Owner: Ch Supt Territorial Policing

Ref	Area for Improvement	Due Date	Action Owner	Progress Update	Date of Update
AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT FROM DETAILED REPORT					
	BTP does not consistently ask questions of callers at the first point of contact to identify repeat and vulnerable callers – those most at risk of harm from ASB. This means some of these victims may not be getting the extra support they need.	30-Jun-12	Contacts Manager	In June 2012, BTP added a proforma to NSPIS C&C, whereby call handlers ask questions to ascertain whether the person is a repeat or vulnerable victim. Additionally the Force Crime Registrar has undertaken training in ASB for staff within the FCC, FCRB and FCRL between April and July 2012. Refresher / additional training is planned for supervisors on 17 and 18 October 2012. For the period August 2011 to January 2012, 81 vulnerable / repeat victims were identified compared with 686 for the period February to July 2012. This is an indication of the progress being made as a result of the training. Separately BTP undertook National Decision Making training from January to March 2012 which support staff to take the appropriate action once a repeat or vulnerable victim has been identified.	13-Sep-12
	Risk assessments are not being completed for ASB incidents. BTP are in the process of utilising a scored risk matrix to assist with prioritising tasking at TCGs, which could be used for risk assessing ASB.	31-Dec-12	T/Chief Inspector Territorial Policing	BTP has undertaken a scoping exercise with six Home Office forces who use similar models/best practice, including Cumbria and West Midlands and obtained copies of their risk assessments. The T/Chief Inspector, Territorial Policing is updating BTP's strategy to incorporate risk assessments. The new strategy will focus on ASB policy, toolkits, risk assessments and training package with a 'Manual of Standards' being produced for dissemination throughout BTP and will form the focus of the daily Territorial Policing teleconference.	12-Sep-12
	Repeat victims and vulnerable victims are not routinely and systematically being identified at the point of contact. Questions are not being asked of the caller. This has been recognised by BTP who have just completed training in control rooms. The NSPIS command and control system does not automatically identify callers previously assessed as repeat or vulnerable (although this could be done to a limited extent manually). Although the call taker is asked to consider vulnerability, there is generally no questioning of the caller to determine this.	31-Oct-12	Contacts Manager	In June 2012, BTP added a proforma to NSPIS C&C, whereby call handlers ask questions to ascertain whether the person is a repeat or vulnerable victim. Additionally the Force Crime Registrar has undertaken training in ASB for staff within the FCC, FCRB and FCRL between April and July 2012. Refresher / additional training is planned for supervisors on 17 and 18 October 2012. For the period August 2011 to January 2012, 81 vulnerable / repeat victims were identified compared with 686 for the period February to July 2012. This is an indication of the progress being made as a result of the training. Separately BTP undertook National Decision Making training from January to March 2012 which support staff to take the appropriate action once a repeat or vulnerable victim has been identified.	22-Aug-12
	Repeat and vulnerable victims are not considered within the existing performance framework. They are not routinely "tagged" on NSPIS and so are not easily identified.	31-Mar-13	Contacts Manager	Territorial Policing and Crime have introduced a KPI for 2012/13 to achieve a 30% rise in the identification of vulnerable and repeat victims in comparison with 2011/12. The routine tagging will be incorporated in the next upgrade of NSPIS C&C. BTP is reviewing its performance framework to identify meaningful KPIs with the overall objective of reducing repeat and vulnerable victims.	12-Sep-12
	Of the 100 ASB incidents reviewed, 42 involved crime. Of those only 31 were recorded as crimes.	31-Dec-12	Force Crime Registrar	BTP has a robust recording of crime system in place. BTP records non-recordable as well as notifiable offences, for example byelaws, littering, etc as well recordable offences. The failure identified by HMIC for data prior to April 2012, did not only consist of all notifiable offences; only 8 were notifiable for which crimes were raised. Through the audits undertaken by the Force Crime Registrar and his team, if an offence is identified that has not been recorded, it is automatically recorded and the Area Crime Management Unit Managers are advised. The remainder of offences that are non-notifiable were identified by HMIC because BTP links ASB with non-notifiable offence codes. BTP records non-notifiable offences when they are detected, but not those that are undetected. Since April 2012 when the training was provided, the number of non-notifiable offences recorded has increased by 6%; however BTP is still under-recording, but further training is taking place in October 2012 for supervisors in relation to this. Additional guidance has been produced by the Force Crime Registrar in relation to the Recording and Detection of non-notifiable offence in England & Wales, which has been distributed to allows officers to use their discretion in relation to this.	12-Sep-12
	There is no risk assessment framework for ASB within BTP and this means that at present the level of risk is currently unknown. Having a risk assessment would improve the level of service given to those ASB incidents that have been highlighted as posing more risk.	31-Dec-12	T/Chief Inspector Territorial Policing	BTP has been in contact with Cumbria and West Midlands and obtained copies of their risk assessments. The T/Chief Inspector, Territorial Policing is updating BTP's strategy to incorporate risk assessments. The First Contact Centre will be responsible for identifying whether a repeat / vulnerable victim is low, medium, high risk; this information will be passed to the attending officers.	22-Aug-12

Ref	Area for Improvement	Due Date	Action Owner	Progress Update	Date of Update
	Where ASB cases are closed on NSPIS, there is confusion between the categories of personal, environmental and nuisance. Out of 100 incidents reviewed by HMIC, 28 were incorrectly classified.	31-Dec-12	T/Chief Inspector Territorial Policing / Force Crime Registrar	BTP has a robust recording of crime system in place, as it records both non-recordable offences, for example byelaws, littering, etc as well recordable offences. At the time of the inspection BTP had only just introduced the ASB categories of personal, environmental and nuisance. The Force Crime Registrar has undertaken training in ASB for staff within the FCC, FCRB and FCRL between April and July 2012. Refresher / additional training is planned for supervisors on 17 and 18 October 2012. BTP employed a Crime Auditor in April 2012 to support the work of the First Contact Centre (FCC) in Birmingham in relation to classification of ASB cases.	11-Sep-12
	ASB incidents that relate to local priorities are not identified at the point of report within the control room.	31-Dec-12	Contacts Manager	The Force Crime Registrar has undertaken training with FCC and Force Control Rooms Birmingham and London. BTP has included definitions of Environmental, Personal and Nuisance in the ASB Strategy. Refresher / additional training is planned for supervisors in October 2012. The First Contact Centre (FCC) and the Force Control Rooms (FCR) cover significant geographical areas in England, Wales and Scotland. It should be noted that ASB is a core priority for all of BTP, therefore a suitable graded response is allocated as appropriate. At this time, whilst it would not be practical for FCC / FCR staff to have a list of geographical priorities, this would be flagged on Area.	12-Sep-12
Does the force understand its ASB issues and have leadership, governance, policy, and compliance checking to support this work?					
	Overall leadership and drive about ASB is displayed at differing levels. BTP staff do take ASB seriously and clearly understand the impact on 'station communities', rail staff and the travelling public. Contact centre and control room staff need to be made more aware of the importance of their role in identifying risk, vulnerability and harm when dealing with ASB. The release of the ASB strategy and recent training should see improvements in this area and BTP have employed a full time Quality Assurance Officer to check progress within control rooms and contact management.	31-Oct-12	Chief Superintendent Territorial Policing	In June 2012, BTP added a proforma to NSPIS C&C, whereby call handlers ask questions to ascertain whether the person is a repeat or vulnerable victim. Additionally the Force Crime Registrar has undertaken training in ASB for staff within the FCC, FCRB and FCRL between April and July 2012. Refresher / additional training is planned for supervisors on 17 and 18 October 2012. Separately BTP undertook National Decision Making training from January to March 2012 which support staff to take the appropriate action once a repeat or vulnerable victim has been identified.	22-Aug-12
1.1.1	BTP have a Chief Officer lead who drives ASB performance. Although this is recognised at superintending ranks and above lower ranks have less awareness of the ACPO lead. The BTP intranet website has had recent coverage of the newly released ASB strategy and this has assisted in raising staff awareness.	31-Oct-12	T/Chief Inspector Territorial Policing	Although BTP does include who the Chief Officer lead is within its training package (Assistant Chief Constable Territorial Policing & Crime), it will be updating the ASB strategy and undertaking a Communications strategy across BTP. Learning and Development has agreed to incorporate the following into new recruit, PC refresher and leadership courses from Autumn 2012: ASB training will now include the following: use of National Decision Making, vulnerable and repeat victims, use of assessments, ACPO details and enforcement options. The ACC Territorial Policing and Crime is working on a communications plan to raise the whole ASB agenda even more throughout BTP.	11-Sep-12
1.1.4	The force has recently delivered an ASB strategy which sets out and defines what ASB is including personal, environmental and nuisance. This covers a range of recordable and non recordable crime. The strategy highlights the need to focus on repeat and vulnerable victims but does not give definitions. Staff were unclear as to what the definitions were, although they knew of the strategy and were able to refer to it.	31-Oct-12	T/Chief Inspector Territorial Policing	The T/Chief Inspector, Territorial Policing is working with Leicestershire Constabulary in relation to definitions of vulnerable and repeat victims. This will be included in the revised ASB strategy that is being produced by the end of October 2012.	22-Aug-12
1.1.5	There is no graded response for ASB. Call handling staff and supervisors decide on response using their judgement. All staff have received training in the National Decision Making Model and it is expected that they will make informed decisions, taking into account all information presented, on how best to respond to the call. Where no police attendance occurs the call taker explains the reasons to the caller. Staff are not fully aware of the importance of ASB within control rooms or contact management, however the ASB strategy is assisting in increasing knowledge and awareness.	31-Oct-12	Contacts Manager / T/Chief Inspector Territorial Policing	In June 2012, BTP added a proforma to NSPIS C&C, whereby call handlers ask questions to ascertain whether the person is a repeat or vulnerable victim. Additionally the Force Crime Registrar has undertaken training in ASB for staff within the FCC, FCRB and FCRL between April and July 2012. Refresher / additional training is planned for supervisors on 17 and 18 October 2012. Separately BTP undertook National Decision Making training from January to March 2012 which support staff to take the appropriate action once a repeat or vulnerable victim has been identified. The types of calls relating to ASB could include person swearing, drunkenness, loitering, graffiti and youths skateboarding.	22-Aug-12
1.1.6	Although there is no designated "marketing strategy" for ASB, BTP uses the media and other forms of marketing to both gather information and to feedback to the public. This includes local PACT meetings, newsletters, posters, TV, newspaper, social networks and You Tube.	31-Oct-12	T/Chief Inspector Territorial Policing	BTP is currently updating the ASB strategy and once this is completed in October 2012 there will be a communications strategy to support this. The ACC Territorial Policing and Crime is working on a communications plan to raise the whole ASB agenda even more throughout BTP.	22-Aug-12

Ref	Area for Improvement	Due Date	Action Owner	Progress Update	Date of Update
1.1.7	Abstraction is closely monitored with regular dip sampling to ensure the target of 80% is being met. ASB training does occur for new officers as part of basic training but also as part of NPT training. The training focuses upon the NPT officer role and how to problem solve, although not all officers had received this. There are many avenues for problem solving advice including Crime Reduction Advisors, TOC advisors and IAGs, who can assist in problem solving advice. There is a tool box on the intranet however this was not widely used or known about.	31-Oct-12	T/Chief Inspector Territorial Policing	A Sergeant within Territorial Policing has been tasked with producing more effective toolkits for BTP, including a community engagement toolkit. This will then be incorporated within the revised BTP ASB Strategy, which will be disseminated via the communications strategy.	22-Aug-12
Does the force have ASB embedded in its performance management regime?					
	Overall BTP have a robust performance management regime in measuring ASB, this is based on the number of incidents recorded and the number of formal case management plans carried out. They are moving to more local based targets and these will include a mixture of 'quantitative' and 'qualitative' targets. BTP are not measuring against risk or repeat and vulnerable ASB.	31-Mar-13	Chief Superintendent Territorial Policing	Territorial Policing and Crime have introduced a KPI for 2012/13 to achieve a 30% rise in the identification of vulnerable and repeat victims in comparison with 2011/12. BTP is reviewing its performance framework to identify meaningful KPIs with the overall objective of reducing repeat and vulnerable victims.	22-Aug-12
1.2.1	There is an ASB delivery plan to monitor the six themes of the ASB strategy and each area reports progress against the themes. However under the ASB Strategy theme "focus on vulnerable and repeat victims" it is documented that when a report is received a graded response will follow taking into account the risk. HMIC could not find any mention in the delivery plan regarding graded response or risk assessing. The strategy does not give definitions of repeat and vulnerable victims.	31-Oct-12	T/Chief Inspector Territorial Policing	BTP has been in contact with Cumbria and West Midlands and obtained copies of their risk assessments. The T/Chief Inspector, Territorial Policing is updating BTP's strategy to incorporate risk assessments. The new strategy will focus on ASB policy, toolkits, risk assessments and training packages with a 'Manual of Standards' being produced for dissemination throughout BTP. This will be delivered through training, the Communications strategy and also through monitoring on Area / BTP teleconferences.	22-Aug-12
1.2.3	At the highest level the force manages performance through the monthly force management team meeting, chaired by the DCC. ASB, along with other areas, gets discussed and challenged during part one of this meeting. This does not include measuring performance on repeat victimisation and vulnerability.	31-Mar-13	Ch Supt Territorial Policing / Head of Performance and Analysis	Territorial Policing and Crime have introduced a KPI for 2012/13 to achieve a 30% rise in the identification of vulnerable and repeat victims in comparison with 2011/12. Additionally Territorial Policing is working with Performance and Analysis to identify 'hot spots' in relation to ASB. BTP is reviewing its performance framework to identify meaningful KPIs with the overall objective of reducing repeat and vulnerable victims.	12-Sep-12
1.2.4	Areas have fortnightly meetings to discuss and challenge areas of performance that includes ASB. Each area sets its own targets for ASB and is then held to account by the force management team. When performance starts to dip the ACC in charge of Territorial Policing ensures Area Commanders have effective plans to deliver improvement. However, in the absence of readily available performance information this does not include performance in relation to repeat and vulnerable victims.	31-Mar-13	Chief Superintendent Territorial Policing	Territorial Policing and Crime have introduced a KPI for 2012/13 to achieve a 30% rise in the identification of vulnerable and repeat victims in comparison with 2011/12. It is monitored through Service Excellence Board and at Area Management Team meetings.	12-Sep-12
1.2.5	NPTs and Train Operating Company (TOC) staff have received awards recognising their work on ASB. However there was general feeling that ASB achievements are not recognised as much as other areas of policing and no examples of recognition could be given.	31-Oct-12	T/Chief Inspector Territorial Policing	The T/Chief Inspector, Territorial Policing is formulating a proposal for the Chief Superintendent and ACC Territorial Policing, to hold a national awards ceremony for the best ASB initiatives. Categories would include most effective Problem Solving Plans, best joint working, most cost effective reduction in ASB and recognition of SPCs for tackling ASB.	22-Aug-12
Does the force manage ASB problems through NIM processes?					
1.3.2	The force intelligence bureaux complete analytical products relating to ASB locally and force wide. They utilise BTP data and third party data from other agencies and organisations. BTP analysts use data on repeat locations and repeat victims to identify hotspots, but this does not include an assessment of the risk posed to victims. An assessment is completed when tasking out resources at the TCGs by the chair, but ASB is not always prioritised by risk level. HMIC note that there is a recently compiled risk assessment for tasking and once this is rolled out this should assist.	31-Mar-13	Head of Performance and Analysis	Territorial Policing is working with Performance and Analysis to identify 'hot spots' in relation to ASB. The analysis will focus on: vulnerable and repeat victims, ASB in relation to nuisance, environment and personal which will in turn identify the 'hot spot' locations. Once identified, these will be passed to NPTs through tasking, with the location being re-evaluated to see if there has been a reduction.	12-Sep-12
At the point of contact, does the force effectively identify and record incidents of ASB, repeat and vulnerable complainants?					
	Overall BTP are not consistently and systematically identifying repeat and vulnerable ASB victims at the point of report. However the force does have other processes within crime recording and intelligence which will identify repeat victims at a later stage. It is noted that training has been completed and improvements should be seen. Tags on the computer system, to identify repeat or vulnerable victims, are not used.	31-Oct-12	Chief Superintendent Territorial Policing	In June 2012, BTP added a proforma to NSPIS C&C, whereby call handlers ask questions to ascertain whether the person is a repeat or vulnerable victim. Additionally the Force Crime Registrar has undertaken training in ASB for staff within the FCC, FCRB and FCRL between April and July 2012. Refresher / additional training is planned for supervisors on 17 and 18 October 2012. Separately BTP undertook National Decision Making training from January to March 2012 which support staff to take the appropriate action once a repeat or vulnerable victim has been identified. The routine tagging will be incorporated in the next upgrade of NSPIS C&C.	12-Sep-12

Ref	Area for Improvement	Due Date	Action Owner	Progress Update	Date of Update
2.1.1	Repeat victims are not routinely and systematically being identified at the time of report. Of 100 calls listened to by HMIC, only 10 showed evidence of repeat victimisation being discussed with the caller. All of those 10 involved the caller offering this information rather than being questioned about it. Training has been introduced and improvements have been seen. This is being monitored by BTP. IT systems do not currently assist in the identification of repeat victims although this is being planned for latest version of the NSPIS system. Tags are not being used and at present manual searching has to be completed on names.	31-Oct-12	Contacts Manager / Force Crime Registrar	In June 2012, BTP added a proforma to NSPIS C&C, whereby call handlers ask questions to ascertain whether the person is a repeat or vulnerable victim. Additionally the Force Crime Registrar has undertaken training in ASB for staff within the FCC, FCRB and FCRL between April and July 2012. Refresher / additional training is planned for supervisors on 17 and 18 October 2012. Separately BTP undertook National Decision Making training from January to March 2012 which support staff to take the appropriate action once a repeat or vulnerable victim has been identified. The routine tagging will be incorporated in the next upgrade of NSPIS C&C.	12-Sep-12
2.1.2	Vulnerable victims are not routinely and systematically being identified at the time of reporting. Of 100 calls listened to by HMIC, only 10 showed evidence of vulnerable victims being discussed with the caller. Call handlers are not consistently asking questions to assess vulnerability. The computer system does not display if the victim has previously been classed as vulnerable. Training has been put in place and improvements have been seen. This is being monitored by BTP.	31-Oct-12	Contacts Manager / Force Crime Registrar	In June 2012, BTP added a proforma to NSPIS C&C, whereby call handlers ask questions to ascertain whether the person is a repeat or vulnerable victim. Additionally the Force Crime Registrar has undertaken training in ASB for staff within the FCC, FCRB and FCRL between April and July 2012. Refresher / additional training is planned for supervisors on 17 and 18 October 2012. Separately BTP undertook National Decision Making training from January to March 2012 which support staff to take the appropriate action once a repeat or vulnerable victim has been identified. The routine tagging will be incorporated in the next upgrade of NSPIS C&C.	12-Sep-12
2.1.3	There is no system to identify if an incident relates to local NPT priorities such as on-going operations or Problem Solving Plans (PSPs). Call handlers are not briefed about local priorities.	31-Oct-12	Contacts Manager / T/Chief Inspector Territorial Policing	The Force Crime Registrar has undertaken training with FCC and Force Control Rooms Birmingham and London. BTP has included definitions of Environmental, Personal and Nuisance in the ASB Strategy. Refresher / additional training is planned for supervisors in October 2012. The First Contact Centre (FCC) and the Force Control Rooms (FCR) cover significant geographical areas in England, Wales and Scotland. It should be noted that ASB is a core priority for all of BTP, therefore a suitable graded response is allocated as appropriate. At this time, whilst it would not be practical for FCC / FCR staff to have a list of geographical priorities, this would be flagged on Area.	22-Aug-12
2.1.4	Although supervisors are expected to dip sample calls this is not happening on a regular basis. BTP have just recruited a quality assurance officer whose role will be checking call handling. Victim surveys are completed centrally and a call-back system has been introduced. Of the 100 incident records reviewed HMIC found evidence of supervisory guidance recorded on only three and evidence of a quality check recorded on only one.	31-Oct-12	Contacts Manager	BTP undertook National Decision Making training from January to March 2012, which has seen an increase in the number of identified repeat and vulnerable victims. In June 2012, BTP added a proforma to NSPIS C&C, whereby call handlers ask questions to ascertain whether the person is a repeat or vulnerable victim. Additionally the Force Crime Registrar has undertaken training in ASB for staff within the FCC, FCRB and FCRL between April and July 2012 to make staff more aware of the importance of their role in relation to ASB. Refresher / additional training specifically aimed at supervisors and their role is planned for October 2012.	22-Aug-12
2.1.5	The three codes, personal, environmental and nuisance, have only just been introduced and their use in opening (and closing) incidents is not well understood by operators and call handlers.	31-Oct-12	Contacts Manager / Force Crime Registrar	The Force Crime Registrar has undertaken training in ASB for staff within the FCC, FCRB and FCRL between April and July 2012 to make staff more aware of the importance of their role in relation to ASB. Refresher / additional training is planned for supervisors on 17 and 18 October 2012.	22-Aug-12

Does the force respond to reports of ASB in accordance with force policy and adopt a short-term problem-solving approach, with partner agencies where appropriate?

Overall BTP records a higher number of incidents onto their crime recording systems than Home Office Forces. These all fall under a prioritised 'points system' which ensures compliance and investigation. However processes are not in place for dealing with ASB incidents in a structured manner, from time of report.	31-Oct-12	Chief Superintendent Territorial Policing	BTP has formalised the process in relation to ASB incidents through National Decision Making training in January to March 2012, the addition of a proforma to NSPIS C&C, whereby call handlers ask questions to ascertain whether the person is a repeat or vulnerable victim and training, via the Force Crime Registrar for staff within the FCC, FCRB and FCRL between April and July 2012 to make staff more aware of the importance of their role in relation to ASB. Refresher / additional training specifically aimed at supervisors and their role is planned for October 2012.	22-Aug-12
Call handling staff do not receive training regarding ASB. They were aware of the new personal, environmental, and nuisance codes but were not always clear of the meaning.	31-Oct-12	Contacts Manager / Force Crime Registrar	BTP undertook National Decision Making training from January to March 2012. Additionally the Force Crime Registrar has undertaken training in ASB for staff within the FCC, FCRB and FCRL between April and July 2012 to make staff more aware of the importance of their role in relation to ASB. Refresher / additional training is planned for supervisors on 17 and 18 October 2012.	22-Aug-12
Call handling staff do not systematically pass information about the history of repeat victimisation or vulnerability to attending staff.	31-Dec-12	Contacts Manager	There is a process in place whereby officers attending an incident are informed of all the information available on an NSPIS C&C log, including whether it is a repeat or vulnerable victim. The Real Time Intelligence officer are now checking background history and vulnerabilities of the caller / victim.	12-Sep-12

Ref	Area for Improvement	Due Date	Action Owner	Progress Update	Date of Update
2.2.3	It is unclear if all ASB incidents reported to BTP are being recorded onto the crime recording systems. HMIC spoke to managers from crime recording and contact management and they believed that there may be gaps in ASB recording, for example they were unsure what the process would be if a complainant contacted BTP by letter. There was evidence of ASB incidents reported directly to patrolling staff being placed onto the force intelligence system rather than being recorded as an incident. However, intelligence records included follow up enquiries and results clearly displaying action.	31-Mar-13	T/Chief Inspector Territorial Policing	As not all ASB incidents are crimes, it would depend on the type of incident referred to via emails / letters / twitter feeds as to whether it would be added to NSPIS C&C. If an incident is not crimed, a 5x5x5 would be submitted via the Force Intelligence System, which would be considered at the Tactical Analysis meeting and Area tasking. For incidents where there is no crime, BTP are endeavouring to put interventions in place that will ensure that quality of life issues are addressed appropriately. This will include addressing issues by the implementation of problem solving plans and high visibility patrols.	12-Sep-12
2.2.4	ASB offenders and locations are included in briefings to officers and staff. However repeat victims do not often feature in these briefings. CID and response officers both have access to crime mapping which displays hot spots and there was evidence of this being used regularly. Where appropriate, ASB features on the daily briefing on the intranet and this, again, is regularly reviewed by CID and response officers. Analysts, on occasions, will go out and brief officers on particular issues. All Problem Solving Plans have clear ownership. NPTs have a clear view of ASB issues in their areas and displayed good knowledge of issues and trends.	31-Mar-13	Chief Superintendent Territorial Policing	Territorial Policing is working with Performance and Analysis to identify 'hot spots' in relation to ASB. The analysis will focus on: vulnerable and repeat victims, ASB in relation to nuisance, environment and personal which will in turn identify the 'hot spot' locations. Once identified, these will be passed to NPTs through tasking, with the location being re-evaluated to see if there has been a reduction.	12-Sep-12
2.2.6	A tool kit of potential tactical options to tackle ASB is available on the intranet but it is not widely known about or used	31-Oct-12	T/Chief Inspector Territorial Policing	A Sergeant within Territorial Policing has been tasked with producing more effective toolkits for BTP, including a community engagement toolkit. This will then be incorporated within the revised BTP ASB Strategy, which will be disseminated via the communications strategy.	22-Aug-12
2.2.7	Short term ASB that is recorded onto the crime system is monitored and both recordable and non recordable incidents are subject to a computerised „points system in which all ASB incidents are scored and prioritised. This ensures the monitoring of follow up care, updates and investigation. ASB issues placed onto the intelligence system are not supervised. Although incident records on NSPIS displayed a low number of supervised entries (out of 100 entries reviewed only 3 showed supervisory oversight), the majority of these incidents were entered on the crime recording system which ensures strict supervision.	31-Oct-12	Contacts Manager / Force Crime Registrar	In June 2012, BTP added a proforma to NSPIS C&C, whereby call handlers ask questions to ascertain whether the person is a repeat or vulnerable victim. Additionally the Force Crime Registrar has undertaken training in ASB for staff within the FCC, FCRB and FCRL between April and July 2012 to make staff more aware of the importance of their role in relation to ASB. Refresher / additional training specifically aimed at supervisors and their role is planned for 17 and 18 October 2012.	22-Aug-12
Does the force effectively put in place long term problem solving solutions, with partners where appropriate?					
2.3.5	BTP do not complete any risk assessments for ASB. Problem Solving Plans do not have risk assessments completed as part of the overall plan	31-Dec-12	T/Chief Inspector Territorial Policing	BTP has undertaken a scoping exercise with six Home Office forces who use similar models/best practice, including Cumbria and West Midlands and obtained copies of their risk assessments. The T/Chief Inspector, Territorial Policing is updating BTP's strategy to incorporate risk assessments. The new strategy will focus on ASB policy, toolkits, risk assessments and training package with a 'Manual of Standards' being produced for dissemination throughout BTP and will form the focus of the daily Territorial Policing teleconference.	12-Sep-12
Are complainants of ASB contacted in line with their needs to update them on police action taken and to check on their view of progress of the reported incident?					
Overall victim care and updates were apparent for those incidents placed onto the crime recording system. The majority of reported ASB incidents appear to be recorded onto this system as BTP record a far higher number of byelaw incidents. However ASB incidents that do not fall into the crime record category, do not have a structured follow up contact process.		31-Dec-12	Chief Superintendent Territorial Policing	BTP records a high level of non-recordable and recordable crimes (which would not be recorded by Home Office Forces) and are subject to supervisory overview and follow up via Crime Management Units and Area tasking. If an incident is not crimed, the information is placed on the Force Intelligence System.	12-Sep-12
2.5.1	Where incidents are placed onto the crime recording system they are subject to a computerised evaluation system. This enables the monitoring of incidents to ensure staff are investigating cases appropriately and updating victims. Supervisors are able to monitor the points system and are held to account for any incidents receiving a red or amber status Victim care units also update victims. However ASB incidents that are not recorded on the crime recording system are not subject of structured monitoring, for instance those ASB incidents placed onto the intelligence system. HMIC reviewed intelligence reports and found that details of the action taken and results were recorded. The review of calls and incidents revealed a high level of customer focus by call handlers (98 out of 100 displayed good customer care and focus).	31-Dec-12	Chief Superintendent Territorial Policing	BTP records a high level of non-recordable and recordable crimes (which would not be recorded by Home Office Forces) and are subject to supervisory overview and follow up via Crime Management Units and Area tasking. If an incident is not crimed, the information is placed on the Force Intelligence System.	12-Sep-12
2.5.3	Victim care units and crime management centres update victims and the points system ensures follow up contact is carried out and recorded on the crime system. However those incidents which are not recorded on the crime recording system do not have a process to ensure follow up contact is conducted.	31-Dec-12	Chief Superintendent Territorial Policing	BTP records a high level of non-recordable and recordable crimes (which would not be recorded by Home Office Forces) and are subject to supervisory overview and follow up via Crime Management Units and Area tasking. If an incident is not crimed, the information is placed on the Force Intelligence System.	12-Sep-12