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BRITISH TRANSPORT POLICE

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REPORT TO:	British Transport Police Authority
DATE:	26 May 2011
SUBJECT:	British Transport Police Review of Coroner's Inquests Recommendations into the London Bombings of 7 July 2005
SPONSOR:	ACC Stephen Thomas
AUTHOR:	Inspector Janet Doel

1 PURPOSE OF PAPER

1.1 This paper will consider the appropriate actions that British Transport Police (BTP) should take as a result of the report into the London Bombings of 7 July 2005, by the Coroner the Rt. Hon. Lady Justice Hallet DBE.

2 BACKGROUND

2.1 Where a Coroner is satisfied that the evidence gives rise to a concern that circumstances creating a risk of other deaths will occur or continue to exist in the future, and is of the opinion that action should be taken to prevent the occurrence or continuation of such circumstances, she may report the circumstances to a person whom she believes has power to take action. The Coroner announced in court on 11 March 2011 that she was proposing to make such a report under Rule 43 of the Coroners Rules 1984 ("the Rules").

2.2 The Coroner's report was published on the 6 May 2011. The Report makes nine recommendations, which are addressed to the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Director General of Security Service, London Resilience Team, Transport for London, London Ambulance Service, Secretary of State for Health, Barts & London NHS Trust.

2.3 By virtue of Rule 43A(1), as a recipient of the report the addressees must provide the Coroner with a written response, containing details of any action that has been taken or which are proposed to be taken in response to those parts of the report that are addressed to the addressee.

2.4 BTP are not specifically addressed by the Coroner; however the force has reviewed the nine recommendations (refer to Appendix A) and proactively engaged the London Resilience Team and Transport for London.

2.5 The Deputy Mayor, Richard Barnes, is reviewing the report on behalf of the London Resilience Team. Mr. Barnes has indicated that he will chair a meeting of senior staff from the partner agencies to produce a response to the Coroner. It is anticipated that the meeting will be in the form of a workshop which will review both the recommendations and the narrative within the Coroner's report. The expectation is that the partners will then produce an implementation plan. A formal note is anticipated from the Deputy Mayors office by the end of May 2011 outlining this process. BTP will be a part of this process. (refer to Appendix B outlines London Resilience Team approach)

2.6 Recommendations of particular relevance to BTP are summarised as follows:

- R3 – Multi-Agency Frontline Training
- R4 – Protocols for Tfl alerting the emergency services to Major Incidents and other network emergencies
- R5 – Rendezvous points (RVPs) at LU Stations
- R6 Sharing info on status of the traction current.

Outline of Coroners Recommendations

2.7 R3 - Multi-Agency Frontline Training

2.7.1. *Recommendation 3 states: 'I recommend that the LRT reviews the provision of inter-agency major incident training for frontline staff, particular with reference to the London Underground system.'*

2.7.2. In response to this recommendation; the current training that BTP completes in respect of major incidents and associated issues is that all police officers, PCSO's and Special Constables receive major incident training within their initial training. The Learning & Development Department will be providing additional Major Incident Training to all Sergeants and Inspectors. This will be a two day package which will be completed by January 2012. There will be 33 courses with 14 students on each course. (refer to Appendix C for Outline of Major Incident Training Overview)

2.7.3. Training enables individuals to understand their role within a major incident scenario. Exercising enables organisations to test their contingency and emergency plans and is not a test of individuals. The Coroner's recommendation refers to training and not exercising, this will need to be clarified in discussing with the London Resilience Team Workshops.

2.7.4. In respect of current multi-agency work, the main thrust is around testing current plans by exercising. BTP completes a number of multi-agency exercises across the country; these are usually in the form of table top exercises. The current tabletop exercises that BTP lead on are within the Olympic and Paralympic Games programme. The programme of testing and exercising is owned and managed and coordinated by the Force Headquarters Operations Department

2.7.5. London Underground completes a multi-agency exercise on an annual basis to comply with their operating licence. BTP is a key partner in this process.

2.8 R4 - Protocols for TFL alerting the emergency services to Major Incidents and other network emergencies.

2.8.1. *Recommendation 4 states: 'I recommend that TfL and the LRT review the protocols by which TfL (i) is alerted to major incidents declared by the emergency services that affect the underground network, and (ii) informs the emergency services of an emergency on its own network (including issuing of a 'code amber' or a 'code red', or the ordering of an evacuation).'*

2.8.2. BTP has a contingency plan that deals with the declaration of a major incident and this plan outlines what the immediate actions the Force Control Room staff are required to implement. This plan will be reviewed in the light of the Coroner's recommendations in liaison with the other emergency services and London Underground to ensure that procedures remain fit for purpose.

2.8.3. BTP contingency plans are governed and managed by FHQ Operations Department and they will monitor progress of this recommendation via the London Resilience Team workshops.

2.9 R5 - RVPs at LU Stations

2.9.1. *Recommendation 5 states: 'I recommend that TfL and the LRT review the procedures by which (i) a common initial rendezvous point is established, and its location communicated to all the arriving emergency services (ii) the initial rendezvous point is permanently manned by the appropriate member of London Underground.'*

2.9.2. London Underground has pre-determined RVP's at each underground station which are designed to be used by the Fire Service. In the event of a terrorist incident it not desirable for the police to have a pre-determined RVP, hence the decision is one to be made on the day dependant upon the circumstances. For major incidents the 'first officer at the scene' nominates a RVP as they are in the best position to access the situation.

2.10 R6- Sharing info on status of the traction current

2.10.1. *Recommendation 6 states: 'I recommend that TfL and the LRT review the procedures by which confirmation is sought on behalf of any or all the emergency services that the traction current is off, and by which that confirmation is disseminated.'*

2.10.2. This recommendation relates primarily to the Fire Service

2.10.3. BTP has a robust track safety Standard Operating Procedure which has been reviewed and republished in March 2011 by FHQ Operations Department. This outlines the procedure that staff are required to follow when the traction current needs to be turned off.

2.10.4. The Force Control Room(s) have a long standing system of communicating with the rail industry in relation to power on/off.

2.10.5. FHQ Operations Department will oversee the progress on this on behalf BTP

3 FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS – NO

3.1 There are currently no additional financial implications at this time; this will however be reviewed after the London Resilience Team workshop implementation plan.

4 RISK IMPLICATIONS – Low

4.1 The operational risks to the BTP are currently being managed and are assessed as low as reasonably practicable.

4.2 The reputational risk to the force of non compliance with the recommendations will be mitigated by our participation with the London Resilience Team Workshops and involvement in any action plans.

5 DIVERSITY ISSUES

5.1 No diversity issues anticipated at this time.

6 NEXT STEPS

6.1 BTP will engage fully with the London Resilience Team and attend the Multi-Agency workshops to address the report recommendations.

6.2 The FHQ Operations Department will oversee and monitor progress on behalf of the Chief Constable.

6.3 The BTPA will be provided progress reports via the Senior Command Team.

Appendix A

Coroner's 9 Recommendations

No.	Recommendation	Addressee
R1	I recommend that consideration be given to whether the procedures can be improved to ensure that 'human sources' who are asked to view photographs are shown copies of the photographs of the best quality, consistent with operational sensitivities.	Secretary of State for the Home Office Director general of the Security Service
R2	I recommend that procedures be examined by the Security Service to establish is there is room for further improvement in the recording of decisions relation to the assessment of targets.	Secretary of State for the Home Office Director general of the Security Service
R3	I recommend that the London Resilience Team reviews the provision of inter-agency major incident training for front line staff, particularly with reference to the London Underground system	London Resilience Team
R4	I recommend that TfL and the LRT review the protocols by which TfL (i) is alerted to major incidents declared by the emergency services that affect the underground network, and (ii) informs the emergency services of an emergency on its own network (including issuing of a 'code amber' or a 'code red', or the ordering of an evacuation).	TfL London Resilience Team
R5	I recommend that TfL and the LRT review the procedures by which (i) a common initial rendezvous point is established, and its location communicated to all the arriving emergency services (ii) the initial rendezvous point is permanently manned by the appropriate member of London Underground.	TfL London Resilience Team
R6	I recommend that TfL and the LRT review the procedures by which confirmation is sought on behalf of any or all the emergency services that the traction current is off, and by which that confirmation is disseminated.	TfL London Resilience Team

R7	I recommend that TfL (i) reconsider whether it is practicable to provide first aid equipment on underground trains, either in the driver's cab or at some other suitable location, and (ii) carry out a further review of station stretchers to confirm whether they are suitable for use on both stations and trains.	TfL
R8	I recommend that the LAS, together with the Barts and London NHS trust (on behalf of the LAA) review existing training in relation to multi casualty triage (ie the process of triage sieve) in particular with respect to the role of basic medical intervention.	LAS Barts & London NHS trust
R9	I recommend that the Department of Health, the mayor of London , the London resilience team and any other relevant bodies review the emergency medical care of the type provided by LAA and MERIT and, in particular (i) its capability and (ii) its funding.	Secretary of State for Health London Resilience Team

Appendix B

London Resilience Team – Proposed Action Plan

The 7/7 inquest report was published on 6 May 11. LRT was named in 5 of the 9 recommendations and must reply to the Coroner within 56 days (1 Jul 11). You will understand that speed is of the essence in developing the response. The aim of this informal e-mail is to:

- Outline approach that we will be take.
- Summarise the considerations behind the approach.

Richard Barnes, as Chair of the London Resilience Forum will write to relevant Chief Officers of the partnership in the next week, requesting them to take part in workshop to develop the response to the Coroner. Details for the process such as dates, places etc are still being developed.

The Approach

Richard Barnes, supported by a panel of 2 or 3 senior managers from within the wider partnership and with support from technical specialists as required, will facilitate a workshop to consider the report and agree a response to the Coroner. Responders invited to the workshop will include:

- Metropolitan Police Service
- British Transport Police
- City Of London Police
- London Fire Brigade
- London Ambulance Service
- Transport for London

The Secretariat for the workshop will be provided by the Greater London Authority and London Resilience Team.

Factors Behind the Approach

- The Coroner's report is divided into two principle sections, Preventability and Emergency Response. The workshop will consider the recommendations within the context of the narrative in the Emergency Response section.

- The focus of the workshop will be to develop a multi-agency plan to implement the recommendations in the report.

- Recommendations of particular relevance:

- R3 - multi-agency frontline training
- R4 - Protocols for Tfl alerting the emergency services to Major Incidents and other network emergencies.
- R5 - RVPs at LU Stations
- R6- Sharing info on status of the traction current
- R9 - London Air Ambulance. Neither GLA nor LRT has any role in the implementation of Recommendation 9 (London Air Ambulance) and, at this stage, it is anticipated that the workshop will not consider the issue.

- The aim is to submit the response to the Coroner in June because 1 Jul is very close to the anniversary of the 7 July attacks.

- The Mayor will sign the LRT submission to the Coroner. We should note the need to coordinate the response across other agencies including Central Government and Tfl.

Appendix C

BRITISH TRANSPORT POLICE - MAJOR INCIDENT TRAINING

Rank(s) Aimed At	Title of Course	Provided By	Duration	Short Overview of Course Content
PCSO	MI awareness training (Incorporated into initial training -MANDATORY)	L&D	Short input	Ensure PCSO's know what action to take at the initial response stage of a MI.
Control Room Staff	MI awareness training (MANDATORY)	FCR/L staff	Short input	Ensure FCRL/B know what action to take at the initial response stage of a MI.
Constable	MI awareness and fatality training (Incorporated into initial training MANDATORY)	L&D	2 days	Ensure probationer constables know what action to take at the initial response stage of a MI. Includes a table top exercise
Sergeant	Supervisors Course (PC-PS)	L&D	2 Hours	Ensure Sergeants understand the dynamics of a MI, and understand what role they may be required to perform.
Contingency Planning Officers and their supervisors	Various Emergency Planning Courses	Emergency Planning College	2 days	Various EP & BC courses for specialist planners.
Multi Agency Gold Incident Command (MAGIC)	Ch Superintendents and ACPO officers	NPIA	2 days	MAGIC is aimed at category 1 responders from the 'blue light' services and partner agencies who would normally perform strategic (Gold) command for their organisation during a major incident/civil emergency.
Major Incident Analysis Module	Appointed analysts and senior analysts	NPIA	5 Days	Newly appointed within a major incident team and analysts who may be asked to support major incident investigations as a part of their duties.
Constable, Sergeant and Police Staff	Loggist training	HPA	2 days	Training package developed between British Transport Police & HPA, for training loggists for events and incidents. Currently under review by L&D for the Olympics.
Sergeant, Inspector & Police Staff equivalent	CLDP (Ops 1 module)	L&D	½ day input	Ensure Sergeants & Inspectors understand the dynamics of a MI, and understand what role they may be required to perform.