BRITISH TRANSPORT POLICE AUTHORITY

REVIEW OF NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICING IN THE BRITISH TRANSPORT POLICE

Acknowledgements & Chair's foreword

[to be completed]

CONTENTS

Acronyms and abbreviations

ACC	Assistant Chief Constable
ACPO	Association of Chief Police Officers
AIB	Area Intelligence Bureau
APA	Association of Police Authorities
ASB	Anti Social Behaviour
ATW	Arriva Trains Wales
BCS	British Crime Survey
BCU	Basic Command Unit
BTP	British Transport Police
BTPA	British Transport Police Authority
CAPS	Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy
CRO	Crime Reduction Officers
DETR	Department for the Environment Transport and Regions
DfT	Department for Transport
PDA	Personal Digital Assistant
DPTAC	Disabled Persons Transport Advisory Committee
DRC	Disability Rights Commission
FHQ	Force Headquarters
FIB	Force Intelligence Bureau
HMIC	Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary
KIN	Key Individual Network
LU	London Underground
NP	Neighbourhood Policing
NPIA	National Police Improvement Agency
NPS	National Passenger Survey
NPT	Neighbourhood Policing Team
NRPP	National Reassurance Policing Programme
PACT	Police and Communities Together
PC	Police Constable
PCSOs	Police Community Support Officers
PSP	Problem Solving Plans
REO	Railway Enforcement Officers
RSSB	Rail Safety and Standards Board
SR&CS	Stakeholder Relations & Communication Strategy Committee

1. Introduction

1.1 Background to the evaluation

1.1.1

The 2004 Government White Paper, and subsequent 2005 Home Office publication 'Neighbourhood Policing, Your police; your community; our commitment[1] set out the Government's specific intentions in relation to delivery of neighbourhood policing teams across England and Wales. In particular the Home Office gave a commitment that by 2008;

> *'every area in England and Wales will benefit from dedicated, visible accessible and responsive neighbourhood policing teams – led by officers but involving special constables, community support officers, volunteers, neighbourhood wardens and others too[2] '*

1.1.2

While the White Paper made it clear that the Government did not intend to prescribe a one-size fits all template for what neighbourhood policing must look like in every area, it did establish the following as the key features shared by all successful teams[3];

- Dedicated resources for neighbourhoods which include the extended police family – which are appropriate to the local neighbourhood
- An emphasis on local problem solving with appropriate mechanisms in place for doing so
- Engagement with communities using a range of appropriate methods with a focus on public involvement in both identifying and prioritising problems
- Mechanisms in place to target resources and hold partners to account for delivery

1.1.3

In its 2005 -8 Strategic Plan, the British Transport Police (BTP) stated its intention to mirror Home Office plans for Reassurance and Neighbourhood Policing (NP) whilst adapting them to the unique environment in which it

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[1] Home Office (2005) 'Neighbourhood Policing. Your police; your community, our commitment. Home Office Communication Directorate, London.
[2] Home Office (2005) 'Neighbourhood Policing. Your police; your community, our commitment.p2. Home Office Communication Directorate, London.
[3] Home Office (2004) 'Building Communities, Beating Crime'. Home Office, London, p20

operated. This was reinforced in the following years by a DfT recommendation for BTP to continue developing its neighbourhood policing model, and by investment from Train Operating Companies which was directed specifically towards NP.

1.1.4

BTP's London Underground Area began introducing a reassurance policing model, the precursor to Neighbourhood Policing, in 2002. The roll-out of Neighbourhood Policing on the railways began in 2006 with five pilot areas which were located and scoped jointly with key stakeholders. Primarily, the locations selected had suffered disproportionately high levels of crime and disorder and were stretches of railway territory that could be easily identified and quantified.

1.1.5

Since 2006 a total of 34 neighbourhood teams (28 fully established and 6 further newly implemented teams) have been introduced across the overground rail network, the most recent of these being the suburban overground teams funded by the London Mayor. The BTP neighbourhood policing programme has also been a focus for reinvestment of resources identified via the Force's efficiency programme – Frontline First.

1.2   Aims of the review

1.2.1

The Authority's Stakeholder Relations & Consultation Strategy Committee (and previously the Force) originally undertook to carry out a review of BTP's approach to neighbourhood policing in 2007. In doing so they sought to answer a number of questions about the appropriateness of Force's approach and what outcomes it had delivered for the Force, passengers and rail industry partners.

1.2.2

In July 2008 the Committee received an interim report from research consultants commissioned by the Force to carry out an initial evaluation of BTP's approach to Neighbourhood Policing. The consensus of both the Committee and Force representatives present was that, while elements of the interim report were of interest, it had not delivered the outputs required and was unlikely to do so in the second phase of the evaluation. As a result the Committee and Assistant Chief Constable (ACC) Operations chose to bring the evaluation in-house and requested that the Force and Authority Secretariat carry out a joint evaluation of the Force's approach to Neighbourhood Policing to date.

1.3   Scope of the review

1.3.1

The evaluation focused on the overground network. NP on the London Underground (LU) Area is not within the scope of this project as LU has just re-launched its NP model. An evaluation of this will take place after sufficient time in operation.

1.4   Terms of Reference

1.4.1

The revised project brief developed jointly by the committee and the Force Operations department recommended that the evaluation gather and evaluate evidence of the following[4];

TOR1: Why neighbourhood policing had been introduced on the railways
TOR2: The operational and conceptual issues associated with adapting neighbourhood policing to the railway environment
TOR3: The early neighbourhoods that had been set up and the results of these
TOR4: A data review of where neighbourhood policing teams started from and where they are now
TOR5: How targets were set for neighbourhood policing teams
TOR6: How stakeholders were engaged in neighbourhood policing
TOR7: The outcomes of HMIC reports into BTP neighbourhood policing and how the Force had responded to these
TOR8: The lessons learned so far
TOR9: The way forward

These objectives largely reflected the features identified for successful NP projects in the 2004 Home Office White Paper.

1.5   Methodology

1.5.1

For reasons of expediency the Authority adopted the Force's evaluation approach; inevitably this will lead to some issues requiring further clarification and some new questions emerging which will require further work in any follow-up phase of the evaluation.

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[4] See section 35/2008 of the minutes of the meeting of the SR&CS Committee 01.07.08

1.5.2

As set out in greater detail in section 5 of this report, the evaluation employed a multi-method approach to data collection and interrogated a range of primary and secondary data sources. Primary data collection was largely undertaken using qualitative methods including focus groups and semi-structured interviews. The multi-method approach allowed for cross checking of themes emerging and provided both descriptive and contextual information. The range of data sources considered by the Force and Authority comprised;

- Outputs from internal workshops
- Outputs from in-depth focus groups with NP team members from the case study sites
- Outputs from a series of partner interviews/focus groups
- Outputs from a baseline perceptions survey
- Case study evidence
- Additional evidence submitted by Train Operators
- Findings and recommendations of HMIC inspections of BTP in 2006 & 2008
- Internal assessment of progress against good practice guidance
- Authority discussions with key BTP personnel

1.6   Structure of the report

1.6.1

The remainder of the report is divided into three main sections as set out in the table overleaf. At the end of each of the scene setting sections (2-4) a series of questions are introduced. In answering these questions the terms of reference of the evaluation are addressed; the relationships between each of the report sections and the original terms of reference are also drawn out in the table overleaf.

By way of drawing out the key findings of the evaluation, and where appropriate also highlighting where the original terms of reference have not been fully met, a summary section is included between sections 5 and 6 of this report (starting on page 45) . In doing so the summary section pulls together the issues of interest arising from sections 2-4 of the evaluation, the main evidence arising from the evaluation and gaps in our current knowledge which could be addressed by follow-up work.

Report section		Title	Relates toTORs
Part 1: Scene setting	Section 1	Introduction	
	Section 2	Background to Home Office NP	TOR1
	Section 3	The nature of crime and fear of crime on the railways	TOR2
	Section 4	Background to BTP NP	TOR3 TOR4 TOR5
	Section 5	Evaluation methodology	
Summary section		Key questions posed. Summary of the evidence gathered. Opportunities for further work.	
Part 2: Analysis & discussion – achievements and challenges	Section 6	Impact on BTP	TOR6 TOR7 TOR8
	Section 7	Impact on Problem Solving & Engagement	TOR6 TOR7 TOR8
	Section 8	Impact on partners	TOR6 TOR7 TOR8
	Section 9	Impact on passengers	TOR6 TOR7 TOR8
	Section 10	The role of the Police Authority	TOR8
Part 3: Conclusions and recommendations	Section 11	Conclusions	TOR8 TOR9
	Section 12	Recommendations	TOR9
Appendices			

2. Background to Neighbourhood Policing: a review of the literature

2.1 Introduction

2.1.1

This section highlights and draws together the main themes arising from a recent review of a range of academic and government literature on Neighbourhood Policing. In doing so it provides an overview of the origins of Neighbourhood Policing as an operational concept, what this approach to policing is intended to deliver and a summary of the outcomes of recent evaluations of pilot NP teams. It is important to note that this review is not exhaustive and does not evaluate and compare the relative quality of each literature source.

2.1.2

The literature reviewed is not specific to BTP but is focussed on the approach and principles developed and adopted by territorial Home Office forces; however where it is appropriate to do so key similarities and differences between the BTP and Home Office approach have been highlighted.

2.2 The origins of Neighbourhood Policing in England & Wales

2.2.1
There is a consensus in both the academic and government literature that the origins of the current Neighbourhood Policing approach in England and Wales can be traced back most recently to the 'National Reassurance Policing' model first developed by Surrey Police and Surrey University in the early part of the current decade[5]. Beyond this links are drawn to the community policing style of mid-twentieth century if not the very origins of modern policing in the UK[6]. Indeed researchers such as Innes[7][8] have highlighted that these notion of policing being rooted in the community has

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[5] Tuffin, R (2006) 'Home Office Findings 272: The National Reassurance Policing Programme: a six-site evaluation'. Home Office, London.
[6] Innes, M (2004) 'Reinventing tradition? Reassurance, neighbourhood security and policing'. *Criminal Justice*, Volume 4(4), pp 151-171
[7] Innes, M. (2006) 'Introduction Reassurance and the "New" Community Policing'. *Policing and Society*, Vol16(2), pp 95-98
[8] Innes, M & Fielding, N. (2002) 'From Community to Communicative Policing: 'Signal Crimes And The Problem of Public Reassurance'. *Sociological Research Online*.

never really gone away, rather, that recent empirical research has provided evidence that has reinvigorated debates about the range and nature of the benefits which this style of policing can deliver. It is possible to also trace its roots in problem-oriented policing, because of the explicit links to problem-solving which are less prominent in CP.

2.2.2

In addition both academic and Government literature draws historical parallels with the community policing style adopted elsewhere, for example in the United States and in particular with the Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS initiative) launched in the mid 1990s. The CAPS initiative was based on principles of community engagement particularly in addressing those 'signal crimes' which mattered most to local people[9][10] a theme which re-emerged in the National Reassurance Policing Programme in England and Wales. The current model of Neighbourhood policing in England and Wales differs most from other comparable policing styles in that it is both systematised in its approach and is being actively managed and led by ACPO[11].

2.2.3

The current Neighbourhood Policing Programme began in November 2003 when the Government launched a major consultation exercise seeking comments on proposals to reform policing in England and Wales[12]. This consultation exercise specifically invited inputs on proposals to empower local communities to become more meaningfully engaged in public security and policing decisions within their local area. This consultation also proposed to strengthen multi agency partnership working and increase police accountability through delivering effective neighbourhood policing. Responses to this consultation exercise[13] (and to the more recent Casey Review[14]) indicated that the public did identify with the concept of policing at a neighbourhood level and was particularly supportive of Government proposals to increase the visibility and accountability of their local policing services. At the same time, possible approaches to a neighbourhood based style of policing were being piloted in the National reassurance Policing Programme.

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[9] Tuffin, R (2006) 'Home Office Findings 272: The National Reassurance Policing Programme: a six-site evaluation'. Home Office, London

[10] Skogan, W.G; et al. (2000) 'Problem Solving in Practice: Implementing Community Policing in Chicago'. US Insitiute of Justice, National Institute of Justice.

[11] Quinton, P & Morris, J (2008) 'Neighbourhood Policing: the impact of piloting and early implementation'. Home Office Online Report 01/08

[12] Home Office (2003) 'Policing: Building Safer Communities Together. Home Office, London.

[13] Home Office (2004) 'Policing: Building Safer Communities Together: summary of consultation responses. Home Office, London.

[14] Casey, L. (2008) 'Engaging Communities in Fighting Crime: Crime and Communities Review'. Cabinet Office, London.

2.2.4

Launched in October 2003[15][16], the National Reassurance Policing Programme (NRPP) in England and Wales had its origins in trials of reassurance policing at both Surrey Police and the Metropolitan Police Service. The programme was intended to be a learning exercise through which the 'effects of properly implementing an evidence-based strategy for improving trust, confidence and a sense of security[17]' could be demonstrated. As with the CAPS programme in the United States, the NRPP sought to both address crime (in particular low level offences) and anti-social behaviour, and more general community concerns such as control of public spaces and improving levels of public confidence in policing. Piloted in sixteen wards in eight English forces, the key to the NRPP was targeting the available resources towards those issues which local communities identified as being of most concern (signal crimes) and engaging with local people in finding solutions[18]. The Metropolitan Police, meanwhile, went ahead and began the roll-out of their Safer Neighbourhoods Programme in April 2004 and completed this two years later.

2.2.5

In November 2004 the Government published its White Paper 'Building Communities, Beating Crime' which drew together the responses to the proposals set out in the 2003 consultation exercise, the early findings from the NRPP and for first time set out specific ambitions around delivering a model of 'revitalised neighbourhood policing'[19]. Both the NRPP and neighbourhood policing sought to achieve development of dedicated local policing teams who would work with the public, and partner agencies, within a programme management framework to address issues of local concern.

2.3 Delivering Neighbourhood Policing

2.3.1

Chapter three of the 2004 Government White Paper, and the subsequent 2005 Home Office publication 'Neighbourhood Policing, '*Your police; your community; our commitment*[20] set out in some detail the Government's specific intentions in relation to delivery of Home Office neighbourhood

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[15] Irving, B. (2005) 'Reassurance Policing – Making it Happen. A summary End–Of-Programme Report on Implementation Management'.

[16] Quinton, P & Morris, J (2008) 'Neighbourhood Policing: the impact of piloting and early implementation'. Home Office Online Report 01/08.

[17] Irving, B. (2005) 'Reassurance Policing – Making it Happen. A summary End–Of-Programme Report on Implementation Management'p3.

[18] Tuffin, R; Morris, J & Poole, A. (2006) 'Home Office Research Study 296: An evaluation of the impact of the National Reassurance Policing Programme'. Home Office, London.

[19] Home Office (2004) 'Building Communities, Beating Crime'. Home Office, London, p20.

[20] Home Office (2005) 'Neighbourhood Policing. Your police; your community, our commitment. Home Office Communication Directorate, London.

policing teams across England and Wales. In particular the Home Office gave a commitment that by 2008

> *'every area in England and Wales will benefit from dedicated, visible accessible and responsive neighbourhood policing teams – led by officers but involving special constables, community support officers, volunteers, neighbourhood wardens and others too[21]'*

2.3.2

In supporting delivery of this commitment, the Home Office made funding available via a Neighbourhood Policing Fund which amongst other things was intended to support employment of 24,000 Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs)[22]. It also undertook to produce joint guidance with the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) and Centrex to assist with implementation from the neighbourhood the force level. However, the White Paper emphasised that the Government did not intend to prescribe a one-size fits all template for what constituted a 'neighbourhood' or what was neighbourhood policing must look like in every area (a deliberate decision not to mandate the Met standard of one Sergeant, two PCs and three PCSOs per ward) but it did establish the following as the key features shared by all successful teams[23];

- Dedicated resources for neighbourhoods which include the extended police family – appropriate to the local neighbourhood
- An emphasis on local problem solving with appropriate mechanisms in place for doing so
- Engagement with communities using a range of appropriate methods with a focus on public involvement in both identifying and prioritising problems
- Mechanisms in place to target resources and hold partners to account for delivery

2.3.3

While ACPO identified that the overarching aim of Neighbourhood Policing was '*delivering control in response to public priorities[24]*' it believed that in doing so it also sought to improve public confidence in policing (how this was to be measured at a neighbourhood level is not clear though confidence is measured at a force level via the British Crime Survey (BCS)) [25]; and further

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[21] Home Office (2005) 'Neighbourhood Policing. Your police; your community, our commitment.p2. Home Office Communication Directorate, London.
[22] Later reduced at the end of 2006 to 16,000.
[23] Home Office (2004) 'Building Communities, Beating Crime'. Home Office, London, p20
[24] ACPO (2004) 'Reform of Neighbourhood Policing: Making public problems policing priorities'. A submission from the Association of Chief Police Officers, p3.
[25] HMIC (2006) 'Baseline Assessment 2006: Specific Grading Criteria 1B Neighbourhood Policing and Problem Solving'. Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary.

recognised that successful delivery of neighbourhood policing was dependent on the existence of three essential 'pre-conditions[26];

- Dedicated resources
- Intelligence led targeting of the issues most important to the public
- Joint action/partnership based problem solving

In practice these pre-conditions essentially translate to visible foot patrol by officers who know and are known by the community, community engagement, and the problem-solving delivery mechanisms of the National Reassurance Policing Programme.

2.3.4

However, subsequent evaluations of both Neighbourhood and Reassurance Policing (discussed in more detail below) have identified that one of the key challenges for delivery has been securing these preconditions in a consistent and sustainable way. The interim[27] and final[28] reports of the Flanagan review of policing (2007 & 2008) and a report by Ipsos MORI[29] also in identified a continuing gap between actual levels of crime and public perceptions of crime and confidence in policing. These reports also identified the role Neighbourhood Policing had already played in beginning to address this apparent tension and, perhaps more importantly, the role NP should continue to play in the future.

2.4   Evaluations to date

2.4.1

Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary has been tasked with the formal inspection of forces on the delivery of Neighbourhood Policing[30], phase one of these inspections was completed in January 2007 and phase two in September 2008[31].   In addition, a number of formal and informal evaluations

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[26] ACPO (2004) 'Reform of Neighbourhood Policing: Making public problems policing priorities'. A submission from the Association of Chief Police Officers, p6.
[27] Flanagan, R (2007) 'The Review of Policing by Sir Ronnie Flanagan: Interim Report'. London, Home Office.
[28] Flanagan, R (2008) 'The Review of Policing by Sir Ronnie Flanagan: Final Report'. London, Home Office.
[29] Duffy, R; Wake, R; Burrows, T. & Bremner, P. (2007) *'Closing the Gaps: Crime & Public Perceptions,'* Ipsos MORI Social Research Institute.

[30] HMIC (2006) 'Baseline Assessment 2006: Specific Grading Criteria 1B Neighbourhood Policing and Problem Solving'. Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary
[31] HMIC (2008) Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary – serving neighbourhoods and individuals. A thematic report on Neighbourhood Policing and Developing Citizen Focus Policing.

of both reassurance and neighbourhood have taken place since 2003 including full and interim evaluations carried out by the Home Office, individual forces[32] and multi agency groups[33]. The New Zealand Police Service has very recently published a international review of existing literature on community based policing which provides additional useful material on this topic as an emerging style of policing and evaluations of such programmes in the UK, US and elsewhere[34].

2.4.2

A key outcome from the initial evaluation of Neighbourhood Policing in England and Wales by the Home Office[35] is that the successes and benefits apparently delivered by the pilots of the NRPP (set out in more detail below) have not, after the first year of the national programme, been replicated by the rollout of either pathfinder Basic Command Units (BCUs) or the full neighbourhood policing programme. The main caveat around these early results from the Home Office is that they are just that, early results, and that apparent non-delivery of benefits may simply be due either to evaluation failure (a failure of the evaluation methods to adequately identify the benefits delivered) to a lack of consistent bedding in of the approach across which has resulted in implementation failure thus far. Therefore it will be necessary to monitor the outputs of future evaluation exercises in order to gain a better understanding of the outcomes of Neighbourhood Policing.

2.4.3

Indeed one key critique from the academic literature is the absence of essential longitudinal research on the impacts and outcomes of neighbourhood/reassurance/community policing although as this could arguably still be considered as an emerging policing style this is not entirely surprising. The CAPS at ten[36] report provides perhaps the only appropriate example of long term tracking of the implementation and benefits realisation of a community policing approach.

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[32] Stanko, E. (2008) Presentation to MPS Neighbourhood Policing Conference 7th March 2008.

[33] Kindell, R (2006) 'An Evaluation of Neighbourhood Policing in Nottingham'. Community Cohesion and Engagement Division, Nottingham City Council Neighbourhood Services.

[34] Coquilhat, J. (2008) 'Community Policing: An International Literature Review'. New Zealand Police.

[35] Quinton, P & Morris, J (2008) 'Neighbourhood Policing: the impact of piloting and early implementation'. Home Office Online Report 01/08.

[36] Chicago Community Policing Evaluation Consortium (2004) 'Community Policing in Chicago, Year Ten'. Illinois Justice Inforamtion Authority.

2.5   Key successes: what has NP delivered to date?

2.5.1

A stated above, the main evaluation of Neighbourhood Policing to date appears to be inconclusive in terms of what benefits the approach has actually achieved. However, evidence from the earlier evaluation of the 'more focused' NRPP pilots suggests that the following were achieved and therefore might be expected outcomes from NP in the future[37],[38];. The impact of NRPP was wide-ranging across a host of outcome indicators, and largely sustained. Benefits included;

- Increased public confidence in the police which is a sustainable effect in the medium term

- Reduced levels of self reported victimisation within the neighbourhood which are again sustained in the medium term

- A reduction in the perception of the levels of crime and antisocial behaviour

- Perceptions of increased police visibility, familiarity and levels of engagement with local police teams

2.5.2

Research on the NRPP pilots also suggested that these effects were consistent across the all the pilot sites and could be explained by the NRPP activity which had taken place. That is, the impact of other variables/effects on the results could reasonably be discounted based on the data gathered. In particular, that foot patrol, community engagement and problem-solving were found to be associated with improved confidence[39]. The most recent Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) thematic inspection[40] also seems to have found evidence of improved public perceptions of the standard of local policing and the effectiveness of policing in terms of addressing ASB and local priorities. However, evidence of significant increases in public confidence was less consistent and was found in only one third of Forces.

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[37] Quinton, P & Morris, J (2008) 'Neighbourhood Policing: the impact of piloting and early implementation'. Home Office Online Report 01/08.
[38] Tuffin, R; Morris, J & Poole, A. (2006) 'Home Office Research Study 296: An evaluation of the impact of the National Reassurance Policing Programme'. Home Office, London.
[39] Tuffin, R; Morris, J & Poole, A. (2006) 'Home Office Research Study 296: An evaluation of the impact of the National Reassurance Policing Programme'. Home Office, London.
[40] HMIC (2008) Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary – serving neighbourhoods and individuals. A thematic report on Neighbourhood Policing and Developing Citizen Focus Policing.

2.5.3

These findings from initial evaluations in England and Wales are supported by evidence from other community policing initiatives[41]. In particular the positive impacts on community perceptions about police visibility, communication and engagement, and increased public confidence have been evidenced elsewhere, in particular from the CAPS initiative in the United States[42] [43].

2.6   Ongoing challenges

2.6.1

By contrast, evidence from the NRPP, BCU and NP evaluations suggests that to date there has been less of an effect on the levels of fear of crime. This did not appear to have been significantly reduced and any effect achieved was not sustained in the medium term. However, fear of crime tends to lag crime reduction, so it might be something that could improve in the longer term.

2.6.2

The various reviews of the Home Office implementation of NP do not seem to include a separate evaluation of partner activity in relation to reducing reduce fear of crime; the evaluation of impacts throughout these evaluations reference 'police and partner activity' in combination. An evaluation of the impacts of partner activity in relation to BTP NP on the railways may be easier to isolate and quantify.

2.6.3

Evidence from the later evaluations of pathfinder BCUs and NP teams suggests while the evaluation methodology may have had an impact on results, and it was likely that an inconsistency (or failure) in the implementation of neighbourhood policing between individual teams (and even between police forces) which has meant that the effects are less evident at this early stage than may have been hoped.

2.6.4

Again, evidence from reviews of the literature on community based policing initiatives both support and add to these themes as areas of ongoing challenge. Three common themes emerge as particular barriers to delivery of neighbourhood policing [44],[45],[46], [47];

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[41] Tillman, R. J. (2000) The Effectiveness of Community Policing. Eastern Michigna University, School of Police Staff and Command.

[42] Coquilhat, J. (2008) 'Community Policing: An International Literature Review'. New Zealand Police.

[43] Myhill, A (2006) 'Community engagement in policing. Lessons from the literature'

[44] Myhill, A (2006) 'Community engagement in policing. Lessons from the literature'

▪ **Organisational/cultural barriers** – the senior management within the force does not 'buy-in' to the concept of neighbourhood/community based policing and any stated support is tokenistic and not supported by management action.

▪ **Implementation barriers** – delivery of the approach is incomplete or inconsistent; this may be due to a variety of reasons and was highlighted as a key challenge by ACPO[48] in early evaluations of the neighbourhood policing style and has been highlighted again by the 2008 Casey Review[49]. Implementation is likely to be hindered most by insufficient resources whether this be in terms of available personnel, money for training or financing for engagement activities.

▪ **Community barriers** – in some communities engagement between the police, support agencies and the public may be highly problematic[50]. This may be due to lack of trust, using inappropriate engagement methods or engaging with the wrong groups/individuals, or by not responding to the feedback provided. An emerging concern is maintaining levels of interest and engagement where this has been successful. Many forces are choosing to address this challenge by using innovating methods to engage with the local community. The use of community officers and accredited staff to drive and sustain engagement through innovation is a common theme among forces that have performed well in formal inspections on neighbourhood policing[51].

2.7 A summary of issues emerging

2.7.1

▪ Neighbourhood Policing is not an entirely new concept but perhaps best understood as a reinterpretation of community policing (with an explicit focus on problem-solving)

▪ NP differs from previous similar styles in that it is being driven centrally by both Government and ACPO who have in turn

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[45] Coquilhat, J. (2008) 'Community Policing: An International Literature Review'. New Zealand Police.

[46] Mastrofski, S; Parks, R.B; Worden, R.E (1998)

[47] Sadd, S. & Grinc, R.M. (1996) 'Implementation Challenges in Community Policing'.

[48] ACPO (2004) 'Reform of Neighbourhood Policing: Making public problems policing priorities'. A submission from the Association of Chief Police Officers, p3.

[49] Casey, L. (2008) 'Engaging Communities in Fighting Crime: Crime and Communities Review'. Cabinet Office, London.

[50] Barnes, I & Eagle, T. (2007) 'The Role of Community Engagement in Neighbourhood Policing'. *Policing,* Volume 1 (2), pp167-172.

[51] Police Professional (2008) 'Executive Feature: Neighbourhood Policing examples of good practice'. Police Professional, September 18th 2008, pp14-17.

provided clear guidance and funding to support consistent approach to implementation, delivery and review

- Evidence about what NP in particular has delivered when implemented 'at scale' is inconclusive during the first year of the programme, but suggests that benefits can be realised in the short term when all three prerequisite delivery mechanisms are in place

- The main barriers to the implementation of Home Office NP have been identified in terms of organisational culture; practical implementation problems and lack of community engagement

Questions arising

2.1 How does BTP's approach to NP compare with that taken by Home Office Forces – how is the BTP NP approach defined?

2.2 What pre-conditions does BTP NP assume, how does this compare with Home Office forces?

2.3 What are the main successes for BTP NP by comparison with the Home Office experience?

2.4 How do BTP's NP successes compare with the experience of Home Office forces?

2.5 What organisational/cultural barriers to delivering BTP NP have been overcome/still exist?

2.6 What implementation barriers to delivering BTP NP have been overcome/still exist?

2.7 What community barriers to delivering BTP NP have been overcome/still exist?

3. Fear of Crime and Concerns about Personal Safety on the Rail Network: the potential for BTP NP

3.1 Purpose of this section

3.1.1

This section of the report provides a brief summary of the findings of the British Transport Police Authority's (BTPA's) 2008 annual review of recent research on fear of crime and, in particular, the nature and extent of fear of crime amongst rail passengers. This part of the report is therefore intended to provide the broader context for the evaluation by setting out, in quite high level terms the nature of the environment in which the Force's NP teams are operating.

3.2 National crime trends

3.2.1

Data from the 2007/8 annual Home Office crime statistics report[52] suggests that both recorded and actual crime (as measured by the British Crime Survey (BCS)) was down between 9 and 10% compared with 2006/7. Whilst police recorded crime suggests that all crime categories except drugs offences fell during this period, data from the BCS suggests that rates of both domestic burglary and personal theft remained stable over this period. Rates of underreporting remain high for crime types which are typical of those experienced on the rail network, for example;

- Nationally only 41% bicycle theft is recorded
- Vandalism 35% recorded
- Assault without injury 34% recorded
- Theft from the person 32% recorded[53]

3.2.2

The BCS also identified that the risk of becoming a victim of crime fell 2 percentage points between 2006/7 and 2007/8 (from 24 to 22%) and that young males aged between 16 and 24 remained at highest risk of becoming a crime victim. Despite these results approximately two thirds of people still think that crime has increased in the last 3 years[54] and the gap between

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[52] Home Office (July 2008) Crime in England & Wales 2007/8. London, Home Office.
[53] Home Office (July 2008) Crime in England & Wales 2007/8. London, Home Office., p38-39
[54] Home Office (July 2008) Crime in England & Wales 2007/8. London, Home Office., p10

actual risk and perception of risk and has widened since 2004/5[55]. In particular;

- Women generally were more likely to think crime levels had risen a lot and were more worried about crime than other demographic groups. This was most marked for women aged 65 and above [56]. Men and women however seem to have similar perceptions about actually becoming a victim of crime.

- People from non-white ethnic backgrounds were at least twice as likely to have high levels of worry about a range of crimes; this is most marked for worry about violent crime[57]. People from this demographic also perceive themselves to be at greater risk of becoming a victim of crime.

- People from urban areas are approximately twice as likely to have high levels of worry about a range of crimes, again this is most marked for violent crime[58]

3.3 How do BTP crime trends differ?

3.3.1

Initial analysis carried out by Rail Safety and Standards Board (RSSB)[59] (on behalf of ATOC) in 2006/7 suggests that BTP's' crime profile may differ fundamentally from that of Home Office forces in that a larger proportion of crime recorded by BTP is crime against the person rather than property crime, as is the case for local forces. While the actual magnitude of difference is unknown as levels of underreporting may vary for BTP; this clearly has potential relevance to the sort of crime rail staff and passengers may be fearful of and the level of concern amongst those people most fearful of crime against the person.

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[55] Home Office (July 2008) Crime in England & Wales 2007/8. London, Home Office., p11
[56] Home Office (July 2008) Crime in England & Wales 2007/8. London, Home Office., p129, 139 & 140
[57] Home Office (July 2008) Crime in England & Wales 2007/8. London, Home Office., p139
[58] Home Office (July 2008) Crime in England & Wales 2007/8. London, Home Office., p140
[59] RSSB (2007) Research Report T667: Research into security at stations, p13. London RSSB.

3.4   What drives fear of crime?

3.4.1

There is a sizeable body of research on drivers of fear which has identified a wide range of factors which may also be relevant to the level and nature of rail passengers' fear of crime. Recurring themes include;

- Previous personal experience: e.g. being a victim of crime or witnessing a crime being committed

- Knowledge that an area is a location where crime is committed

- Witnessing anti-social behaviour though not specifically a crime being committed

- Having to travel alone or late at night – research carried out by TfL in 2005[60] identified that passenger priorities shift from customer service driven to personal security focused outside of peak hours

- The nature of the rail environment i.e. the uniquely enclosed and isolated nature of trains and stations

- Poor environmental maintenance e.g. lack of lighting, graffiti and litter not removed which act as a signal of lack of control over an area

- Public response to media *'moral panic'* ; that is the tendency of the media to periodically report on and focus on extreme incidents, for example the media attention associated with the Safer Stations campaign run by the Evening Standard in response to the murder of Tom Ap Rhys Pryce in January 2006. Recent research by MORI[61] suggests that media coverage of high profile 'indicator crimes' is particularly significant driver of public perception of personal risk

- More generally, concern about crime is an increasingly political issue for the British public. Research carried by MORI in August 2007 identified 'concern about crime' as the most important political issue and one which had shown the largest increase in ranking in recent years62

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[60] London Assembly (2006) *Crime and Safety at London's Suburban Railway Stations*, p25.
[61] Ipsos MORI Social Research Institute (2007) *Closing the Gaps: crime and public perceptions.*
[62] Ipsos MORI Social Research Institute (2007) *Closing the Gaps: crime and public perceptions,* p.13.

3.5   Patterns in fear of crime on the rail network

3.5.1

While the empirical evidence of the nature of rail passenger fear of crime   is somewhat limited, the following headline themes have emerged from the data reviewed thus far;

▪   Passenger fear / perceived risk of crime far exceeds the likelihood of becoming a victim of crime (especially in relation to violent crime)

▪   The gap between perceived and actual risk is more marked on public transport than for general patterns of fear of crime[63]

▪   Levels of under-reporting of crime on the transport network can be very high[64] (up to 90% for some crime types)[65]

▪   Fear is greatest among women[66] [67]and the elderly although they are statistically at least risk of becoming a victim

▪   Those most at risk of crime are
  ➢   Young (<25 years)
  ➢   Males
  ➢   Those from ethnic minorities (though this is not necessarily due to racially motivated crime)
  ➢   Those living in travelling to/through Urban (especially smaller stations)

▪   Passengers are most fearful/concerned about personal crime rather than property crime, in particular they are concerned about;
  ➢   Robbery
  ➢   Violent assault (being beaten up)
  ➢   Sexual assaults (especially women)

▪   Passengers are more fearful
  ➢   On stations than on trains[68] [69] [70] (though there is some difference of opinion about this)
  ➢   At night[71] and/or when travelling alone

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[63] Cozens *et al* 2004.
[64] Cozens *et al.* 2002.
[65] DETR (1997) *Understanding Fear of Crime.* London, DETR.
[66] DETR (1997) *Understanding Fear of Crime.* London, DETR.
[67] RSSB (2004) Fears & Experiences of Passengers from Assault – Final Report. London RSSB.
[68] RSSB (2004) Fears & Experiences of Passengers from Assault – Final Report. London RSSB.
[69] DfT (2004) *Crime and Disorder on Public Transport.* London, DfT.
[70] GMPTE (2006) 2006-7 Safety Results, Q2 2006.
[71] GMPTE (2006) 2006-7 Safety Results, Q2 2006.

- Fear of crime/ concern about personal safety is not the major reason for not travelling by train (accounts for around 2-5% of non-travel) [72] [73] but this will account for a large volume of people who do not currently use the rail network.

3.5.2

Estimates of actual numbers of non-travellers are not given but non-travel has been defined by the Department for Transport (DfT)[74] as those who have not travelled by train at all in the previous 12 months or who travel less frequently than once per month. This could potentially account for an additional 24-60m passenger journeys per annum (calculated as 1.2bn[75] x 2% or 5%). Research carried out in 1997 suggests that initiatives to address concern about personal security on the rail network could increase patronage by up to 15%[76] both by encouraging people who do not travel at all to travel and by increasing rail travel for those who do not travel at particular times of day or on particular routes. More recent research carried out on behalf of the DfT identified that measures to improve security at stations and on trains might increase patronage by as much as 32%[77].

- Fear modifies passenger behaviour (e.g. time of journey, where they wait for a train, where on a train they sit)

- Personal security is an area of relatively low satisfaction amongst rail passengers (along with fares)[78] [79] when compared with the other parameters explored by the National Passenger Survey

3.5.3

The National Passenger Survey (NPS) (autumn 2005 to autumn 2008) reveals a gradual increase in levels of passenger satisfaction with personal security (both at stations and on trains) between autumn 2005 and autumn 2008 as summarised in the following table.

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[72] DfT (2006) Public experiences of and attitudes towards rail travel. London, DfT, p15.

[73] DfT (2006) Public experiences of and attitudes towards rail travel. London, DfT, p15.

[74] DfT (2006) Public experiences of and attitudes towards rail travel. London, DfT, p15.

[75] ORR(2008) National Rail Trends Yearbook 2007-8)

[76] Crime Concern and Transport and Travel Research (1997) quoted in Cozens *et al* 2004, p26.

[77] Natcen for DfT (2008) Experiences and perceptions of anti-social behaviour on public transport. London, DfT; p22.

[78] DfT (2004) *Crime and Disorder on Public Transport*. London, DfT

79 Passenger Focus (Various) Biannual National Passenger Survey

Percentage of passengers rating their satisfaction with personal security as 'satisfied' or 'good' (Source: Passenger Focus National Passenger Surveys autumn 2005 - autumn 2008

Region	On station				On train			
	Autumn 05	Autumn 06	Autumn 07	Autumn 08	Autumn 05	Autumn 06	Autumn 07	Autumn 08
National	59	59	62	63	69	70	70	72
London & SE	57	58	60	61	65	67	68	69
Regional	59	60	65	66	75	75	75	78
Long distance	68	70	71	70	82	83	83	82

From this data the following specific issues emerge;

- Levels of satisfaction with personal security are still consistently higher on trains than on stations

- Greatest increases in satisfaction are in relation to personal security 'on station'. Satisfaction levels 'on train' have remained reasonably stable over the period covered by this data.

- There are marked differences in the levels of satisfaction with personal security both by geographic area and by train operator

- Generally levels of satisfaction are lowest for passengers using stations in London and the South East and highest for passengers using long-distance train services

- Specific geographic areas of most concern/perception of risk both on trains and at stations appear to be;

  ➢ The South East & London in particular c2c, Silverlink and South Eastern Trains which all had lowest levels of satisfaction AND highest levels of dissatisfaction (rather than neither/nor) of all operators in the region

  ➢ For regional operators, of note are the routes operated by Arriva Trains Wales where levels of dissatisfaction on station (15%) were the highest of any TOC in the autumn 2007 survey

3.5.4

Satisfaction with personal security was also explored in a piece of research commissioned by Passenger Focus in 2007, this confirmed that satisfaction with personal security currently exceeds 'reasonable expectations' but remained a priority for passengers when considering improvements to the rail network[80].

3.5.5

The Force and Authority have also negotiated space for bespoke questions on the autumn wave of the NPS on which the Force's Quality of Service team carries out detailed analysis. Information collected from their most recent survey identifies the following as issues of note[81];

3.5.6

The proportion of respondents stating that they have had reason to be concerned about their personal safety while travelling on the railway in the past six months has decreased steadily over the past three years (23% in 2005; 18% in 2006; and 17% in 2007). In 2007, this proportion decreased with age whilst higher proportions of female, Black and Minority Ethnic (BME), commuting and peak time travelling respondents said that they had had cause for concern.

3.5.7

The top six reasons for concern (as stated by all respondents) are identified as being (in descending order):

- Anti-social behaviour by other people on the train: 74% (2006: 71%)
- Anti-social behaviour by other people at the station: 64% (2006: 64%)
- Lack of on-train staff: 47% (2006: 47%)
- Lack of station staff: 46% (2006: 48%)
- Anti-social behaviour by other people in the neighbourhood: 39% (2006: 40%)
- Poor lighting in the station vicinity: 25% (2006: 25%)

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[80] Passenger Focus (2007) Passengers' Priorities for improvements in rail services: summary of research conducted by MVA Consultancy for Passenger Focus.
[81] British Transport Police (2007) Report to the British Transport Police Authority's Stakeholder Relations & Communications Strategy Committee, 8th April 2008.

3.6 Fear/concern by sub- group

3.6.1

The review of the existing research evidence also highlighted a number of key issues which distinguish the transport behaviours and fear of crime concerns of various interest groups which are presented separately in the sections below.

Women

- Fear of crime and personal security concerns are the major concerns for women in relation to public transport[82] [83]. The most important issue for female rail passengers is feeling personally safe[84]. The Department for the Environment Transport and Regions (DETR) research indicated that an estimated extra 10% patronage could be achieved on public transport if passengers, especially women, felt safer[85]

- Women often travel at off peak times due to unique family/work commitments

- Fear is linked to isolation, be this geographic remoteness or personal vulnerability in terms of proximity to other people

- Women feel relatively safe on stations and trains in the day but markedly less so on both early in the morning or at night[86]

- They are particularly concerned about personal safety at stations at night (falls from 88.1% feeling safe during the day to 29.9% feeling safe at night) [87]

- Fear is not necessarily related to experience but perceived risk

- Fear is heightened by poorly maintained environments & signal crimes such as graffiti & vandalism

- Women are more likely than average to not travel by train due to fear of crime (7% will not travel compared with the 5% average)[88]

82 Women's Transport Needs: Keynote speech by Karen Buck to the Women's Transport Network conference, 13.12.05

83 DfT (2005) Transport Statistics Bulletin: Public Transport Statistics Bulletin GB: 2005 Edition. London, DfT.

84 Health & Safety Commission (2003) Report of Public Meeting. Research findings quoted by June Bridgeman of Soroptomist International, p1.

85 Transport 2000 (undated) Destination Passenger: Personal Security accessed via transport2000.org.uk/library/DestinationPassenger/section_06.htm

86 Social Exclusion Unit (2003) Making the Connections: Final Report on Transport and Social Exclusion. London, Cabinet Office.

87 DfT (undated) Public transport gender audit evidence base. London, DfT.

88 R RSSB (2004) Fears & Experiences of Passengers from Assault – Final Report. London RSSB, p26

- Higher level of concern about waiting on platforms than for men (concerns 53% of women vs. 23% of men)[89]

- Most common request for security improvements is for increased visibility/more staff at stations and on trains (more so rail staff than police personnel)[90]

- Underreporting by women of threatening behaviour or actual assault could be as high as 90%[91]

Men

Whilst statistically more at risk of being a victim of crime than women, research suggests that men are generally less fearful of crime on the railways than women. However, they are particularly fearful of the following;

- Violent crime/assaults and confrontations by groups of men[92] [93]
- All types of anti-social behaviour/low level disorder but especially that which is alcohol or begging related

Older people

People from older age groups share many of the travel behaviours and associated personal security concerns of female rail passengers (see above).

- Often travel at off peak times[94]
- Are more fearful early in the morning or late at night,
- Fear linked to isolation and poorly maintained station and train facilities
- Also concerned about accessibility of the rail network and personal safety relating to risk of personal accident, rather than being a victim of crime
- Are often more dependent on public transport as their main means of transport than people from younger age groups

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[89] Women's Transport Needs: Keynote speech by Karen Buck to the Women's Transport Network conference, 13.12.05
90 Health & Safety Commission (2003) Report of Public Meeting. Research findings quoted by June Bridgeman of Soroptomist International, p2.
91 Health & Safety Commission (2003) Report of Public Meeting. Connex research findings quoted by June Bridgeman of Soroptomist International, p1.
92 RSSB (2004) Fears & Experiences of Passengers from Assault – Final Report. London RSSB
[93] DfT (undated) Understanding fear of crime. Accessed via http://www.dft.gov.uk/stellent/groups/dft_mobility/documents/page/dft_mobility_503
94 DETR (1999) Older people: Their transport needs and requirements – Main report. London, DETR.

Children & Young people

- Statistically, young people are most likely to both commit <u>and</u> be a victims of crime
- Young males (16-19) are disproportionately more likely to be victims of crime than other groups[95]
- Young people are particularly likely to be engaged in low-level disorder and anti-social behaviour – but this may be unwitting and the result of boisterous play
- Up to 57% of children have witnessed low level disorder on the transport network[96]
- Public transport is commonly perceived as a hostile environment by young people
- Young people are most fearful of low-level disorder and anti-social behaviour such as bullying on journeys to and from school or during leisure travel
- Levels of underreporting are particularly high for this group so actual extent of crime affecting this group is likely to have been underestimated

Ethnic minority groups

- People from ethnic minority communities are up to twice as likely to be dependent on public transport than any other group[97] [98]
- More than twice as likely than average not to travel by train due to fear of crime (11 vs. 5%[99])
- Most concerned about;

  ➢ Hate crime, especially low level disorder such as race related graffiti and verbal abuse
  ➢ Poor security (due to lack of staff presence) and lighting
  ➢ Information not available in their spoken language

People with physical disabilities/mental illness/learning difficulties

While crime is a concern for people with disabilities, personal security appears to be less of a concern for people with disabilities than for people without disabilities. MORI research conducted on behalf of the Disabled Persons

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[95] 95 Crime Concern/ DETR (1998) Young people and crime on public transport. London, DETR, p25

[96] 96 Crime Concern/ DETR (1998) Young people and crime on public transport. London, DETR, p40

[97] Atkins, C. (DfT) (2004) *Transport, Minority Ethnic & Faith Groups.* Speech to conference on transport needs of minority ethnic and faith groups.

[98] DfT Undated) *Public Transport Needs of Minority Ethnic and Faith Communities Guidance Pack.* London, DfT

[99] RSSB (2004) Fears & Experiences of Passengers from Assault – Final Report. London RSSB, p26

Transport Advisory Committee (DPTAC) between 2001 and 2002 revealed that their primary concern in relation to rail travel is accessibility and reliability rather than personal security; in fact train travel is perceived to be a (relatively) safe form of transport (rated +23% net good) though less safe than buses (+31% net good) and planes (+67% net good) in terms of public transport[100]. However more recent research carried out by DPTAC[101] has identified that fear of crime is perhaps more of a barrier to travel by public transport for people with disabilities (both cognitive and physical) than previously thought and is more of an issue limiting travel than for people without disabilities.

Research conducted by the DfT in 2003 (and by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation[102] in 1995 and the Disability Rights Commission (DRC) in 2007[103]) identified the following key concerns in relation to personal security[104];

- Having a disability aid, such as a cane or a guide dog, can make someone a target for antisocial or criminal behaviour
- Are particularly vulnerable to hate crime (up to 47% have experienced this)
- People with disabilities feel more vulnerable as they are less able to quickly perceive and then respond to threatening or criminal behaviour, particularly in the closed environment of a train
- People with impaired vision or restricted mobility feel particularly vulnerable in isolated and ill-lit areas of the station
- People with disabilities may be less willing to report crime as they feel it will not be taken seriously by the authorities

Questions arising

3.1 What impact has BTP NP had on volume crime at NP sites on the rail network?

3.2 What impact has BTP NP had on perceptions of fear and risk of crime on the rail network?

3.3 What impact has BTP NP had on volume crime on the rail network?

3.4 What impact has BTP had on the reassurance gap for passengers at off peak times?

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100 DPTAC/ MORI (2002) Attitudes of disabled people to public transport: research study. Accessed via http://www.dptac.gov.uk/research/apt/pdf/apt.pdf
101 DPTAC (2008) DPTAC (2008) Research Report on the Development of a Disability Equality and Awareness Training Framework for Transport Staff. London, DPTAC
102 Joseph Rowntree Foundation (1995) Crime against People With Learning Difficulties.
103 Disability Rights Commission (2007) Hate Crime Against Disabled People in Scotland - a survey report.
104 DfT (2003) People's perceptions of personal security and their concerns about crime on public transport: Fact sheet 8 Disabled People's experiences and perceptions

4. Background to Neighbourhood Policing on the Railways

4.1 Introduction

This section of the report briefly summarises how BTP has developed and implemented a Neighbourhood policing style for the rail network. It also identifies the overarching aims of the BTP NP approach and how the approach is now supported and performance managed. The Force's current approach to NP was proposed, as one of a set of options, to the Authority's Stakeholder Relations & Communication Strategy (SR&CS) Committee in June 2005. This range of options were all based to some degree on the Home Office approach but differed in both style and focus. The strengths and weaknesses of the various options were debated and the Force's recommended approach was approved.

4.2 The Neighbourhood Policing Strategy

4.2.1 Strategic Aims

The driver for the Force's approach is the BTP NP strategy. This document establishes the guiding principles; the strategic objectives and the delivery mechanisms for NP on the railways. This it does in order to deliver;

"The right people, at the right places, in the right numbers, in order to create neighbourhoods that are safe and feel safe."

Developed in 2006, the current strategy anchors the concept of NP for the railways in seven high level aims set within a 'mission statement'. This mission statement commits BTP to:

- Improve relationships with our stakeholders and community
- Solve local problems by locally driven intervention by relevant parties and stakeholders.
- Reduce crime and the fear of crime
- Provide visible, dedicated, locally accountable resources with defined geographic responsibility
- Provide intelligence led targeting of issues that matter most to the community
- Bring offenders to justice
- Raise the profile and awareness of the British Transport Police

These strategic aims closely align with the guiding principles set out by the Home Office in its 2004 'Building Communities, Beating Crime' document. A key difference in BTP's strategic ambitions is for NP to be used as a tool for raising the profile of the Force.

4.2.2   Delivering NP on the railways

The Force's NP Strategy document establishes three guiding principles which should underpin delivery of NP on the railways. Features common to all BTP neighbourhood policing teams should therefore be:

▪   Police resources that are dedicated and accountable to the area

▪   Use of Intelligence to deal with issues that are most important to the railway community

▪   Joint action by the police, partner agencies and the public.

4.2.3

Again, the principles set out above closely mirror the preconditions set out in the Home Office guidance on NP. Clearly there are particular challenges for the Force in adapting these operating features, particularly in defining the 'area' to which resources are to be dedicated which for Home Office forces in based on the electoral ward and in defining the community to which NP is to be delivered.

4.2.4

As the police force for the railways, BTP's definition of a neighbourhood inevitably differs from that of a local force. The NP Strategy documentation provides some guidance on defining Neighbourhood Policing Team (NPT) geographies, suggesting that BTP communities will be based on railway and station infrastructure and therefore will include rail staff, passengers and other people living or travelling through or near to station premises.

4.2.5

A BTP policing neighbourhood will typically cover a collection of stations and/or a defined part of railway line, which may include a combination of major railway hubs, satellite stations and the tracks and train that connect them. BTP teams will based at one railway station – usually the hub – but then patrol trains and stations operating across their entire area.   These initial boundaries should be drawn up in consultation with partners in order to achieve agreement on the local perception of the neighbourhood.

4.2.6

Each BTP NP team is led by a sergeant supported by dedicated police officers, PCSOs, Special Constables, and accredited staff.   As local communities have different needs, the composition of each Team is dependent on the priorities and needs of that community. The location and composition of BTP's NP teams were baselined and reported to the

Authority's Stakeholder Relations & Communications Strategy (SR&CS) Committee in April 2008.[105]

4.3   Introducing an NPT: how teams are proposed and ratified

4.3.1

The starting point for an NPT is typically a recommendation made at the BTP Area level. Area teams will either identify new resource, for example a new funding stream and/or will identify an emerging (or existing) crime problem which may be appropriate for the establishment of a new NPT. The Area will then gather and consider a range of evidence, provided both internally and externally from partners, which sets out the nature of any local problems and how an NPT might best address these issues. An assessment of the proposed NPT site or sites is then carried out at an Area level and subject to evaluation of the proposal against a range of criteria (e.g. local crime profile, likely resource need) approval will be given to develop a formal business case for recommendation to the NP Project Board.

4.3.2

A formal proposal is then developed at an Area level, again in consultation with identified local partners to clarify initial priorities and any intelligence to evidence these priorities, the proposed geography of the team, the team composition, and the key existing or potential partners to be involved in local tasking and planning.

4.3.3

The formal proposal is submitted to the NP Project Board for consideration, challenge and/or ratification. Early in the development of NP for the railways this seems to have happened retrospectively with teams being confirmed at the Project Board rather than approved. It is not clear from a review of the more recent minutes of the Project Board exactly how the ratification process works in practice now though there is evidence that proposed teams have been presented to the Board by Area leads. The Force has suggested that to date, Areas have not taken a wholly consistent approach to proposing teams to the Project board; as such a corporate template for formal proposals has now been developed. This pulls together available baselining information on;

- Funding stream
- Stakeholder requirements
- Proposed geographic definition
- Community profile
- Passenger throughput
- Special features (e.g. deprivation index, iconic site)

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[105] British Transport Police (2008) Paper presented to the SR&CS Committee, April 2007, Agenda Item 5A.

4.3.4

The illustration overleaf summarises the current organisational process for proposing and approving NPTs within BTP is perhaps best explained diagrammatically. The Force and Authority will want to follow up on how the new guidance is being used and whether this adds greater transparency and robustness to the establishment and ongoing evaluation of new NPTs. The Force and Authority will also want to consider mechanisms for potentially reshaping or re-profiling teams in the future.

Existing resource redeployed		New resource	
Existing reassurance team (LU)	Existing community team e.g. Pontypridd	New external funding source e.g. Mayor's 50	New internal funding e.g. Frontline First

Area assessment

Partner engagement and consultation

Formal proposal developed

Neighbourhood Policing Project Board

Ratification

Initiation stage

- Resource is identified
- Potential site(s) identified
- Possible partners identified
- Initial input from all partners captured
- Key criteria considered and evaluated for each (crime profile, local environment, staffing requirements)
- Other representations captured

Proposal development

- Proposals shared with partners for comment
- Further data/evidence is collected
- Options are considered and approved locally
- Final proposal prepared and recommended to Project Board

Proposal approved/rejected

- Proposal scrutinised
- Alternatives considered
- Proposal revised
- Proposal approved/rejected

4.4 Supporting delivery of NP

4.4.1 Supporting documentation

Since 2006 the Force has developed a series of supporting documents and data resources which provide guidance for teams. The most important of these supporting documents are;

- NP Strategy
- NP Team Profile - how a typical team might look
- NP Process Map -
- NP NIM Interaction between NPT and AIBs
- NP Deployment & Abstraction Policy
- NP Role Profiles & Integrated Competency Frameworks (ICF)
- Community Engagement Strategy & Guidelines
- Good Practice Guidance Database
- NP Performance Framework
- Key Individual Networks (KINs) guidance and database
- Neighbourhood Profile Template
- Problem Solving Plans Tactics Guidance and Database
- Police And Communities Together (PACT) Surgery Guide

4.4.2 Performance management process

The Force's approach to managing performance around NP is set out in its 'NP Performance Framework' document. This identifies three tiers of performance management;

- Locally – via the NPT supervisor
- Area level – via the Area NPT lead and FHQ Strategic development Department
- Force level – at the NP Project Board

The NPT supervisor meets with all teams locally to carry out a review of qualitative feedback and to discuss progress and future direction. The supervisor then produces a quarterly report for submission to the Area NP lead. This report is then considered and scrutinised by the Area lead who produces a quarterly area summary report for submission to the NP Project Board. Quarterly reports from all Areas are scrutinised at the NP Project Board alongside performance data produced by the Force Headquarters (FHQ) Strategic Development Department.

NPTs are assessed across the following range of measures against which a record of which are recorded on a team or Area performance report form;

- Engagement
- Problem solving
- Feedback
- Deployment and Enforcements
- Reassurance
- Media and Marketing
- Perceptions

The Force's 'NP Performance Framework', including an example of a performance report form with advice notes for completion is attached to this report at Appendix A for information.

4.4.3 Evidence of performance management

A review of the minutes from the NP Project Board for the period February 2008 and April 2009 suggests an increasing focus on challenging and following up on both good and poor performance rather than simply reporting and recording the Area updates. For example, at the April 2009 meeting a force-wide review of problem solving plans revealed that many of these were out of date and a series of actions were issued to follow up on this issue locally. The minutes of these meetings also show how local level reviews of performance are being used at an Area level to refocus teams and redeploy resources across individual NPT areas.

The Project Board is also an important forum for FHQ and the Areas to share good (and bad) practice and to offer advice for teams with specific issues.

4.4.4 External scrutiny

As Neighbourhood Policing is now part of mainstream policing in England and Wales, external inspections by Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary (HMIC) will include assessments of performance in this area. For BTP this external inspection regime is supported by internal processes devised by the Neighbourhood Policing project team in conjunction with BTP's Assessment and Inspection Unit. The Force has been inspected on NP as part of the 2006 Force Baseline Inspection and in a Thematic Inspection in 2008; the outputs of these inspections are discussed in more detail in sections 6-9 of this report.

4.5 BTP's NP progress so far

4.5.1 The pilot teams

From 2006, BTP piloted Neighbourhood Policing in five geographical areas (London Underground Area has had reassurance policing teams in place since 2002). These areas were identified and the geographic boundaries

agreed in line with the aims and principles of Neighbourhood Policing. The pilot areas were:

- Victoria – London Bridge loop

- Lewisham – Dartford

- Queens Park – Harrow and Wealdstone

- Stratford – Shenfield

- Pontypridd – Cardiff Valleys

A further nine potential sites for NPTs were identified in the Force's initial Strategy document, which introduced teams in each of BTP's operational Areas.

A chronology of the introduction of pilot and NPTs across the entire Force since 2006 is included at Appendix B of this report.

4.5.2   Continued roll out

Details of the focus, team structure, and costs of set up for all of BTP's current teams are captured and set out in the full team 'directory' document which is maintained by the Force's Neighbourhood Policing and Partnerships Unit. The current NP Team document is included at Appendix C of this report for information; this document also includes a list of teams which are in the process of being implemented. Details of each NPT's current and previous Problem Solving Plans (PSPs) are also maintained centrally and published on the Force's internal website.

Questions arising

4.1   To what extent has the Force made progress towards delivering against the NP Mission Statement?

4.2   Are the Force's guiding principles for NP in place and followed?

4.3   Is the prescribed approach for introducing new NPTs robust and followed?

4.4   How effective is the Force's NP Performance Management Strategy?

5. Evaluation methodology

5.1 Purpose of the section

This section provides an overview of the following:

- The evaluations adopted approach
- How the data needed to achieve the project aims was collected
- Why these particular methods of data collection were chosen
- The challenges and limitations of the selected methods
- How the data was analysed and interpreted
- The steps taken to quality assure the data collection and its interpretation

5.2 Approach to the evaluation

5.2.1 Case study method

In order to conduct the best possible evaluation within the given timescales, the project team decided to base its research strategy on a case study approach, utilising both qualitative and quantitative methods of data collection. The advantage of the case study method is that it allows for an evaluation – based on a range of data sources – of neighbourhood policing in its real-life context.

The selected case study sites were;

- Two established sites (Lewisham and Pontypridd)
- Two emerging sites (Southport Merseyrail and Birmingham Cross City Line)
- Two control sites with no Neighbourhood Policing Teams but similar infrastructure and demographics (Bromley South and Preston)

These particular sites were chosen by the Force because they were felt to cover a wide spectrum of operating environments but where all NPTs operated within a framework as set out in the strategy. The evaluation focused on the overground network as London Underground (LU) has only recently re-launched its NP model. An evaluation of this will take place at a future date.

5.2.2 Outcome measures

Establishing a set of outcome measures for neighbourhood policing requires the identification of those delivery mechanisms that are intended to bring

about change at the neighbourhood level. This involves identifying the various policing activities that NP both encourages and facilitates. These include:

- Visible patrol – the consistent presence of police officers dedicated to a defined geographical area
- Community engagement – enhanced police-community relations and intelligence-led identification of community concerns
- Problem-solving – joint action between the police and its partners to tackle community concerns

These mechanisms have been acknowledged as key to the successful implementation of neighbourhood policing, not just within BTP, but as a national programme.

In terms of establishing a set of outcome measures, visible patrol, community engagement and problem-solving can all be seen as facilitating change in a number of ways:

- By improving BTPs relationships with its stakeholders and community
- By solving local problems through locally agreed and driven interventions
- By reducing crime and the fear of crime
- By raising the profile and awareness of BTP

These measures were chosen as indicators of whether or not the implementation of NP had been successful. They therefore provided the reference points for the various methods of data collection adopted by the evaluation.

5.2.3 Multi-method data collection

The evaluation employed a multi-method approach to data collection and interrogated a range of primary and secondary data sources. Primary data collection was largely undertaken using qualitative methods including focus groups and interviews which are described in more detail in section X below.

A multi-method approach was selected in order to;

- Provide the richest and most robust data possible within the time constraints of the evaluation
- Provide data from a range of sources which could then be used to test and triangulate findings

5.3   Primary data sources & collection methods

Briefings

Briefings were arranged with chosen officers at each of the six evaluation sites. Wherever possible the officers were of sergeant rank or above and had some degree of operational responsibility for the site being evaluated. The briefings were typically scheduled for the morning of the fieldwork and conducted face-to-face, although on the one occasion that this was not possible, a telephone briefing was conducted instead.

Each briefing followed the same basic structure – officers were asked a number of questions about the site to build up a picture of how policing there was organised and resourced, how relationships with stakeholders were established and maintained, what crime and disorder problems there were and how they were being responded to.

Focus groups

The primary method of data collection consisted of focus groups with rail staff, retail tenants and members of the travelling public. The fieldwork was designed with the intention of conducting a total of twelve focus groups – one with rail and retail staff and one with passengers at each of the six evaluation sites. There were three reasons why the research was designed in this way. Firstly, in order to evaluate NP at different stages of its implementation, it was necessary to obtain comparable data from all six of the chosen sites. Secondly, because these particular groups represent the main recipients of policing services on the railways, it was important to explore whether NP was 'working' from their perspective. Thirdly, to ensure that the discussions were as relevant as possible to each group, it was necessary to separate the rail and retail staff from members of the public.

Interviews

In addition to conducting focus groups, a series of depth interviews were undertaken with various key individuals, including managerial staff from Train Operating Companies (TOCs) and private security firms. The rationale for conducting interviews with these particular individuals was a reluctance to include them in groups with those for whom they were responsible as managers. To have combined managers with their staff would have risked losing valuable data as participants would arguably have been less forthcoming with their views.

The research was designed with the intention of conducting one or two managerial interviews per site. Moreover, to ensure as wide a range of views as possible, it was decided that managers from a variety of different roles would be interviewed. However, although the project team was given guidance on who to recruit, it proved extremely difficult to exercise control over who was interviewed, mainly because those made available were done

so at the discretion of their employers. This meant the sampling frame was more convenient than purposive.

Surveys

In order to obtain information about participant's demographics, travel habits and perceptions of crime and disorder in their local area, a short survey was administered following every focus group and interview. A total of 98 surveys were completed: 45 by rail staff and private security (including managers) and 53 by passengers.

5.4   Secondary data sources

5.5   Quality Assurance

5.5.1   Project steering group

A group consisting of representatives from both the Force and Authority was established to provide guidance and feedback on the proposed approach to data collection and to comment on the final report.

5.5.2   External quality assurance

An external quality assurance function was provided by the National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA) in order to reassure the project team as to the suitability of its approach.

5.6   Limitations to the findings

5.6.1   Sampling

Although focus groups allow for an in-depth exploration of people's views and experiences they do not guarantee a statistically representative sample. In terms of passengers, it was decided that although it was possible to aim for a 50:50 gender split, it was not practical to target for both age and ethnicity. For rail and retail staff, on the other hand, the difficulties negotiating access meant that it was not practical to target for gender, age or ethnicity.

Also of concern was whether the sample was representative of 'typical' passengers. This is not to say that there is such a thing as a 'typical' passenger. It is simply to say that a certain type of passenger – one quite involved with and informed about railway issues – was particularly prevalent in the sample. This is something that needs to be borne in mind when interpreting the data.

With regards to rail staff it is important to bear in mind that those who participated in the focus groups did so at the discretion of their TOCs. This meant that it wasn't always possible to obtain the desired range of views. Similarly, there were also sites where rumours had spread about the nature of the research, something which led to some participants pushing their own agenda. There was a belief amongst staff at one control site, for instance, that a Neighbourhood Policing Team (NPT) would soon be introduced there – a belief which may have influenced the discussion.

5.6.2 Data collection

The non-attendance of passengers at the Preston focus group meant that telephone interviews had to be conducted instead. As a result, the data from this group lacks depth when compared to passenger groups at other sites, something that needs to be kept in mind when interpreting the overall impact of NP.

5.7   Data analysis

To give meaning to the large amount of data generated by the focus groups and interviews, it was necessary to organise, interpret and explain the data in a way that clearly connected it to the project aims. At the same time, however, the process had to be flexible enough to allow for those newly emerging themes that were particularly salient within the social worlds of those being studied.

The selected analytical framework was one of selective coding. This involves emphasising pre-determined codes as well as those taken to be most revealing about the data. The data were thus coded into key themes – those concerned with the evaluation's initial research questions; and additional themes – those emergent themes deemed to have had a significant enough impact on perceptions of NP that it was necessary to include them in the report.

Evaluation summary

Section/question reference: 2.1: *How does BTP's approach to NP compare with that taken by Home Office forces – how is the BTP approach defined?*

Evidence gathered: Evidence presented in section 4 demonstrates that the BTP approach closely mirrors the Home Office Force approach both in terms of its structure and aims. The key differences are in its definition of the terms 'neighbourhood' and 'community'.

Follow-up work: None proposed.

Section/question reference: *2.2 What pre-conditions does BTP NP assume, how does this compare with Home Office forces?*

Evidence gathered: As set out in section 4.2.2, the BTP approach assumes the same pre-conditions as the Home Office approach.
These relate to 1) dedicated local resources; 2) Local priorities; 3) Joint action between the Force and its partners.

Follow-up work: None proposed

Section/question reference*: 2.3a What are the main successes for BTP NP?*

Evidence gathered: As set out in sections 6-9 the Force, industry partners and the public consistently report an increase in the visibility of BTP at all the NP sites surveyed. Both the Force and industry partners at all the case study locations also report greatly improved partnership working and a more robust and effective approach to local problem solving. The Force and industry partners at all sites, and passengers at most sites, also describe a reduction in perceived levels of crime. These results generally contrast favourably with reports from non-NPT sites.

The view of senior industry representatives (e.g. TOC MD's) has not been sought thus far.

Awareness of BTP, and its role and remit in relation to NP, is improved for industry partners at all sites, in particular at a managerial level though this is generally not replicated for passengers to date.

There is some evidence that recorded crime and/or detection rates are improved at some sites though further analysis of crime data will be necessary to clarify this position.

Follow-up work: A more detailed (and ongoing) analysis and monitoring of crime trends at NP vs non-NP sites; this should involve both descriptive and inferential statistical analysis.

Also to research the view of TOC MDs to identify any future opportunities for NP and/or to identify potential barriers to implementation.

Section/question reference: *2.3b How does this compare with the Home Office experience?*

Evidence gathered: As described in sections 2.5.1-2.5.3, these findings broadly replicate the reported results of evaluations of Home Office NP. However there is less consistent evidence from BTP of the improvements in public (and industry) confidence in policing as a result of NP on the railways.

By contrast there appears to be stronger evidence of improved partnership working and the perceived benefits of this for the Force and industry partners. This relates to both problem solving planning and tasking activities (e.g. PACT) and joint deployment of resources such as co-operative working of BTP officers and accredited rail staff/private security.

Follow-up work: A review of confidence measure data (from both industry and passengers) following ongoing work by the Quality of Service team to develop baselining practices.

Continue to regularly monitor partner views about the quality (and outcomes) of partnership working.

Section/question reference: *2.4a What are the main challenges for BTP NP?*

Evidence gathered: As described in sections 6-9 key ongoing challenges for BTP are in engaging with 'harder to reach partners' – in particular train crew (section 8) and passengers (section 7). Both of these groups are time poor in terms of opportunities to engage with BTP NPs and some creative approaches to overcome this will need to be explored. Evidence from all of the case study sites suggest that engagement activities thus have yet to make a significant impact on either of these groups. Communications with passengers (and use of marketing materials) generally have yet to achieve the desired results.

Demand management and the challenge of matching deployment patterns against those times (and places) when passengers and staff at all case study sites report greatest concern. Weekends and evenings, and on trains and at unmanned stations, emerge as times and places when NPT are perhaps not as visible as customers (both passengers and industry staff) would like (see sections 8.5.7-9).

Abstraction was raised as an emerging issue at two sites (see sections 8.5.5-6) though in response the Force has implemented an additional team in one of these areas.

Follow-up work: An evaluation of the impact of the implementation of the recommendation for the Force to continue to focus its engagement and communications activities with train crew and passengers.

A more detailed investigation of the causes of abstraction from NP duties.

Section/question reference: *2.4b How does this compare with the Home Office experience?*

Evidence gathered: As described in sections 2.6.1-2.6.4, at the sites studied BTP NP activity appears to have had a more significant impact on feelings of personal security/fear of crime particularly for rail staff from most sites and to some extent for passengers at some sites where this was not generally found to be the case for Home Office NP.

The Force appears to have had less success in engaging with the public (and some industry staff) by comparison with Home Office forces, though it faces vastly different challenges in attempting to do so.

There is evidence (see sections 6-9 and below) that BTP has experienced the same barriers to implementation as Home Office forces though to varying degrees at each of the sites. Organisational culture, at a Chief Officer level, appears to have been less of an issue. From other evidence considered which related to the Force's general organisational processes around NP.

Evidence from HMIC inspections and from the Force's own documentation suggests that implementation of new NPTS has not always been uniform. New guidance has recently been issued to create a consistent process and audit trail of decision making.

Follow-up work: An evaluation of the impact of the implementation of the recommendation for the Force to continue to focus its engagement and communications activities with train crew and passengers.

The Authority to periodically monitor the decision making processes (and documentation to support) the introduction of new NPTs or reshaping of existing teams to assess the impact of and compliance with new guidance on proposing new teams.

Section/question reference: *2.5 What organisational/cultural barriers to delivering BTP NP have been overcome/still exist?*

Evidence gathered: This does not appear to be an issue at a senior officer level though there may be some challenges at an Area level in terms of balancing the demands being placed on NPTs and the support they then

receive from Areas. Over-tasking in relation to meeting both NPT and Area targets is an emerging theme from some NPTs.

Securing engagement from people at the right level is an ongoing barrier for some case study teams - and there is similar evidence from teams on other sites across BTP. The main issue appears to be buy-in internally in terms of securing support around communications and intelligence sharing and externally in relation to securing attendance from partners at planning meetings. The Force has issued new guidance on intelligence sharing and is reinvigorating its NP communications and marketing work. This evaluation recommends that supporting guidance on engagement also be refreshed to include examples of good practice.

Follow-up work: The Force and Authority to monitor and evaluate the impacts of the implementation of the recommendations arising from this review. Also to monitor and evaluate the impacts of the Force's ongoing work around communications and marketing.

It may be necessary for the Authority to look in more depth and the interaction between local targets for NPTs (as agreed via PACT), their contribution to Area performance via their local NP targets in the annual Policing Plan and the contribution NPTs make to BTP National Policing Plan targets.

Section/question reference: *2.6 What implementation barriers to delivering BTP NP have been overcome/still exist?*

Evidence gathered: There is some evidence (see section 4.3) that to date a corporate approach to introducing new teams (and in future reshaping teams) has not always been followed. This may create an issue in terms of establishing an audit trail of progress for each team and creating a record for the future of where teams have been proposed but not implemented.

Follow-up work: The Force and Authority to monitor and evaluate the impacts of the implementation of the recommendations arising from this review, particularly around the impact of new guidance on proposing and ratifying new teams and subsequent performance management.

Section/question reference: *2.7 What community barriers to delivering BTP NP have been overcome/still exist?*

Evidence gathered: As set out above the Force has experienced a challenge in some areas in encouraging the right industry partners to engage. This can have implications for securing partner buy-in for jointly owning actions and in securing resource commitment from partners. Also as described in sections 6-9 key there are ongoing challenges for BTP are in engaging with 'harder to reach partners' – in particular train crew (section 8) and passengers (section 7). This may have implications for improving awareness and confidence and in securing intelligence from these groups.

Follow-up work: No further evidence is needed though the situation should be monitored in the future.

Section/question reference: *3.1 What impact has BTP NP had on volume crime at NP sites on the rail network?*

Evidence gathered: There is some evidence (set out in section 6.2 and referred to in section 7 and 8) that recorded crime and/or detection rates are improved at some sites though further analysis of crime data will be necessary to clarify the actual position.

Follow-up work: A more detailed (and ongoing) analysis and monitoring of crime trends at NP vs non-NP sites; this should involve both descriptive and inferential statistical analysis. This can be considered together with any evidence the Force gathers on perceptions of crime levels.

Section/question reference: *3.2 What impact has BTP NP had on perceptions of fear and risk of crime on the rail network?*

Evidence gathered: There is good qualitative evidence from some of the case study sites that the introduction of NP has had a positive impact on perceptions of risk and fear for both rail staff and passengers (see sections 7.3-7.5 and . However it has not been possible to quantify the magnitude of this impact; as such the Force is continuing to explore ways to baseline new sites in order to more effectively track progress in this area. This impact has not been demonstrated at all the case study sites so ongoing evaluation will be needed.

Follow-up work: The Committee to receive and consider the outputs of the Force's work to baseline and monitor the impact of NP on perceptions of fear and risk.

Section/question reference: *3.3 What impact has BTP NP had on volume crime on the rail network?*

Evidence gathered: There is some evidence (set out in section 6.2 and referred to in section 7 and 8) that recorded crime and/or detection rates are improved at some sites, particularly in relation to ASB. This is a similar picture to the results of the early evaluation of NP in Home Office forces. However, though further and more detailed analysis and monitoring of crime data will be necessary to clarify the actual position.

Follow-up work: A more detailed (and ongoing) analysis and monitoring of crime trends at NP vs non-NP sites; this should involve both descriptive and inferential statistical analysis. This can be considered together with any evidence the Force gathers on perceptions of crime levels.

Section/question reference: *3.4 What impact has BTP had on the reassurance gap for passengers at off peak times?*

Evidence gathered: There is consistent evidence from passengers (and industry staff) at all sites that this is an area where BTP NP has yet to make a significant impact. A limited presence at weekends and in the evenings, and on trains and at more isolated stations is demonstrated in the feedback from all NP and non-NP case study sites.

Consequently this is an area of work where there is potential for the Force to have a large impact on visibility and reassurance in the future.

Follow-up work: The Committee to work with the Force to agree a set of actions around NP demand management/resource deployment following the outputs of the Force's current scrutiny of demand management force-wide later in 2009.

Section/question reference: *4.1 To what extent has the Force made progress towards delivering against the NP Mission Statement?*

Evidence gathered: As set out above, the Force has made particular progress in delivering against the elements of its mission statement which relate to its working relationships with industry partners, in particular in establishing and using formalised problem solving mechanisms which have increased partner involvement and ownership. There is good evidence that the Force NP is focusing on local level problems (from the point of view of staff and passengers) as agreed with industry stakeholders and that this is beginning to have a positive impact on both crime and perceptions of crime and safety.

There is strong evidence from all the case study sites that officer visibility has improved for all stakeholder groups as a result of the introduction of NP; though there are some ongoing issues about raising awareness of BTP amongst passengers.

There is emerging evidence that NP is having a positive impact on perceptions of crime levels and feelings of personal safety for both staff and passengers though there is more work to be done to robustly analyse and evidence these impacts in the future.

The main challenge for the Force in the future is (re)defining and developing its relationship with passengers and train crew and ensuring that mechanisms are in place to capture their voice in both identifying priorities and evidencing progress.

Follow-up work: Continue to regularly monitor partner views (both BTP and external) about the quality and outcomes of partnership working.

A more detailed (and ongoing) analysis and monitoring of crime trends at NP

vs non-NP sites; this should involve both descriptive and inferential statistical analysis. This can be considered together with any evidence the Force gathers on perceptions of crime levels.

Also an evaluation of the impact of the implementation of the recommendation for the Force to continue to focus its engagement and communications activities with train crew and passengers.

Section/question reference: *4.2 Are the Force's guiding principles for NP in place and followed?*

Evidence gathered: The principles are clearly set out in the Force's NP Strategy and there is good evidence from officers and rail staff at a managerial level (i.e. those currently most involved in formal planning activities) that both they and industry partners understand the principles upon which NP is to be delivered.

Geographic ownership and local accountability is evidenced at all sites though there is evidence emerging from two of the sites that abstractions have the potential to undermine the perception that resources are actually *'dedicated'* to work on a defined patch. This is an issue that Force has already identified and is working to address though the Authority will want to be updated on this work.

There is good evidence from all the case study sites that *local intelligence* is directing local activity though again there is some feedback from officers that over-tasking of teams is a risk if NPTs are also expected to contribute to Area and national Policing Plan targets.

Improvements in *joint action* between the Force NPTs and their partners is well evidenced at all the sites surveyed, something which is not in evidence at non-NPT sites. However, this joint activity is more established and productive at some sites that at others and some NPTs report problems in getting the right people (both internal and external) to engage. Maintaining momentum and interest in joint problem solving will clearly be a challenge for BTP in the future; creating a forum for sharing good practice (this is done to some extent via the NP Project Board) will no doubt be a key driver in achieving this.

Passengers and some frontline staff (especially train crew) seem to be generally (though not entirely) absent from engagement in establishing these 'guiding principles' though the significant challenges for BTP in engaging meaningfully with these two groups is acknowledged.

Follow-up work: Continue to regularly monitor partner views about the quality (and outcomes) of partnership working.

A more detailed investigation of the causes of abstraction from NP duties.

It may be necessary for the Authority to look in more depth and the interaction between local targets for NPTs (as agreed via PACT), their contribution to

Area performance via their local NP targets in the annual Policing Plan and the contribution NPTs make to BTP National Policing Plan targets.

An evaluation of the impact of the implementation of the recommendation for the Force to continue to focus its engagement and communications activities with train crew and passengers.

Section/question reference: *4.3 Is the prescribed approach for introducing new NPTs robust and followed?*

Evidence gathered: There is some evidence (see section 4.3) that to date a corporate approach to introducing new teams (and in future reshaping teams) has not always been followed. This may create an issue in terms of establishing an audit trail of progress for each team and creating a record for the future of where teams have been proposed but not implemented.

Follow-up work: The Force and Authority to monitor and evaluate the impacts of the implementation of the recommendations arising from this review, particularly around the impact of new guidance on proposing and ratifying new teams and subsequent performance management.

The Force and Authority to also work together to consider developing a process for reshaping or refocusing existing NTPs.

Section/question reference: *4.4 How effective is the Force's NP Performance Management Strategy?*

Evidence gathered: The Force has a clear framework in place for performance managing NP. However, beyond reviewing the framework, the minutes of the NP Project Board and informal discussions with senior representatives from the Operations Department this evaluation has not considered in any great detail the appropriateness and effectiveness of the current performance management arrangements.

Follow-up work: A more detailed review and evaluation of the current approach for performance managing NP. This should consider performance management at all levels from the individual teams; BTP Areas, the NP project Board to an Authority level oversight and challenge.

6: BTP Neighbourhood Policing and its impact on BTP

Main achievements

- Solutions are sustainable and address causes not symptoms
- Visibility and awareness have increased
- The approach allows for use of innovative engagement methods
- More creative solutions to problem solving can be explored than for response policing
- NP is a more 'productive' approach than what existed before
- It has fostered good working relationships with other forces and external agencies
- It has facilitated effective working between BTP and security/accredited staff
- NP supports good working relationships between PCs and PCSOs
- More effective arrangements are in place for intelligence gathering and sharing than existed previously
- Is believed to have delivered increased detections and reductions in crime
- Officers find this style of policing rewarding and worthwhile

Current concerns

- Industry engagement is variable – both by role and location
- The results of analysis of the impact of NPTs on levels of crime is not conclusive
- The relative influence of some partners may be greater than others and this is a concern
- Passenger engagement is an ongoing challenge
- Public awareness of NPTs (and BTP) is still low
- Engagement with train staff can also be problematic and requires a creative response
- There is a balance to be achieved between time spent on local tasking and contributing to Area and National targets
- Managing abstractions are noted as both a current and future challenge
- Elements of NP are bureaucratic (processing detainees and KIN paperwork in particular is burdensome)
- There may still be work to do to fully adapt/refine NP for BTP
- There is scope to better explore and promote the opportunities NP can offer in terms of personal development

Recommendations arising:

- The Authority, with support from BTP to review success/workability of the current evaluation framework, with the aim of developing a formal NP evaluation framework for use across the Force
- More detailed work should be done on analysing trends in crime data to establish the impact of NPTs on this indicator
- The Force's guidance on stakeholder engagement should be updated to include good practice advice
- FHQ's Quality of Service team should continue to support NPTs in identifying and trialling passenger engagement methods
- NPTs to work with BTP Media & Marketing Department to make best use of NPT marketing materials
- Feedback about tensions between delivering against NPT priorities and local/national policing plans to be fed into strategic level discussions on planning
- Any follow-up NP evaluation work to consider abstractions challenges and solutions
- Any follow-up evaluation work to consider internal attitudes around the current approach to NP on the railways
- NP Strategy to be refreshed to include a revised definition of an NTP 'territory/geography'
- The Force and Authority to consider how to best promote and evaluate NP as an avenue within BTP for personal development

6.1   Introduction

6.1.1

This section of the report considers and evaluates the impact of the introduction of NP from the perspective of the Force itself.

In doing so the evaluation has drawn on a range of internal and external sources including;

- Outputs from the 2006 baseline and 2008 thematic HMIC inspections
- Outputs from a series of focus groups with NPT members
- Internal evaluation report from BTP London North
- BTP analysis of crime data at NPT case study sites and control locations
- Semi-structured discussions with key personnel within the FHQ Operations Department

6.1.3

The remainder of this section sets out the key themes emerging from the data sources set out above and the main recommendations arising.

6.2   Impacts on recorded crime

6.2.1

Evidence of the impact of NP on reducing crime from BTP's own analysis of crime data is not wholly conclusive at present. HMIC's 2008 inspection identified that while anecdotal evidence existed for a reduction in priority crime in and around NPT locations in London South (described in more detail in section 8.5.3 of this report) evidence of a direct correlation was not available.

6.2.2

Analysis carried out by BTP for this evaluation presents a similar mixed picture; the following extract from an internal crime analysis report offers some initial conclusions.

Reducing Crime

a) Has overall crime reduced?

7.2   Overall crime reduction at NPTs is variable. The first year of operation appears to result in a general increase in crime. However, as teams embed, overall crime levels do appear to reduce. There is a definite link between overall crime reduction, in the longer term, and problem solving activity where the NPT appears more capable of managing that activity.

(contd.)

b) Have signal crimes reduced?

7.3   ASB has reduced significantly at three of the four NPT sites examined. Although this has yet to be at overall levels comparable to non-NPT sites, it is clear that PCSOs play a key role in this reduction.
7.4   Reduction in theft has not been categorically linked to NPTs except where the NPT has taken theft as a priority.

7.5   Graffiti appears the signal crime most likely to be impacted by the presence of an NPT. Graffiti offences fell significantly and comparatively at three of the NPT sites. The increase at the fourth site can be specifically explained by NPT activity and is seen as a positive instance of NP work.

c) Have staff assaults been reduced?

7.6   The impact of NPTs on staff assaults is linked to a number of factors including the number of assaults occurring and the presence of TOC revenue protection. Booking hall and train staff appear less likely to be victims of staff assaults compared with 2005/2006. Where staff assaults have increased this appears more linked to increased activity of revenue protection staff. (There is some anecdotal evidence to suggest that TOC staff are more confident and active since the introduction of the NPT due to the support they provide).

d) Has serious and violent crime been reduced?

7.7   Generally NPTs are less likely to experience violent crime. Where there are volumes of serious assaults it does appear that NPTs are an effective tool for reducing their numbers.

7.8   As with serious assaults, NPTs may be an effective tool to reduce robberies (for example the 69.1% reduction at Lewisham in 2007/2008) where the volume of such crime is amenable to problem solving activity.

e)   Has self generated policing activity increased?

7.9   Categorically, such activity does appear to have increased at NPT locations. This is linked both to the increased presence of the NPT but also to increased opportunities and demand for specific operations (such as Operation Shield or the deployment of drugs dogs).

6.2.3

Despite the absence of a consistent message in the data considered to date, the strategic, organisational view from BTP is that NP has been the single most significant shift in policing strategy in the last four years and that this has coincided with the largest decrease in recorded crime on the railways in recent times. While NP has not been rolled out across the whole of BTP's territory, teams were (and continue to be) placed in those locations where need was greatest and where the biggest impact would be felt. London is highlighted as a particular case in point, where pilot and then permanent NP teams were located at stations and on lines where need was most pressing. In terms of thee Force's professional judgement, while the direct impact of NP on levels of crime on any discrete 'patch' are not entirely clear, the wider impacts of NP are more distinct.

A more detailed interrogation and analysis of the trends in the Force's crime data will be an essential follow up task on completion of this evaluation.

6.3   Outputs from NPT Member interviews

6.3.1 Awareness and visibility

Officers from the NPTs consulted report that they feel NP has increased BTP's visibility within the community, particularly for the travelling public. The NPT's use of (Personal Digital Assistants) PDAs to enable officers to spend more time 'on the ground' was also referenced by one team as an important factor in achieving this outcome. In addition, the Southport and Pontypridd NPTs also report that the NP approach, particularly in terms of its structured engagement, has also enabled them to raise awareness of BTP with a far wider range of partners than was the case before. They report that they now have regular dialogue with Local Authorities, schools passenger representative groups in addition to industry partners.

6.3.2

An underlying challenge for NPTs, also referenced in section 9.7.5 of this report, is BTP's starting point of relatively low current levels of awareness, particularly for the public. Officers from the Birmingham NPT identify that the lack of public awareness about BTP as the dedicated force for the railway (as distinct from the local force) may be a barrier to engagement on railways specific issues. This view, if correct, emphasises the need to explore and make best use of strategies to raise awareness of BTP's role and remit and the particular role of BTP's NPTs on the railways.

6.3.3 Relationships

While improved relationships with passengers were not specifically referenced by any of the case study NPTs, all speak of improved relationships with their

'community'. Further discussion reveals that for BTP's own officers, relationships are most improved with industry staff and private security/ accredited staff since the introduction of NP. A view echoed in the feedback from industry staff themselves. Better working relationships with the local Home Office force are also described, by two of the surveyed NPTs, as benefits realised thus far. One NPT referred to this improvement in working relationships as building an 'appetite' for future partnership work. Interestingly NPTs also reference the impact the approach is having on internal working relationships, suggesting that the relationship between Police Constables (PCs) and PCSOs has been strengthened as a result.

6.3.4

One concern arising from the NPT feedback is the potential for unequal relationships to be formed with local partners. The tone of this thread of their discussions suggests that, at this stage, the concern is around the potential for certain partners to exert disproportionate influence over the NPT but there may also be a risk that, if not sensitively managed, this could have a negative impact on the nature of an NPT's working relationships with other partners in the future.

6.3.5 Engagement

NPT members report improved engagement with a wide range of partners from their local communities, of particular note is that all teams now highlight their successful engagement with children and young people is something which did not happen previously. All teams also refer to the opportunity that NP has given them to try a range of techniques to engage with partners; leaflet drops, surgeries and suggestion boxes being quoted as methods tried for communicating with stakeholders. All NPTs also report that improved engagement means that they are able to use a range of techniques to deliver solutions for local priorities. For example, a PACT panel might agree to address a local issue of ASB through a combination of education, prevention and enforcement; before the introduction of NP BTP would usually decide that a purely enforcement based approach would be taken.

6.3.6

Three main challenges around engagement are identified by the Force's NPTs. The first relates to communicating with train crew; this they suggest is due to the limited time train crew have to speak with the NPTs unless the dialogue can take place onboard trains. NPTs also report difficulties in engaging with passengers. While strategies (such as station surgeries) appear to be successful in some areas, engagement with passengers generally remains patchy and limited in its outputs. As discussed in more detail in section 7.5.18 of this report, greater use of technology – an in particular the internet – may offer opportunities (and some challenges) in addressing this issue. Finally, some NTPs appear to be experiencing

difficulties in making and sustaining contact with outside agencies; we take this to mean partners outside of the immediate railway environment. The challenge of achieving meaningful engagement with both passengers and industry stakeholders is also identified as an ongoing challenge in the evaluation of London North's NPTs.

6.3.7 Delivering results

All NPT case study sites report that they have been successful in 'delivering results' defining these outcomes in a number of ways. All teams refer to the NPT delivering more effective approaches to problem solving both in terms of identifying the correct priorities and offering sustainable solutions. Officers are clear that NPT is delivering long terms solutions which address the causes of causes of priority issues, rather than just tackling the symptoms.

6.3.8

Officers believe that intelligence gathering has also improved since the introduction of NP on the railways; both as a result of improved working relationships and due to the structure and frequency of formal planning processes. In its 2008 inspection HMIC also identified that NPTs were a valuable asset for colleagues in developing intelligence but an opportunity existed to feed this intelligence through the 'level 0' tasking process into Area Intelligence Bureaus (AIBs) and the Force Intelligence Bureau (FIB). This recommendation was included into the Force's post-inspection improvement plan (see Appendix D) and the subsequent actions delivered. For example, the Scottish Area's 'Help Us – Help You forms which capture and then share intelligence have been identified as good practice and circulated to all NPTs. However, more generally it is probably too early to assess the longer term impact of this work; the Force and Authority will therefore want to follow up on what outcomes this change in approach has delivered.

6.3.9

As discussed in part 6.2 of this report, evidence from the Force's performance data on the impact of NPT on levels of crime is not conclusive at this stage though something different does appear to be happening at the NPT case study sites which is not happening control sites or on Areas as a whole. Some NPTs have achieved rates of crime reduction which outperform their Area and/or local comparator sites; at others crime has risen at a rate which is different again to that of comparators. However, NPT team members report a significant reduction in levels of crime on their areas and are convinced that it is the presence of the NPT which is responsible for this.

6.3.10 The future of BTP NP

Perhaps unexpectedly NPT members raise some concerns about   their capacity to continue to deliver NP in the future. Feedback from participants

suggest that the key issues to consider for the future are around abstractions, the appropriateness of the current BTP NP model and the use/nature of targets for NPTs.

6.3.11

In relation to abstractions, officers at the case study sites identify that the bureaucracy around creating an audit trail for the work of their team (for example updating their PSPs and KIN databases) is keeping them from frontline duties. In the absence of any metrics around these statements it is difficult to quantify this issue. However follow-up feedback from representatives within the Operations Department suggests that this may in part be a perceptual issue. The corporate requirement is for NPT to have no more than 3 live PSPs in any one quarter i.e. a maximum of 12 in any single performance year. Further that updates to the KIN database should simply capture interactions with partners and other contacts but that the development and maintenance of the database is not an end in itself. It may be useful to reality test local understanding and perceptions of the use of PSPs and the KIN database and the actual burden this is placing on NPTs. Though not raised specifically by the participants in the NPT officer focus groups, there is some emerging anecdotal evidence that Area recording practices may also be placing a further bureaucratic burden on NPTs. As each NPT is also expected to contribute to the overall performance of the Area they are also subject to the recording/reporting requirements of non-NPT staff. The impacts of dual tasking of NPTs, both in terms of workload and bureaucracy, is worthy of more detailed investigation in the future.

6.3.12

A further recurring theme from NPT member interviews and focus groups is large the amount of time PCs are reportedly spending processing detainees; with some teams suggesting that this could almost become a full time job at some locations. Again in the absence of any quantitative data around these assertions it is difficult to make any statements about the significance of this issue. There may be value in following up on the extent and causes of abstractions in a second phase of evaluation work on NP.

6.3.13

Feedback from one case study team raises issues about how NP is defined for the railways and whether the most appropriate model is currently in place. The data submitted to the evaluation on this point lacked detail so it is difficult to be clear about what the exact nature of this concern is. There is some indication that there may be confusion about where BTP 'neighbourhoods' should start and end (in terms of distance outside the Force's jurisdiction). While this is made clear in the Force's current NP Strategy it would appear that the following definition is open to some local interpretation;

> "*Defining what constitutes a neighbourhood can be problematic. However, due to the clearly defined boundaries between rail stations and the wider community, BTP will establish communities based upon station and railway infrastructure. These initial boundaries will be drawn up in conjunction with partners and communities to ensure a true reflection of a neighbourhood is achieved. BTP recognises that matters affecting other communities can impact upon railway communities… As part of the process, BTP will work with partners in the railway industry and other police forces and community partners to tackle problems that affect us all.*"

6.3.14

This apparent local flexibility may be entirely appropriate though this will need to be reflected in the Force's supporting documentation. Any follow up phase to this evaluation should also look in more detail at internal attitudes about the appropriateness or lack of clarity around current definitions to establish whether the view referenced above is an exception or part of a more general perception.

6.3.15

The third issue to be raised by NPT members focuses on the level of tasking NPT are subject too and their capacity to deliver both local priorities (identified through PACT) and to contribute to delivery of Area and National targets. Again this was only raised by one of the case study NPTs but was highlighted in the London North evaluation of NP in 2008. This is an important issue and will need to form part of a wider debate about setting priorities for the Force in the future.

6.3.16 Other issues

Feedback from NPT members identifies a further issue relating to scope of NPT roles and the interactions between the various members of an NPT. Data from two of the case study NPTs suggests that NPT officers (both PCs and PCSOs) find the work they are involved in both challenging and rewarding and that involvement in the team has led to strong working relationships between officers of differing ranks.

6.3.17

The role of PCSOs is highlighted as one which may not yet have reached its full potential and focus group participants suggest that there may be scope to strengthen this role in relation to increasing visibility and improving engagement with passengers and train crew. The theme of developing the PCSO engagement role is picked up again in section 8 of this report.

6.3.18

Though not raised by NPT members themselves feedback from the Operations Department has suggested that there may be scope for exploring the opportunities that NPT could offer in terms of personal development. There is scope for PCs to gain management experience as PCSO co-ordinators and for Sergeants to develop valuable experience of community engagement, resource co-ordination and strategic problem solving approaches.

6.4 Main benefits realised

- Solutions are sustainable and address causes not symptoms
- Visibility and awareness have increased
- The approach allows for use of innovative engagement methods
- More creative solutions to problem solving can be explored than for response policing
- NP is a more 'productive' approach than what existed before
- It has fostered good working relationships with other forces and external agencies
- It has facilitated effective working between BTP and security/accredited staff
- NP supports good working relationships between PCs and PCSOs
- More effective arrangements are in place for intelligence gathering and sharing than existed previously
- Is believed to have delivered increased detections and reductions in crime
- Officers find this style of policing rewarding and worthwhile

6.5 Challenges remaining

- Industry engagement is variable – both by role and location
- The results of analysis of the impact of NPTs on levels of crime is not conclusive
- The relative influence of some partners may be greater than others and this is a concern
- Passenger engagement is an ongoing challenge
- Public awareness of NPTs (and BTP) is still low
- Engagement with train staff can also be problematic and requires a creative response
- There is a balance to be achieved between time spent on local tasking and contributing to Area and National targets
- Managing abstractions are noted as both a current and future challenge
- Elements of NP are bureaucratic (processing detainees and KIN paperwork in particular is burdensome)
- There may still be work to do to fully adapt/refine NP for BTP

- There is scope to better explore and promote the opportunities NP can offer in terms of personal development

6.6   Recommendations arising

R6.1: The Authority, with support from BTP to review success/workability of the current evaluation framework, with the aim of developing a formal NP evaluation framework for use across the Force

R6.2: More detailed work should be done on analysing trends in crime data to establish the impact of NPTs on this indicator

R6.3   The Force's guidance on stakeholder engagement should be updated to include good practice advice

R6.4: FHQ's Quality of Service team should continue to support NPTs in identifying and trialling passenger engagement methods

R6.5: NPTs to work with BTP Media & Marketing Department to make best use of NPT marketing materials

R6.6: Feedback about tensions between delivering against NPT priorities and local/national policing plans to be fed into strategic level discussions on planning

R6.7: Any follow-up NP evaluation work to consider abstractions challenges and solutions

R6.8: Any follow-up evaluation work to consider internal attitudes around the current approach to NP on the railways

R6.9: NP Strategy to be refreshed to include a revised definition of an NPT 'territory/geography'

R6.10: The Force and Authority to consider how to best promote and evaluate NP as an avenue within BTP for personal development

7. NP on the Railways: Impact on Passengers

Main achievements

- Visibility of BTP has increased for passengers across all NP sites
- Passengers at most sites report a perceived reduction in crime most notably in relation to ASB and alcohol related disorder
- Passengers at some sites report an increase in feelings of personal security over the period since the NPT was introduced

Challenges remaining

- Awareness of NP appears to be noticeably for less for passengers when compared with industry staff
- Passengers are generally not engaged in problem solving and monitoring processes and this remains a significant challenge for the Force
- Passengers generally do not feel they have a relationship with their BTP NPT
- Communications and marketing with passengers on NP does not seem to have been effective
- Passengers identify a gap in NPT coverage in the evenings at weekends
- Mechanisms are not in place yet to baseline and measure the impact of BTP NPTs on visibility and other measures such as fear of crime and engagement in problem solving.

Recommendations arising

- The Force to continue to focus on exploring ways in which to engage with passengers and develop guidance about what could and should be delivered by each team.
- Also to ensure that mechanisms exist for evaluating and sharing good practice between NPTs in relation to passenger engagement methods
- The Force to continue implementation of its NP Communications Strategy with a particular focus on the use and evaluation of marketing materials
- The Authority to receive and review an update on the outcomes of the implementation and evaluation of NP marketing materials
- The Force and Authority to research ways to baseline passenger views
- The Force and Authority to receive and consider the findings of the Force evaluation of demand management and its implications for deployment of NPT resources

7.1 Introduction

7.1.1

This section of the report evaluates the impact of the introduction of NP on passengers

7.1.2

In considering the impact of the introduction of BTP Neighbourhood Policing; the evaluation has drawn on a range of internal and external sources including;

- Outputs from the 2006 baseline and 2008 thematic HMIC inspections
- Outputs from a series of interviews/focus groups and electronic surveys with passengers from the case study sites
- Additional evidence submitted by Southeastern Trains
- Outputs from TOC research – Arriva Trains 'Code of Conduct' study

7.1.3

The remainder of this section sets out the key themes emerging from the data sources set out above and the main recommendations arising.

7.2 Previous evaluations of BTP's NP approach and its impact on passengers

7.2.1

In its 2006 baseline inspection of BTP, HMIC acknowledged the challenge the Force faced in implementing Neighbourhood Policing on the railways; particularly in terms of finding ways to engage with stakeholders beyond the immediate railway community. However the inspection also identified that the Force had already developed a sophisticated understanding of its railway community and diversity of this broad stakeholder group. HMIC also confirmed that the Force had at that time developed an extensive Force wide community consultation process in the context of the development of its annual policing plan and that this might provide a starting point for passenger engagement on NP.

7.2.2

However, as the Force had typically engaged with passengers through the National Passenger Survey (a large scale, biannual and externally operated

postal survey) or via professional passenger representatives[106] at an Area level, it was perhaps ambitious to expect that these processes could be a precursor to the one to one engagement with passengers expected by the NP model.

7.2.3

Indeed, the 2006 HMIC report highlighted the need for the Force to do further work in relation to improving the Force's communications around NP and identified that a community engagement strategy for NP had not yet been produced. The development of such a product was a specific recommendation; at the time of the 2006 inspection a Media and Marketing Manager had recently been appointed and was expected to progress work in this area.

7.2.4

HMIC carried out a further thematic inspection of BTP Neighbourhood Policing in 2008 and the challenge of achieving meaningful engagement with rail passengers was again a recurring theme of both the final report and its recommendations. While the inspection report again acknowledges the unique problems the Force faces both in terms of the size of its territory and the transient nature of a significant of its passenger community it highlights an apparent lack of progress in terms of passenger engagement.

7.2.5

HMIC suggested in its 2008 report that a potential to barrier to progress was a lack of corporacy or universal 'vision' around the BTP NP model; and this may have resulted in a 'varying community experience[107]' and led to internal and external variability about the scope of BTP's community. Development and delivery of such a corporate model could 'enhance opportunities for stakeholder engagement and support, as well as providing a coherent brand to aid external and internal understanding'.

7.2.6

The Force challenges HMIC's assessment of progress around developing a vision and an apparently varying community experience. In particular BTP refers to the findings of Louise Casey's '*Engaging Communities in Fighting Crime'* Review which emphasises that the development of a more standardised approach (for Home Office NP nationally) would build confidence in Neighbourhood Policing and achieve greater consistency. However, this review also points out that greater consistency 'must not be at the expense of local flexibility to meet the needs of different communities and

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[106] Such as Passenger Focus passenger link managers

[107] HMIC Inspection report. British Transport Police: Neighbourhood Policing. August 2008, p9.

neighbourhoods as it is just this flexibility that allows for the strong neighbourhood level accountability model to operate effectively'.

7.2.7

Nevertheless following the 2008 HMIC inspection the Force has since revisited its NP strategy, NP vision statement[108] and NP communications strategy (see Appendix E of this report) and following the outcomes of this review will continue to work to explore opportunities for passenger engagement. It will be essential therefore for the Force and Authority to monitor and evaluate the impact of this more corporate approach and new approaches to passenger communications around NP on the extent to which BTP can achieve meaningful engagement with the travelling public.

7.3   Passenger perceptions of NP: evidence provided by train operators

7.3.1
Southeastern Trains provided a detailed submission to the evaluation which set out, based on its own analysis; the benefits it felt seemed to be delivering for passengers. In particular Southeastern believes that the presence of an NPT at Lewisham is having a positive impact on passenger perceptions about personal security. Their report states;

> *"There are very clear indications of the positive benefits being experienced from the introduction of a formal NPT scheme at Lewisham… it is known that during the first year of operation in particular immense improvements in CSS scores[109] relating to passenger feelings of security were recorded at the 'NPT' locations which outstripped those achieved anywhere else by a very significant degree."*

7.3.2

Arriva Trains Wales (ATW) also conducted a follow-up survey after implementation of its Code of Conduct initiative which was supported and enforced by a BTP NP team. The initiative, launched in December 2007, sought to reduce anti-social behaviour on the South Wales valley lines. The ATW survey, carried out six months post implementation reveals an apparently greater impact on passengers than train staff across all categories of incident considered thus far. In particular, the Code of Conduct and the work of the NPT seems to have had a significant impact on alcohol related disorder on trains. 70% of passengers reported a reduction in the number of

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[108] BTP Neighbourhood Policing Action Plan 2008
[109] The actual scores are not provided by the Southeastern report

people drinking on trains compared with just 43% of train crew. The impact (or more importantly the perceived potential impact) of the presence of warranted officers on trains seems to be a recurring theme identified by passengers in a number of the sources considered in the evaluation.

7.4 Passenger perceptions of NP – evidence from BTP baseline surveys

7.4.1

BTP's own baseline NP survey (carried out with rail passengers and station staff between February and March 2008 in five of seven BTP Areas) reveals a significantly lower initial level of awareness of NP and confidence in BTP among passengers when compared with station staff. Only 40% of passengers were aware of the presence of an NPT compared with 79% for station staff and only 45% thought that BTP was doing a good job at their station compared with 62% for station staff. This is perhaps not surprising in that rail staff are in effect the 'resident community' at a given railway station and so would be expected to more quickly develop an awareness of the Force's presence and activities. By contrast the Force's population of rail passengers may spend only a few minutes passing through a station on a daily or less frequent basis and so have far fewer windows of opportunity to make contact with an NPT or notice their impact.

7.4.2

While this initial survey data is useful, what is unclear at present is the longer term direction and magnitude of any change in awareness and confidence amongst passengers (and rail staff) as a result of the introduction of NP so ongoing monitoring is essential. To date BTP has not carried out baselining as a matter of routine and there are some compelling reasons for this. The nature of the Force's operating environment and the transient nature of much of its neighbourhood community creates both logistical and resource challenges in relation to engaging with passengers on a regular basis and analysing this information.

7.4.3

In order to evidence progress and identify areas for further attention it is essential that work continues to develop some manageable method for baselining and analysing trends in passenger perceptions and that this becomes part of the toolkit the Force uses in establishing and evaluating the effectiveness of existing and future NP teams. There may be scope to exploit existing data sources, such as NPS outputs and/or the findings of TOC customer satisfaction surveys to avoid burdening the Force with unnecessary additional activities in this area. Work is now progressing in this area, with baseline data being collected on six new NP sites (two in London South, four

in London North). The methodological lessons learned from this exercise will help refine the products and processes used for future baselining.

7.5   Passenger perceptions of NP – main outputs from BTP focus groups

7.5.1 Awareness of BTP NP

Passengers at all the NPT focus group sites generally lack awareness of their local BTP NPT but the majority have been exposed to the broader concept of NP through contact with their local Home Office Force teams. None of the passenger respondents know their local BTP officers or PCSOs by name and few knew them by sight; though on reflection this may be an unrealistic aspiration for the railways.

7.5.2

The majority of passenger sample groups from NPT sites were able to demonstrate a good understanding of the basic principles of NP and talked positively about its impact. Passengers at the control sites felt that NP would be a successful style of policing, and should help to reduce the current crime and disorder problems that exist along their lines, along with providing a greater police presence. At the time of the evaluation, Bromley South (one of the study control sites) had been proposed as a BTP NP site. Here passengers at Bromley are generally well-informed about NP; again having heard of NP within the Home Office context and have had positive experiences of it.

7.5.3 Visibility of BTP

Passengers at all the case study sites have noticed an increased visibility of 'officers' and at some sites also a greater presence of Railway Enforcement Officers (REOs), although this increased visibility was not directly linked with NP. In relation to this visibility point it is worth noting that evidence that from some locations suggests that passengers are unclear as to whether these staff in 'high visibility jackets' were NPT officers or REOs. There is a consensus among participants that police have more authority and respect from potential offenders - particularly from youth groups; a view which is echoed by frontline rail staff. Although it is also felt that the presence of REOs conducting ticket inspections inevitability provided checks of other behaviours. Passengers report that greater visibility of anyone in authority generally provides a deterrent to crime and Anti Social Behaviour (ASB), and helps improve feelings of personal safety.

7.5.4

While passengers from non-NPT sites report high levels of visibility in mainline stations such as London Bridge (also covered by an NPT) and Preston; they report far lower visibility in suburban areas and a reduced presence after 6pm. This appears to be leading a perception that BTP is concentrating its resources on larger stations only. Whilst NP aims to increase visibility across its NPT sites, deployment is inevitably also driven by intelligence and demand. Clearly there is an opportunity here for NPTs to provide enhanced visibility at suburban and rural stations where BTP's presence is currently low; however managing stakeholder expectations will be a crucial task in introducing and managing NPT on an ongoing basis.

7.5.5 Impact on perceived levels of crime

Passengers report that their main crime concerns on the railway are graffiti, vandalism and general low level ASB (including verbal abuse). A recurring theme was the connection between these problems and alcohol consumption, particularly by young people. Generally participants from all the case study sites feel that local problems have improved since the introduction of the NPT, and that this is mostly (though not exclusively) attributable to an increased police presence. In particular NPTs are believed to be having an impact on ASB and within this category, youth related disorder.

7.5.6

At the Bromley control site passengers reported similar crime concerns such as ASB and vandalism. In addition, they associated graffiti with intimidation which consequently increased their concerns about personal safety. However, passengers at Bromley felt that an NPT would help to address such problems and reduce levels of crime. These are issues that the majority of passengers at the established sites perceive NPTs to be tackling since their inception.

7.5.7

Of note at Pontypridd is the impact of previous experience of threats to personal security, prior to the introduction of NP. These experiences continue to influence passenger travel choices passengers choose to avoid particular stations that are known to have groups of youths congregating at them or use another mode of transport to make their journey instead. While this point was only made by participants at Pontypridd wider research demonstrates that such concerns can have a significant impact on passenger behaviours; as such these perceptions and habits pose an additional challenge for the NPT at some sites.

7.5.8   Impact on feelings of personal security

The impact of the introduction of NPTs on passengers' feelings about personal security thus far is mixed. At both Lewisham and Southport passengers report feeling relatively safe though only at Lewisham do passengers specifically report enhanced feelings of safety since the introduction of the NPT, mostly due to increased visibility:

"Definitely noticed a change in the years I have been using the station and it is much more comforting because I often commute back from Blackheath to London Bridge on the last train, and I started doing it in 2005 and I was quite frankly petrified. Sort of hanging around, because it is quite dark in places and I was really scared. But now there are quite often PCSOs and these jackets around and you just feel more confident. It shouldn't make any difference but it does." (Lewisham passenger)

7.5.9

By contrast, at Pontypridd passengers still have significant personal security concerns despite the efforts of the NPT. At Birmingham Cross-City, while passengers do not specifically comment on an improvement in their feelings of personal security, however they do discuss the positive impact that an increased presence would have in the evenings. This suggests that there is some underlying link between the presence of an NPT and their views on security, though this is not made explicit at this time.

7.5.10

On this particular point it is clear from the feedback received(from all groups of respondents) that concerns about personal safety are amplified at certain times of the week, most notably on Thursday, Friday and Saturday nights. There is considerable frustration at the lack of police presence during these crucial times, particularly because it is assumed that BTP is aware of when and where problems were occurring. The lack of police presence during these times is even more frustrating for those participants who felt that people generally behave themselves when the police are present.

Feedback on feelings of personal security from the non-NPT sites is also mixed confirming that the impact of NPTs cannot be robustly demonstrated at this time.

7.5.11 Engagement and Communications

Few passengers report engagement with an NPT and where this has happened it has been 1:1 contact as result of reporting an incident rather than involvement in a planned engagement strategy. Overall, evidence of community engagement between BTP and its various partners is generally weakest for the passenger group. It may be that NPT led engagement has taken place, for example through station surgeries, but passengers are not aware that this is an NPT related activity. When Force representatives

explained PACT meetings and surgeries to passengers during the study none expressed a particular interest in attending these. While this feedback seems to support the approach taken by most NPTs to focus on industry stakeholder engagement in formal processes, some teams should still consider making the PACT process open for and appealing to passengers.

7.5.12

Similarly, passengers at non-NPT sites also did not provide evidence of community engagement or contact with BTP. None of the passengers appear to know how to contact BTP, although this may be because they haven't attempted to previously. One participant reported approaching a member of rail staff for BTP's contact number but they were unable to provide them with the correct one. The feedback provided by passengers at both NPT and non-NPT seems to suggest two issues which may be worth further investigation. Passengers often refer to the 'police' and may not distinguish between BTP and the local Home Office Force. This may be worth clarifying as the NP approach could provide an excellent opportunity to reinforce messages about BTP's dedicated role. A consequence of this apparently low level of awareness may be that NP on the railways also has a relatively low profile amongst passengers, as seems to be evidenced by the feedback from the focus groups. Reaching this non-resident and 'time poor' group will be a significant challenge for the Force. Therefore continuing work to develop, roll out and evaluate marketing materials for BTP NP, followed up by engagement activities will need to be a focus in the short term.

7.5.13

Of particular note in relation to communications is the message that that passengers state that they would not raise concerns with the NPT unless they believed that it was a serious issue. For example, they would not stop for an informal chat but would stop to report a crime. This is further evidence of the challenge the Force faces in trying to routinely engage with this key stakeholder group.

7.5.14

During the course of the focus groups passengers suggested a number of methods of engagement they felt would be of potential benefit to them and most expressed a preference for face-to-face contact. They would like the details for a named contact within their NPT with whom they could raise concerns. Others also expressed an interest in attending public meetings about BTP NP, particularly in reference to raising problems/concerns although the level of interest in this approach varied by location.

7.5.15

In particular passengers highlighted the need for advanced warning of meetings or other engagement activities which should be at convenient times

and locations. Although this type of engagement is not uniformly successful across other NP sites, the Force believes that the large number of people recruited and in attendance for the Southport focus group suggests that passenger meetings may prove a successful initiative in this particular location.

7.5.16

Significantly, passengers did not think that NPT station surgeries were a good method of engaging with the travelling public, as the following extract from the focus group at Birmingham demonstrates;

> Passenger 1: *"I think I'd walk straight past to be honest. Because if I'm walking round town and there are people collecting for charity every time you walk past, it's like, you know, just leave me alone. I'm not that bothered if, you know, it's just another thing to avoid.*
>
> Passenger 2: *I'd agree with what you're saying. I mean I recently spent the best part of a day running a stall promoting the project I'm doing to our staff and they just don't want to talk to you, they've got better things to do, you know, they don't want to stop while they're on their way to their lunch or wherever they're going… People do not want to talk to you. It's like when you go down the street and there's the person with the clipboard, 'can I have two minutes?' 'No I'm busy'"*

7.5.17

Interestingly, industry focus group participants at several of the sites referenced witnessing NPT led passenger engagement initiatives such as train patrols and station surgeries. When passengers themselves referenced seeing station surgeries they associated these with crime prevention activities and sharing personal security information; they were generally not specifically linked to NP led activities. That NPTs are investing resources in passenger engagement activities, as evidenced by station staff, without passengers linking them to NPT suggests that a revised approach may need to be considered. Some industry participants suggested that these activities did not take place at times when passengers were likely to take part; a further issue may be a need to actively use NPT branded marketing materials at these events. Again we have received some feedback to suggest that NPTs (in some areas) may be limited in their use of marketing information due to restrictions placed on the by local station and train operators.

7.5.18

The Force's NP Communications Strategy (see Appendix E) sets out both who NPTs should communicate with and the range of methods they can employ, including posters, leaflets and newsletters. However, very few passenger participants in the focus groups report seeing any NPT marketing

or communications materials so clearly the issues identified in the 2008 HMIC inspection remain a significant challenge for the Force. The Force has recently developed a Neighbourhood Policing area on its external website but a review of this in June 2009 reveals that not all current teams are listed and not all teams have provided the same information on their page. While an up-to-date and internally consistent website will be a valuable tool for communicating with passengers it seems unlikely that passengers will find their own way to the website at present without the support of more active marketing of NP on station and on trains.

7.5.19

There is likely to be a role for the Chief Officer Group, BTP Marketing Department and/or the Police Authority in negotiating with partners to achieve a strategic level solution in order to overcome some of the practical problems NPTs have been experiencing in implementing their local communications strategy.

7.5.20 Passenger relationships with the NPT

There is little evidence of any relationship between the NPT and passengers at any of the sites researched. One of the passenger participants had engaged with the NPT through a station surgery, though there was little indication that this had resulted in a stronger relationship afterwards. Though passengers report that there is no relationship with BTP, they do believe that should they need to approach the Force, they could so and that BTP would be helpful.

7.5.21

Passengers' main hindrance to getting to know NPTs is the limited time they have. One respondent had seen and approached a station surgery, though they stated that their main reason for doing so was due to their train being delayed and the stall having free items such as pens and oyster card wallets. Again this contact had not changed their perception of BTP and had not informed them about the NPT. Developing more effective approaches to passenger communications and the use of appropriate marketing materials will need to remain a focus for the Force in the immediate future.

7.6   Main benefits realised

- Visibility of BTP has increased for passengers across all NP sites.

- Passengers at most sites report a perceived reduction in crime most notably in relation to ASB and alcohol related disorder

- Passengers at some sites report an increase in feelings of personal security over the period since the NPT was introduced

7.7 Challenges remaining

- Awareness of NP appears to be noticeably for less for passengers when compared with industry staff – while this is to be expected to some extent - the application and effectiveness of engagement activities and communications materials does not seem to have been fully rolled out and evaluated to date.
- Passengers are generally not engaged in problem solving and monitoring processes and this remains a significant challenge for the Force
- Passengers generally do not feel they have a relationship with their BTP NPT
- Communications and marketing with passengers on NP does not seem to have been effective
- Passengers identify a gap in NPT coverage in the evenings at weekend
- Mechanisms are not in place yet to baseline and measure the impact of BTP NPTs on visibility and other measures such as fear of crime and engagement in problem solving.

7.8 Recommendations

R7.1: The Force to continue to focus on exploring ways in which to engage with passengers and develop guidance about what could and should be delivered by each team. Given the nature of its operating environment. It may be that the Force and Authority will want to take a more considered view about what it is realistic for the Force to achieve in this area of work and to develop some further guidance and recommendations in the future. It is likely that engagement methods will need to vary between NPTs and depending on the topic of engagement

R7.2: Also to ensure that mechanisms exist for evaluating and sharing good practice between NPTs in relation to passenger engagement methods

R7.3: The Force to continue implementation of its NP Communications Strategy with a particular focus on the use and evaluation of marketing materials

R7.4: The Authority to receive and review an update on the outcomes of the implementation and evaluation of NP marketing materials

R7.5: The Force and Authority to research ways to baseline passenger views (as part of a wider set of indicators) for each team to allow for monitoring of progress. Again both will need to consider in more detail what can realistically be achieved in this respect. This may include considering existing external data collection mechanisms; exploiting existing data sources, both internal and external and trialling new engagement methods.

R7.6: The Force and Authority to receive and consider the findings of the Force evaluation of demand management and its implications for deployment of NPT resources

Section 8: BTP Neighbourhood Policing and its impact on partners

Main benefits realised

- Awareness of NP is generally good though it is best at a management level
- Staff at NP case study sites report an increase in visibility which is not mirrored by staff at control sites
- Staff at most sites report improved feelings of safety
- Station managers in particular refer to an improvement in the nature and effectiveness of working relationships with BTP
- Evidence of the impact on crime is not definitive at present but the presence of NPTs does appear to be reducing ASB
- There is some partner evidence of BTP NPs having a positive impact on both footfall and revenue

Challenges remaining

- While visibility has improved across all sites, abstraction and reducing visibility appears to be an emerging issue at some sites – this has been identified as an issue by BTP (see section 8.4.2 above)
- Communications with frontline staff seem to be less effective than with managerial level staff who typically attend PACT meeting
- Awareness of and contact with NPTs is particularly weak for train crew
- There are concerns about the effectiveness of reporting and feedback processes in some areas
- There is a perception that NPTs have tended to focus their efforts on stations rather than trains
- Concern has been expressed that current deployment patterns are not providing sufficient resources at key periods such as in the evening and at weekends
- Some concerns have emerged about the response capability of NPTs
- Managing expectations around visibility and response capability will become an increasingly important issue in the future for both new and established teams
- While there is some evidence of a positive impact on crime in most areas surveyed – especially effective in reducing ASB – it is unclear whether this has been displaced to other locations
- Developing a workable approach to baselining the above indicators has proved challenging for the Force

Conclusions & recommendations

- The Force and Authority should monitor ongoing abstraction and turnover levels and work with the Force to evaluate the ongoing impact of actions taken by the Force to minimise abstractions
- The Force and Authority to receive and consider the findings of the Force evaluation of demand management and its implications for deployment of NPT resources
- The Force must carefully manage the expectations of industry partners at both existing and future NP sites about what NPTs can actually deliver for them
- The Force and Authority should from time to time seek feedback on the nature and extent of industry involvement in NP
- The Force should consider how to raise the profile of NPTs amongst frontline staff and help to develop understanding of the role of NPTs amongst train crews
- The Force and Authority should monitor for evidence of displacement of criminal activity from NPT sites to other areas
- The Force should continue to ensure that appropriate/proportionate baselining and monitoring of industry perceptions of NP forms part of the process for establishing new sites and evaluating existing sites

8.1   Introduction

8.1.1

This section considers and evaluates the impact of the introduction of NP industry partners from the perspective of station managers, and frontline staff.

8.1.2

In considering the impact of the introduction of BTP Neighbourhood Policing; the evaluation has drawn on a range of internal and external sources including;

- Outputs from the HMIC's 2006 baseline and 2008 thematic inspections
- Outputs from a series of interviews/focus groups and electronic surveys with partners from the case study sites
- Additional evidence submitted by Southeastern Trains
- Outputs from TOC research – Arriva Trains 'Code of Conduct' study

8.1.3

The remainder of this section sets out the key themes emerging from the data sources set out above and the main recommendations arising.

8.2   Previous evaluations of BTPs work with partners

8.2.1

In its 2006 baseline inspection of BTP, HMIC identified that in adopting a Neighbourhood Policing style for the railways the Force had agreed a 'blueprint for the railways' with partners. In this way partners had been able to shape and influence the service they received from their local Neighbourhood teams. It also identified that in rolling out its Neighbourhood teams the Force has also taken an innovative approach to involving partners in the work of the extended Neighbourhood Policing family, through the use of sponsored Specials and accredited rail staff.

8.2.2

HMIC carried out a further thematic inspection of BTP Neighbourhood Policing in 2008 and found that rail industry partners were reporting an improved awareness of the BTP's work and now had developed a greater role in identifying and addressing local crime concerns and providing intelligence. The results and feedback achieved by the Pontypridd team in particular were

referenced as evidence of stakeholders benefiting from the Neighbourhood Style approach.

8.2.3

The main ongoing challenge for BTP, as identified by the 2008 HMIC inspection, was a need to develop a 'corporate model' of NP and to ensure that this was rolled out - and adhered to – by all NPTs across BTP's entire estate. However, the Force challenged HMIC's assertion about a lack of corporate vision around NP and restated that this was clearly set out in the BTP Neighbourhood Policing Strategy. The Force remains strongly of the view that, as was reinforced by the recent reviews by Flanagan and Casey, models for NP should be flexible, reflective of local needs and circumstances; as such there may not be a single model which can be applied to all BTP sites. Whilst taking into account the need for internal consistency the Force reiterated that it would continue to balance this with responding to local priorities and operating environments.

8.2.4

A further finding of the HMIC inspection was an apparent desire amongst some industry partners to become more involved in the development of NP in the future, particularly around setting priorities, objectives and agreeing costs. This opportunity may be addressed as NP becomes further embedded and refined and as partners become more engaged in the planning process (see section 9 of this report for more discussion on this topic). The roll out of the corporate model may also create some clarity around the extent and nature of industry involvement in NP. However, it will be essential for the Force and Authority to monitor partner opinions of the appropriateness of their involvement in NP processes from time to time.

8.3   Senior industry partner perceptions

8.3.1

While it was not possible to secure the views of this key stakeholder group as part of this evaluation, Southeastern Trains submitted its own evidence which set out, based on its own analysis, the benefits NP had realised for its own operations. In particular Southeastern believes that the presence of an NPT on the Lewisham line has had a positive impact on both passenger footfall and revenue (and to customer satisfaction levels as referred to in section 7 of this report). The report submitted to the evaluation by Paul Nicholas, Head of Crime and Security at Southeastern states;

"There are very clear indications of the positive benefits being experienced from the introduction of a formal NPT scheme at Lewisham. Whilst this report has purely concentrated upon the income and journey

results, it is known that during the first year of operation in particular immense improvements in CSS scores relating to passenger feelings of security were recorded at the 'NPT' locations which outstripped those achieved anywhere else by a very significant degree."

Continuing to support the expansion of similar schemes when opportunity arises, in the same partnership approach with BTP (and TfL as appropriate), is clearly a very worthwhile consideration in future years."

8.4 Rail staff perceptions of NP – evidence from BTP and ATW surveys

8.4.1

BTP's own baseline NP survey (carried out with rail staff and passengers between February and March 2008) indicates a far higher level of awareness of NP and confidence in BTP among station staff by comparison with passengers. While this data has only been gathered from a small sample of rail staff (109 responses) to date it does provide early evidence of the impact of NP on station staff perceptions. Of note amongst the results were that Force was rated particularly well by rail staff for awareness of NP (79%); for visibility (87% saw an officer once a week or more often) and that the NP was focusing on the issues which mattered most locally (77%).

8.4.2

What is unclear at present is the direction and magnitude of any change in awareness and confidence as a result of the introduction of NP. To date BTP has not routinely carried out baselining of its new NP and to some extent this is understandable. However, in order to be in a position to robustly evidence progress and identify opportunities for improvement it is vital that the Force and Authority continue to work together to develop some practicable method for baselining which can become part of the toolkit the Force uses to establish and evaluate the effectiveness of its approach to NP. Again, there may be scope to exploit existing data sources, such as NPS outputs and/or the findings of TOC customer satisfaction surveys to avoid burdening the Force with unnecessary additional activities in this area.

8.4.3

By contrast with BTP's own survey findings, the outputs from Arriva Trains Wales' (ATW) own evaluation of the impact of its 'Code of Conduct' initiative

reveals a greater impact on passengers than train staff. This initiative, launched in December 2007, sought to reduce anti-social behaviour on the South Wales valley lines. ATW itself identifies that the BTP NPT was integral in enforcing the Code and this survey with train staff and passengers sought to identify the main impacts of the initiative.

8.4.4

The survey revealed that the Code, across all the indicators measured, had had a more positive impact on passengers than train crew. For example, 70% of passengers had seen a reduction in drinking on trains by comparison with 43% of train crew. Significantly only 29% of train crew felt safe travelling on trains in the area compared with 53% of passengers. A lack of visibility of BTP officers was referenced a number of times by train crew as the reason for this, with particular concern being expressed at the absence of uniformed BTP officers on Friday and Saturday. This, they felt, continued to hamper their ability to enforce the Code and meant that they were reluctant to intervene themselves in conflict situations.

8.5   Rail staff perceptions of NP – outputs from focus groups

8.5.1   Awareness of BTP NP

NP concept appears to be well embedded at some sites, such as Lewisham, where a large proportion of staff in various roles demonstrate at least some understanding of NP. At this particular site NP is viewed as a positive form of policing and staff perceive NP officers as being there to deal with local issues and achieve an understanding of local crime problems through regular contact with the same people. However, the wider picture is more mixed and at some locations there is far less evidence of awareness and understanding.

8.5.2

The presence of an NPT has had varying impacts on the levels of awareness of both BTP and the concept of NP and this appears to be related to the location of the NPT and the role of individual rail staff members. However, from the evidence collected levels of awareness do not seem to be a function of the longevity of the team. At all the study sites, Station Managers in particular demonstrate a good awareness of NP and confirm that they are involved in problem solving, which has increased their general understanding of BTP. Railway Enforcement Officers (REOs) similarly report good understanding of NP; however frontline rail staff and train crew in particular seem to lack this level of awareness.

8.53

The reasons for the varying degrees of awareness are not clear; however there does seem to be an indication that this may be due to levels of

engagement in formal NP processes such as PACT meetings which are typically attended by staff at a Station Manager level. Therefore the Force faces a challenge in raising awareness of NPT with staff who are not regularly involved in formal interactions with BTP.

8.5.4

By contrast, managers at non-NPT sites also seem to have a good knowledge and awareness of both general policing and the NP model. However this appears to be largely in relation to Home Office policing and not to the role of BTP and its aims in relation to NP. Rail staff report that their knowledge of NP was largely due to their engagement with the station's Home Office force NPT or their local NPT at home.

8.5.5 Improved visibility

Again, staff at all levels and from all the NPTs surveyed report an increase in visibility for BTP; at some locations this was cited as the main improvement post implementation. However, after the initial high profile visibility, at some sites it was felt by some that this presence had started to fade away and as a result had not impacted significantly as was hoped on increasing reassurance. It was unclear from the focus group outputs whether there has actually been a reduction in the number patrols or whether this is a perception resulting from the increased regular police presence consequently being noticed more when it occasionally absent.

8.5.6

The Force has independently identified abstraction as an emerging risk and, as part of this evaluation, has been considering whether and where new resources could be deployed and whether existing NPT areas could be reshaped to achieve maximum presence. As a result the Force introduced a new NPT at Birmingham New Street in January 2009 to reduce the burden of the Birmingham Cross-City team. As a result, rail partners now have high expectations that the Cross-City NPT will return to its previous staffing levels. Clearly, it is important that the Force now follows up on the impact of this new team on partners' perceptions about current abstraction rates and that the Authority includes regular monitoring of abstraction rates as part of its oversight role.

8.5.7

A further issue at some of the sites surveyed are reports that visibility tends to be limited to the major stations on their 'patch'; a similar picture was described by passengers in the previous section of this report. All participants said they would like to see more police presence at smaller and unmanned stations and most importantly on trains all along the lines policed. Obviously at some locations issues of visibility are likely to be linked to the geographic nature of

the line as well as its crime and disorder history. At these posts, rail staff also appear to be relatively ill-informed about the presence of the NPT and have had little involvement with it. This suggests that an innovative approach to maximising visibility, whilst effectively managing partner expectations, will need to be a feature of the Force approach to NP in the future.

8.5.8

The final theme emerging around visibility is the absence of police (and to some extent rail staff) at key off peak times. Thursday, Friday and Saturday evenings were highlighted by industry participants from all sites as the times when they would like to see a greater presence of NPT staff both on stations and most importantly on trains. The BTP Operations Department is currently considering deployment patterns for NPTs as part of a Force wide review of demand management. The Authority will want be updated on the impacts of this Force evaluation on the deployment NPT resources.

8.5.9

Feedback from industry partners at the non-NPT sites surveyed suggests lower visibility and a far less regular presence of BTP officers on their operating areas by comparison with NPT sites. Where they are able to recall seeing BTP personnel this is almost exclusively in relation to planning meetings or to one off events such as Operation Shield. Where a regular security presence is seen this is usually provided by REOs, local security staff and occasionally BTP PCSOs.

8.5.10 Impacts on perceived levels of crime

As with rail passengers, rail staff and mangers identify their major local concerns as graffiti, vandalism and general ASB. Again the majority of these problems are also believed to be linked to young people and/or to consumption of alcohol.   Generally, industry participants feel that the problems have improved to some extent since the introduction of the NPT, particularly in terms of its impact on ASB. However this does not seem to be the case at all sites. In particular, a TOC manager from the Southport NPT area believed that the introduction of an NPT has not yet had a positive impact on the most persistent types crime on their patch. Perhaps confusingly where crime is felt to have been reduced this is often attributed to the increased police presence and the increased authority they have compared with rail or security staff.

8.5.11

In some areas respondents acknowledge that BTPs presence is very much supported by local REOs or security staff, who themselves have a more

powerful presence than regular rail staff. As such they are often able to contain or deter certain antisocial behaviours. A notable exception to this particular narrative is the apparent lack of impact BTP has had thus far on disorder on trains, particularly when this is also related to alcohol based ASB. Largely dealing with this type of incident appears to still fall to the train crew or complementary policing staff such as REOs, or at worst goes unchallenged

8.5.12

There appears to be evidence emerging that the introduction of NPTs is having an impact on the levels of certain types of crime which is being felt beyond the area being policed by individual NPTs. For example, the Operations Department has anecdotal evidence which seems to indicate a link between the introduction of the Lewisham NPT and an overall reduction in robbery on London South. It is believed that the area covered by the NPT was previously an important route in and out of central London for a number of gangs involved in robbery across the London South Areas. To date there does not seem to be any evidence that this activity has been displaced to other locations on the rail network. However, displacement was identified as an emerging issue by rail staff at the Pontypridd NPT site, clearly this situation will need careful monitoring here and elsewhere in the future.

8.5.13

Importantly, the feedback from focus group participants suggests that rail staff and station managers in particular, tend to define the success of the NPT in terms of levels of crime reduction. As such crime reduction is likely to remain a significant focus for the priorities being proposed by industry partners. The Force would therefore need to carefully consider communications with the industry around any future move away from a crime reduction role, for example to focus on increasing detections or improving reassurance; though these are clearly not mutually exclusive activities. The Force will also want to ensure it is resourced to provide robust crime data in order to properly evidence the improvements it believes it has delivered in terms of crime reduction.

8.5.14

Feedback from the non-NPT sites strongly suggests that something different is happening compared with those areas with NPTs. Both Bromley and Preston report that levels of crime in those categories which appear to be reduced by the presence of an NPT (such as ASB and) are at best stable, if not increasing. These differing patterns are not yet clearly demonstrated by reviewing the Force's own crime data - as it is recorded and analysed at present. There may be value in considering more detailed work to explore opportunities for properly attributing the impacts of the activities of BTP NPTs and the Force's complementary policing partners on crime levels.

8.5.15 Impact on feelings of personal security

Feedback on the NPT impact on perceptions of personal security for industry employees suggests that success is very mixed. At two of the NPT locations rail staff, REOs and managers report a much improved picture whilst at the two other sites little if any impact on feelings of safety has been felt. That this remains the case against a background of virtual consensus about the positive impact NPTs have had on local priority issues illustrates the complex relationship that exists between the fear and actual risk of crime and the challenge the Force faces in addressing this. From the case study sites examined, rail staff perceptions of personal security, even when not improved, do appear to be better than those at the non-NPT sites where some very serious concerns exist.

8.5.16

The major factors impacting on staff feelings of personal safety seem to be their confidence in BTP both a police force and in its ability to respond to their requests for assistance. Where staff and managers report confidence in the Force and in its ability to respond, feelings of personal safety are also much improved, where confidence is low the reverse appears to be true. Where 'inconsistent police response' is cited as a concern, this is not generally linked to abstraction but to the location of BTP's offices. Clear communications with partners and careful management of their expectations will be crucial in minimising this potential source of frustration and negativity in the future.

8.5.17

Again of note in relation to this theme is the consistent message that at both NPT and non-NPT sites - and even where staff feel reasonably safe - staff are most concerned about their safety on Thursday, Friday and Saturday nights, and after specific events such as football or rugby matches. Again these messages will need to be taken into account when considering deployment patterns for NPTs in the future.

8.5.18 Communications and engagement

While evidence from Managerial staff is positive, feedback from the focus groups generally seems to suggest that communication and levels of engagement between NPTs and other industry partners varies a great deal. Both by location and by the role of the industry staff member involved; it is entirely possible that this will also be influenced by the individual personalities involved.

8.5.19

Engagement and communications with station staff at a managerial level (including station managers, security managers and union representatives) appears to be happening in a structured and productive way. Nevertheless, processes appear to more effective and better established at some sites than others, for example at Lewisham both station managers and REOs report being heavily involved in problem solving processes and tasking. Effective engagement with partners at this local level will be crucial in securing support from more senior partners in endorsing local strategies and committing the resources partners will need to bring to the table in order the maximise outcomes.

8.5.20

By contrast, at the sites studied frontline staff appear to be largely absent from formal engagement processes although some do report good day-to-day relationships with NPT staff on an informal level. While this in itself may be a reasonable situation and a pragmatic approach to engagement, this reinforces the need to for two preconditions to be in place. First that rail staff understand the NP concept and their important role within it – that is that they are a valuable part of the team and will often become the eyes and ears of the Force on the rail network. Second that lines of communication – be this directly with BTP or via another member of industry staff – are open and understood. It appears from the feedback from some case study sites that managers lack awareness of the need to filter information provided by their NPT down to frontline staff and vice versa.

8.5.21

The confidence issue referenced in section 8.5.4 above may be also be impacting on communications around the reporting of incidents. Comments from some station staff and their managers seem to indicate that because staff do not always receive feedback on the information they share with NPT staff they are not confident that it is being acted on and so are reluctant report further incidents. It is unclear from the evidence available the extent and severity of this issue but clearly the Force will want to investigate this further. In the meantime this may be an additional aspect to be considered when managing partner expectations about BTP NP.

8.5.22 Partnership working and relationships

Across all NPT sites surveyed, the managerial relationship proved to be effective and much stronger than that with rail staff. While frontline and train staff find NPT officers to be friendly on a personal level, they remain far more

dependent on Home Office force officers for their interactions with police, usually in terms of an emergency response. The Force itself however counters this view and reports that BTP command and control data provides good evidence that it is the responder for a significant proportion of emergency calls. Interviewees identify that this general lack of relationship is a result of irregular contact between NPT officers and rail staff. If it is likely that most rail staff will not routinely be involved in formal planning and tasking meetings this feedback is further evidence for a need for NPT members to focus on developing mechanisms for communicating with industry partners outside of planning meetings.

8.5.23

There may also be an important role for PCSOs in building productive relationships with frontline staff at NPT locations. Managers from the Birmingham Cross-City site note that the local turnover of PCSOs is a particular hindrance to building better relationships between the Force and station staff. It may therefore be useful to consider in more detail the capacity and opportunities for PCSOs to lead on the development and maintenance of relationships with frontline staff to the extent that they are not already doing so. Turnover of NPT staff at other levels will also need to be monitored as this will impact on relationships with stakeholders at all levels. Though no specific evidence was collected of problems with turnover of other NPT members, the Force and Authority will need to monitor this data in the long-term.

8.5.24

Effective partnership working with members of the extended policing family is also in evidence. REO managers at Lewisham report that they and their teams have good working relationships with their NPT and this has developed though intelligence sharing and conducting joint operations. (Southeastern introduced Railway Enforcement Officers in 2005; their primary functions are to provide high visibility presence, conduct ticket blocks and enforce railway Byelaws, which clearly complements the work of the NPT.) Tasking of REOs is guided by daily intelligence briefs received from station managers and BTP. The REO manager reports that officers have a friendly, positive attitude both towards him and his staff, and always provide full support; reporting that "it's 100% better than it used to be".

8.2.25

By contrast, whilst the relationship between rail staff and the NPT at Southport is good, the quicker response time achieved by Carlisle Security has resulted in a greater reliance on them by rail staff. Whilst the NPT is intended to operate as part of a collective of different partners, the Force may wish to look at the nature of its various working relationships with different industry contacts at some locations in the future.

8.5.26

It would be simplistic to state that current perceptions and attitudes towards BTP NPT have formed in a vacuum. Clearly at some sites there are legacy issues, both good and bad, which are affecting partner buy-in to NP. The effects of this legacy may range from individual resistance to a need for a cultural shift in attitudes and working relationships with BTP. As an externally initiated approach to policing, the burden of responsibility for enabling and driving involvement in NP and will need to fall on the Force (with support form the Authority) at least in the short term. Achieving an effective and functioning NPT model for BTP will require a shared understanding of the purpose and nature of the approach being promoted. It is evident that at least at some sites this has not yet fully been achieved.

8.6 Main benefits realised

- Awareness of NP is generally good though it is best at a management level
- Staff at NP case study sites report an increase in visibility which is not mirrored by staff at control sites
- Staff at most sites report improved feelings of safety
- Station managers in particular refer to an improvement in the nature and effectiveness of working relationships with BTP
- Evidence of the impact on crime is not definitive at present but the presence of NPTs does appear to be reducing ASB
- There is some partner evidence of BTP NPs having a positive impact on both footfall and revenue

8.7 Challenges remaining

- While visibility has improved across all sites, abstraction and reducing visibility appears to be an emerging issue at some sites – this has been identified as an issue by BTP (see section 8.4.2 above)
- Communications with frontline staff seem to be less effective than with managerial level staff who typically attend PACT meeting
- Awareness of and contact with NPTs is particularly weak for train crew
- There are concerns about the effectiveness of reporting and feedback processes in some areas
- There is a perception that NPTs have tended to focus their efforts on stations rather than trains
- Concern has been expressed that current deployment patterns are not providing sufficient resources at key periods such as in the evening and at weekends
- Some concerns have emerged about the response capability of NPTs

- Managing expectations around visibility and response capability will become an increasingly important issue in the future for both new and established teams
- While there is some evidence of a positive impact on crime in most areas surveyed – especially effective in reducing ASB – it is unclear whether this has been displaced to other locations
- Developing a workable approach to baselining the above indicators has proved challenging for the Force

8.8 Recommendations

R8.1: The Force and Authority should monitor ongoing abstraction and turnover levels and work with the Force to evaluate the ongoing impact of actions taken by the Force to minimise abstractions

R8.2: The Force and Authority to receive and consider the findings of the Force evaluation of demand management and its implications for deployment of NPT resources

R8.3: The Force must carefully manage the expectations of industry partners at both existing and future NP sites about what NPTs can actually deliver for them

R8.4: The Force and Authority should from time to time seek feedback on the nature and extent of industry involvement in NP

R8.5: The Force should consider how to raise the profile of NPTs amongst frontline staff and help to develop understanding of the role of NPTs amongst train crews

R8.6: The Force and Authority should monitor for evidence of displacement of criminal activity from NPT sites to other areas

R8.7: The Force should continue work to ensure that appropriate/proportionate baselining and monitoring of industry perceptions of NP forms part of the process for establishing new sites and evaluating existing sites

9. BTP NP: impacts on partner engagement and problem solving

Key messages:

Main achievements

- There is good evidence that NPTs have increased visibility of BTP officers for both staff and passengers and this is encouraging engagement
- NPTs and the tools they use, such as PACT and PSPs, has provided a format which both officers and industry staff understand and feed into – this has created a dialogue and relationships which don't appear on non-NPT sites
- The PACT and PSP processes are in place and understood by officers and rail staff/managers at all NPT sites surveyed. Participants agree that this has increased opportunities for sharing of intelligence and joint tasking – albeit to different degrees in different areas
- Passengers and staff seem to feel police and industry are tackling the problems which are relevant locally

Current concerns

- There is a risk that approaches to PACT, and in particular use of PSPs, may be inconsistent and tokenistic in some areas. New guidance has been implemented and Force champions have been appointed. The impact of this work is being monitored and evaluated at alternate Project Board meetings
- Perceptions about what the NP approach is delivering differs between sites and between different groups within each site – this may be a function of the lack of an effectively communicated 'corporate model' of BTP NP
- Passengers do not seem to regularly input into the PACT/PSP process – generally the passenger voice is not well heard
- Engagement with train crews also seems to be patchy and is an opportunity for development
- The HMIC inspection identified that BTP was not engaging with communities (i.e. the public) in the way Home Office NP prescribes. The Force has countered this assessment stating that NP is fundamentally different for BTP as a result the communities they serve and engage will also be different.

Recommendations arising:

- **The Force and Authority to develop and agree a meaningful but appropriate baselining process to allow the Force to clearly evidence the improvements it has achieved – this is implied by the qualitative evidence gathered in this evaluation but it is not possible to support this with quantitative data to date**

- **The Force and Authority to monitor and evaluate BTP's general and local approaches to problem solving - including development and use of PSPs**

- **The Force and Authority to work together to ensure that appropriate mechanisms are in place to allow the passenger voice to be heard more clearly in the PACT/PSP process (clearly in some areas regular structured staff and passenger engagement is not possible or wanted – how do we gather data to evidence why we don't engage with particular stakeholders in certain places)**

- **Similarly the Force should continue explore ways to better engage with train crew**

9.1   Introduction

9.1.1

This section of the report evaluates the Force's development and application of a key element of the Neighbourhood Policing style, the "problem solving approach". In doing so the report has focused on the PACT process and the use of PSPs.   The evaluation has considered the adoption and consistent application of both the Police and Community Together (PACT) process and Problem Solving Plans (PSPs) and what this has delivered for the Force and its partners to date.

9.1.2

In considering BTP's use of the problem solving approach within Neighbourhood Policing; the evaluation has drawn on a range of internal and external sources including;

- Outputs from an internal (BTP only) workshop facilitated by BTP and attended by both NPT and non-NPT staff
- Outputs from in-depth focus groups with NP team members from the case study sites
- Outputs from a series of interviews/focus groups and electronic surveys with partners from the case study sites
- Evidence of good practice supplied by the NP teams as case study summaries
- Additional evidence submitted by Southeastern Trains
- Outputs from TOC research – Arriva trains study
- Findings and recommendations of HMIC inspections of BTP in 2006 & 2008
- Internal evaluation completed by BTP's London North Area in 2008

9.1.3

The remainder of this section sets out the Force's approach to problem solving in the context of its Neighbourhood Policing style and considers in turn the assessment and impact of this approach on NP team members, on industry partners and on passengers. The main themes emerging and recommended actions arising are summarised at the end of the section.

9.2   BTP's approach to problem solving

9.2.1

The main tool used by BTP for formal engagement with stakeholders to identify problems and develop solutions is the PACT meeting; essentially a local tasking and co-ordination meeting. A diagram of the elements of this

process is provided overleaf. The Force provides various good practice guidance templates for setting up, and recording the inputs, outputs and discussions arising at PACT meetings.

9.2.2

Internal guidance on the BTP PACT meeting approach[110] identifies that the PACT process should seek to achieve four things;

- An assessment of community issues identified through NPT engagement activity and agreement on which of those issues become Neighbourhood Priorities
- Monitoring of the actions taken to address those priorities
- Deciding when a priority has been successfully been dealt with
- Provide feedback to stakeholders on progress with PACT priorities

9.2.3

For BTP, PACT meetings will typically be attended by;

- BTP (usually the local NPT supervisor)
- TOCs (local management)
- Station staff (local management)
- Retail staff (local management)
- Passengers (user group representatives)

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[110] Developed in December 2008

9.2.4

The main output from the PACT process is the local Problem Solving Plan (PSP) which is jointly developed, owned and monitored with partner organisations. BTP guidance therefore defines the PSP as;

'evidence that a neighbourhood priority, as identified by a PACT meeting, is being managed and tackled'

As such a PSP document should;

▪ Clearly state the problem (the victim, the offender, location)
▪ Identify actions taken to address the problem (enforcement, prevention, intelligence, consultation
▪ On completion, provide evidence that the problem has been tackled

An example of a PSP from the Southport case study site is included at Appendix F to this report for information.

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9.2.5

Prior to the introduction of Neighbourhood teams there was no formalised method of agreeing priorities at a very local level. The primary mechanism used by the Force to identify and agree local priorities would have been the Area and Railway Tasking meetings supplemented by Senior Management level attendance at TOC meetings. The Force identified that the main shortcomings of this approach were;

- Tended to focus on the main crime related issues but did not pick up very local level concerns of interest to staff and passengers
- That the process tended to be reactive rather than proactive
- That it was not always an efficient use of time as individual meetings were held to focus on the concerns of a single partner at a time.

9.2.6

The PACT and PSP approach therefore provides both a forum and a framework for discussions about problem solving and planning at a local level.

9.3   Previous evaluations of problem solving

9.3.1

In its 2006 baseline inspection of BTP, HMIC identified that the Force had adopted a problem solving approach as part of delivering a Neighbourhood Policing style for the railways but that at the time of the inspection the Force was still scoping problem profiles (a separate intelligence product) for all its neighbourhoods. This inspection also identified that a community engagement strategy had yet to be put in place to both capture and feed back on neighbourhood priorities and actions taken to address them. The Force has since completed work on developing a Community Engagement Strategy.

9.3.2

HMIC carried out a further, thematic, inspection of BTP Neighbourhood Policing in 2008 and identified evidence of training (in relation to problem solving) being provided for all NPT staff. Further that the problem solving approach was being developed on all NPT sites. The approach taken by Pontypridd NPT (see case studies at Appendix G) in particular was identified as a good example of local engagement in identifying local problems and solutions.

9.3.3

Two main areas for improvement around problem solving and engagement were identified by this inspection. First, that the Force should identify national and/or area problem solving champions. The reason for this, HMIC suggested was that the absence of such staff may limit the potential of the Force to both deliver on local priorities and to maximise the integration of locally generated information into force level intelligence and tasking structures. The Force's Area Crime Reduction Officers now carry out this function and are engaged in the NP Project Oversight Board.

9.3.4

Second, the inspectorate suggested that BTP should consider providing joint training on problem solving for NPT teams and partners; which both officers and partners felt would assist in maturing relationships and making best use of the PACT process. Training is identified within a number of actions on the Force's post inspection Action Plan (see Appendix D of this report), an improved training programme is currently being rolled out an partners are now invited to participate in training wherever possible.

9.3.5

HMIC made a further recommendation that the Force should exploit opportunities to make better use of the data captured by and through PSPs and PACT by AIBs and FIBs. As part of delivering its post HMIC Action Plan, the Force has since carried some work since on developing a PSP database and an information sharing protocol for this purpose. All PSPs should now be passed to the Area Crime Reduction Officer for entry on the database. It is not clear to what extent the Force is monitoring compliance with this protocol. A log of PSPs is included in the NP area of the Force's intranet site and this suggests that some PSPs have not been signed off or have not been updated since 2008. It will be useful to obtain an up to date picture of progress with the PSP database.

9.4   Internal perceptions of problem solving

9.4.1

Evidence collected at the BTP NP problem solving workshop held in September 2008 provides an insight into internal perceptions of the outputs of the problem solving approach. Feedback from this workshop which reviewed PSPs and the issues they identified seem to suggest that generally engagement with TOC representatives, as part of the intelligence gathering and problem identification process, was good on all the NPT sites

represented. However the quality and exact nature of the encounter does vary locally.

9.4.2

As part of the workshop session officers were asked to review examples of 'poor' current BTP PSPs. Workshop attendees correctly identified that in general, problem definition was vague and lacking in detail. In addition attendees highlighted the following as the short comings of the solutions identified within the plans;

- Vague
- Short term
- Focused on the NPT and not partners
- Showed limited evidence of tactics other than Enforcement
- Lacked clear review or monitoring

As such these were identified as risks associated with the PSP approach.

9.4.3

At the same workshop some doubt was expressed about the existing mechanisms for quality assuring the plans and the processes for monitoring how plans might actually be used once they had been completed. Since this meeting the Force has developed a range of supporting guidance documents and templates to support work on both PACT and development of PSPs. In addition Area Crime Reduction Officers (CROs) now work with NPTs in developing PSPs, the above are clearly ongoing areas of vulnerability which will require monitoring. It may also be worth considering periodic higher level oversight/quality assurance of the development and use of PSPs.

9.4.4

The outputs from a separate series of focus groups held with current NPT team members support some of the evidence gathered via the internal NP workshop. The main area of progress as corroborated by this group was that officers believe that communications between NPTs and industry contacts has improved, though in the absence of any benchmarking data it is hard to quantify the magnitude of this improvement. Team members also believed that a range of more effective mechanisms were now in place to gather intelligence, identify priorities and plan solutions at a local level.

9.4.5

An output of particular note from these NPT team member focus groups was that, in their view, achieving regular and effective engagement on problem identification (and other issues) with train staff (as opposed to other industry

staff members) and most importantly with passengers would remain a major challenge for NPT teams in the future.   Further feedback on who exactly engagement has been with thus far was provided in the outputs from industry workshops referenced in section 9.6.X below.

9.5   Further internal evaluations: NPT member focus groups and London North evaluation report 2008

9.5.1

Evidence from BTP's NP team members suggests a range of improvements have been realised via the introduction of the PACT/PSP process. Of particular note is that PACT meetings are believed to provide a forum for bringing together a wide range of partners in a way which did not exist previously. While the levels of engagement and the range of attendees varies greatly by individual NPT there are numerous examples of PACT meetings being attended by local councillors, representatives from London TravelWatch and the local territorial force.   The Euston NPT PACT (London North Area) meeting is currently Chaired by a Network rail representative and BTP officers attend in the same way as other partners.

9.5.2

NPT members believe that the PACT approach (and supplementary informal activities) means that good systems are in place for gathering intelligence and that the model is encouraging commitment from industry partners both in terms of their time and resources. Not only are working relationships stronger than before but officers believe that they are also more productive.

9.5.3

What is clear from both the NP team member feedback and the outputs from the London North evaluation is the extent that current relationships are significantly influenced both by the 'maturity'[111] of existing relationships and by the local personalities involved. Successes at a number of sites on the London North Area are attributed to the personal drive and enthusiasm of team members and partners. Clearly this is both a strength and a weakness of the NPT model. What the Force and Authority must work together to ensure that effective mechanisms exist to share good practice and support teams which are struggling to initiate and sustain local engagement.

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[111] Community Safety Partnerships Limited (2008) Neighbourhood Policing Through Effective Partnerships Report Issue 1, November 2008. p40.

9.5.4

NPT officers report that their major ongoing frustration is getting the 'right people' (both internal, i.e. CID - and external partners) to be engaged in identifying problems and planning solutions on a regular basis. Having different attendees coming to each meeting means that some teams struggle to develop a dialogue and effectively track progress. On some areas, NPTs are failing to achieve sufficient interest to make PACT meetings effective. While dialogue about problem solving is happening in an informal way at these sites, in the absence of PSP's there is no audit trail for recording priorities and working with partners to commit resources to achieving solutions. There may be value in refreshing the current PACT guidance to include railway specific 'case study' examples of effective strategies for securing and maintaining effective engagement through PACT. Establishing a forum for NPTs to share experiences and good (and bad) practice on a range of engagement issues should also be considered.

9.5.5

Where meetings are happening, some NPTs are facing challenges around helping partners understand the nature of the process. The evaluation on London North suggests that partners attend meetings but do not seem to have understood that the process is intended to be two-way. While partners are willing to bring local problems to the NPT at some sites they seem less inclined to be involved in delivering solutions.

9.5.6

Managing partner expectations is the second major message emerging from NP teams. This seems to relate to two issues separate issues. First, some NPTs identify a potential risk that NPTs could be overwhelmed by invitations to become involved in the activities driven by local partners such as CDRPs. Therefore NPTs must be clear and robust in prioritising their current problem issues and focusing their resources on the locally agreed priorities at any given time. Second some NPTs report issues with various partners exerting (or attempting to exert) different levels of influence over the PACT process. Clearly larger TOCs in theory may appear to have more leverage with NPTs due to the scale of their operation and the resources they are able to deploy. However, some NP teams are concerned that this should not unintentionally exclude smaller partners who may have equally pressing concerns but have less of a presence within the partnership. Again there may value in refreshing the PACT guidance to include good practice on this issue.

Finally NPT members agree that passengers themselves are largely absent from the formal planning process although engaging them in this process has not been a specific aim for BTP. As is discussed in part 8 of this report, realistically there may be no way of engaging individual passengers in the

PACT/PSP process at all NPT sites. However, it is essential that the passenger voice is heard by all teams and as some have demonstrated passenger representatives can be effectively involved in PACT. NPT officers also acknowledge that communications with staff outside of the PACT process can be a problematic; a point echoed by frontline staff in section 9.7 below. As suggested above there seems to be scope to formally share NPT experiences about which strategies assist with improving communications with frontline staff.

9.6   Industry partner perceptions

9.6.1

Feedback from the industry focus groups (with senior station staff and mangers) presents a more positive view of progress. Staff from each of the four case study sites report a significant improvement in the frequency and quality of engagement with BTP officers on local crime issues both as part of the PACT process and more generally. There seems to be agreement across both new and established NP sites that opportunities for sharing intelligence with NP staff are in place and generally understood. Increased visibility and improved relationships with NP teams also seems to be driving increased levels of industry confidence in BTP at those sites and in turn their willingness to be involved in problems solving activities.

9.6.2

Participants in the industry focus groups at each NP case study site demonstrated a good awareness of the PACT process and how the might and do fit into it. PACT meetings were highlighted as the main (but not only) mechanism by which partners could raise new concerns and provide feedback on recent progress with problem solving. Industry representatives also showed good awareness of the PSP process and identified that they have role to play in shaping and delivering the resulting plans.

9.6.3

Interestingly, there appears to be some divergence between BTP's expectations and assessment of its own performance in relation to NP and expectations and assessment of its performance by its industry partners. The Force has quite rigorously tried to follow the Home Office model for engagement on problem solving and has acknowledged its own shortcomings in terms of fully achieving the 'textbook' process. By contrast, industry representatives perceive a clear change for the better and are less aware of how the process 'should' operate. For them, at present the process for engagement and planning is improved and is working.

9.6.4

Clearly, as industry (and passenger) partners become better educated and embedded in the problem solving process it is very likely that their expectations, and their ability to challenge and critique it, will also increase. This transition in levels of expectation and satisfaction is likely to require close monitoring and management.

9.7 Passenger and rail staff perceptions of problem solving: outputs from focus groups

9.7.1 Awareness

It appears from the focus group data that the implementation of the PACT approach has raised awareness of both BTP's role and the philosophy behind NP on the railways. This impact is demonstrated by all staff levels; though this view is most consistent at managerial level (e.g. station staff and REO Managers). Evidence from several sites also seems to suggest that industry employees believe that this is a reciprocal situation and that BTP staff are also now better informed about the various roles they carry out and challenges they face. However train crew tend to be far less aware of formal problem solving mechanisms and as a group are less engaged in them.

9.7.2

Managers and staff also appear to have developed a greater awareness of BTP's wider NPT work through witnessing their station surgeries and seeing them patrolling on stations and trains. It may be that involvement in, or hearing about, PACT has made them generally more conscious of other NPT related activities. At Southport a participant explained that working closely with the NPT has allowed for better understanding regarding the role they carry out, along with their aims and objectives:

"The more you work with them the more you realise what they're like, what the police are like and what they're actually doing and what they're trying to achieve" (Southport manager).

9.7.3

It also appears that activities supplementary to PACT work are taking place at some sites which are also enhancing partner awareness. For example, at Lewisham a programme of monthly intelligence briefing sessions take place which includes a Q&A forum for frontline staff.

9.7.4

A small number of frontline staff express an interest in attending PACT meetings though this may not be practical in reality. What is vitally important is that staff (and passengers) are aware of the PACT process and that they are able to feed into it by both identifying problems and possible solutions. Though it is effective at some sites, communication via the PACT meeting framework generally appears to be a challenge. This challenge relates both to BTP getting information on strategies and outcomes out to staff and to staff feeding information back into the meetings. For example, at one site the NPT produces newsletters on PACT and more general NPT matters but very few frontline staff are aware of these; some even suggesting that NPT newsletters would be a good idea. This illustrates the need to pilot and evaluate communications methods to ensure that key messages developed via PACT and PSPs are reaching all relevant partners.

9.7.5

None of the passengers involved in the focus groups reported any awareness of the BTP PACT/PSP process some had heard of the PACT approach in the context of their local NPT at home. Small number of passengers expressed an interest in attending formal meetings such as PACT, however it is important that regardless of an intention to attend, passengers are aware of the existence of PACT process and local plans in order for them to feed information in.

9.7.6

At Bromley, one of the case study control sites, managers displayed a good awareness of problem solving, and there was evidence of existing collaboration, not only with BTP (including the BTP NPT at Victoria) but also with the local MPS NPT. These included monthly briefings, joint ticket blocks, crime prevention initiatives, and a variety of operations (Shield, Glance). Outside of this, there was no regular face-to-face contact with BTP at Bromley. However, the majority of Bromley rail staff know BTP officers on a first name basis, and have their email addresses and phone numbers for when they need to contact BTP directly. In reality though much of their police contact is with MPS, the reason for this they report is a lack of BTP resources. Staff are disappointed that, when they do contact BTP or provide information/intelligence, they receive little feedback. Any updates they do receive occur a long time after the event. Staff find this lack of feedback disheartening.

9.7.7 Engagement

It is clear from industry partner feedback that the PACT process has created a platform for more regular contact between BTP and a range of partners. At

some sites where contact was minimal or non-existent previously this has created an environment where formal interaction can now take place. Where engagement between the force and local contacts was good historically the PACT process has put more structure and focus around this engagement.

9.7.8

Formal contact with the NPT is generally via senior station management, union representatives and REO/private security managers though PACT membership is more wide ranging at some locations. For example, at Pontypridd PACT meetings include key stakeholders, including: local councillors; youth leaders; local authority representatives; station adopters; TOC managers; and frontline staff representatives. The Pontypridd Community Affairs Manager believed this to be a "good way of being accountable".

9.7.9

Managers at non-NPT sites report that they often provided intelligence to BTP, but the method of contacting BTP is ad hoc and varies according to the nature of the intelligence. Managers at these sites also recognise a need for more contact between themselves and BTP on a strategic level. The lack of engagement with BTP to date has led to them having very little confidence in BTP and questioning the Force's motives:

"It doesn't feel as though they are working with you. They're there in their own right; they're not there to work for or with you, or to help you. They're there like a separate entity, really, doing their own thing"

In general, rail staff at the non-NPT sites do not appear to have the opportunity or methods available in order to pass on intelligence. At some locations there is a substantive difference between the contact rail staff have with BTP and that they have with REOs; with REOs being more actively engaged in tasking and intelligence sharing.

9.7.10 Outcomes

Focus group participants seem to view the regular meeting and planning approach which arise from the PACT/PSP model as an enabler for problem solving. A Manager's from Pontypridd reports that his engagement in PACT gives him a good insight into the role of NP in community engagement and its long-term approach to problem solving.

"There's a lot of engagement that I think might not have been part of a police officer's work if it wasn't for NP. It's more reactive if you're frontline, whereas being in an NPT, I think you probably get more in-depth with the problems and trying to solve them".

9.7.11

Industry participants recalled BTP led initiatives in which they themselves had had greater involvement as a result of the NPT and PACT process, for example involvement in Operation Shield at Lewisham and the policing of the Orangemen's parade Southport. A manager at this site stated that the NPT had been pro-active in helping rail staff assess situations and categorise incidents. Furthermore, Merseyrail staff had been trained by the BTP NPT in the use of spittle kits, and this now forms part of any new employee's induction. The pro-active nature of the NPT demonstrates to rail staff that they want to make a difference, and are there to offer a more hands-on approach. The manager directly links this to the potential for NPT to increase rail staff confidence in the both the NPT and BTP in general.

9.7.12

A formalised problem solving approach also seems to be leading to smarter working practices more generally. At Lewisham, a dedicated team of REOs mirrors the NPT roster to ensure complementary working patterns; indicating that the TOC values the collaboration with the NPT. This joint working is invaluable in building relationships between rail staff and the NPT. The REO manager explained that he feels that this relationship is reciprocal, and that establishing this sort of relationship helped officers to better understand what problems exist in an area, as well as to develop a partnership in devising solutions.

9.8   Main benefits realised

- There is good evidence that NPTs have increased visibility of BTP officers for both staff and passengers and this is encouraging people to engage with the Force more
- NPTs and the tools they use, such as PACT and PSPs, has provided a format which both officers and industry staff understand and feed into – this has created a dialogue and relationships which don't appear on non-NPT sites
- The PACT and PSP processes are in place and understood by officers and rail staff/managers at all NPT sites surveyed. Participants agree that this has increased opportunities for sharing of intelligence and joint tasking – albeit to different degrees in different areas
- Passengers and staff seem to feel police and industry are tackling the problems which are relevant locally

9.9 Challenges remaining

- There is a risk that approaches to PACT, and in particular use of PSPs, may be inconsistent and tokenistic in some areas. New guidance has been implemented and Force champions have been appointed. The impact of this work is being monitored and evaluated at alternate Project Board meetings
- Perceptions about what the NP approach is delivering differs between sites and between different groups within each site – this may be a function of the lack of an effectively communicated 'corporate model' of BTP NP
- Passengers do not seem to regularly input into the PACT/PSP process – generally the passenger voice is not well heard
- Engagement with train crews also seems to be patchy and is an opportunity for development
- The HMIC inspection identified that BTP was not engaging with communities (i.e. the public) in the way Home Office NP prescribes. The Force has countered this assessment stating that NP is fundamentally different for BTP as a result the communities they serve and engage will also be different.

9.10 Recommendations

R 9.1: The Force and Authority to develop and agree a meaningful but appropriate baselining process to allow the Force to clearly evidence the improvements it has achieved – this is implied by the qualitative evidence gathered in this evaluation but it is not possible to support this with quantitative data to date

R9.2: The Force and Authority to monitor and evaluate BTP's general and local approaches to problem solving - including development and use of PSPs

R9.3: The Force and Authority to work together to ensure that appropriate mechanisms are in place to allow the passenger voice to be heard more clearly in the PACT/PSP process (clearly in some areas regular structured staff and passenger engagement is not possible or wanted – how do we gather data to evidence why we don't engage with particular stakeholders in certain places)

R9.4: Similarly the Force should continue explore ways to better engage with train crew

10. NP on the Railways: an evaluation of BTPA's role

Recommendations arising

- **The Authority to develop a mechanism for periodically monitoring the delivery and effectiveness of NP training – this will fall within the remit of the Authority's Stakeholder Relations and Communications Strategy Committee (SR&CS).**
- **Also to consider NP performance at an Area level via the SR&CS committee in addition to general oversight carried out by SB&PM and the full Authority**
- **The SR&CS Committee to routinely monitor abstraction rates for NP teams**
- **Also for the SR&CS Committee to monitor the continuity in post of neighbourhood teams from time to time**
- **The SR&CS Committee to receive regular updates on community engagement generally and specifically in relation to NP**
- **The Authority also regularly review partner perceptions of NP**
- **The Force and Authority to consider options for more effective partnership working**

10.1 Introduction

10.1.1

This section provides a brief overview of the Authority's current oversight and monitoring role in relation to Neighbourhood Policing. It briefly describes the Authority's current approach to oversight and monitoring, how this correlates with current guidance on authority oversight of NP and any recommendations for the future.

10.2 BTPA's approach to date

10.2.1

Neighbourhood Policing is currently considered by BTPA at three key levels within the organisation, as set out below;

Oversight carried out by	Level of oversight	Activities involved
Full Authority	Strategic	Consideration of strategic priorities, resourcing of NP activities and high level delivery against respective policing plan targets, receives reports from lead Committee.
Stakeholder Relations & Communications Strategy Committee	Operational	Monitors roll out and evaluation of benefits of NP. More detailed consideration of the delivery against respective policing plan targets. Receives reports from the Secretariat on lead Member feedback.
Lead Member	Operational	Meetings with Force leads, visits to NP teams, attendance at relevant conferences and seminars.

10.2.2

The Association of Police Authorities (APA) identifies that police authorities have a fundamental role to play in successful delivery of NP and has produced guidance which supports and develops authority roles in this

respect. BTPA has referred to various iterations of the draft APA guidance for authority oversight of Neighbourhood Policing in developing its approach. The final version of the APA guidance[112] was published in June 2008 and while the Committee has not yet formally received and considered this document[113], this section has been developed using the APA guidance as the framework for evaluation.

10.2.3

In summary the APA guidance identifies that an authority has a key role to play in terms of oversight and scrutiny of their force's activities to ensure delivery of the following key outcomes[114];

▪ An increase in trust and confidence amongst communities[115]
▪ The police working closely with their partners and community to understand the issues that matter to people
▪ The police dealing with such issues effectively

10.2.4

The guidance also provides a practical framework by which an authority can both monitor and evaluate current practice and identify areas for further development. This framework is based on six key areas of work for the authority which form the headings of the separate sections of the assessment template. An assessment of the current status of BTPA's oversight role against the APA template is set out in the following tables;

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[112] Association of Police Authorities (June 2008). The police authority role in neighbourhood policing. Ensuring sustainability. London, APA.

[113] A paper is due to be presented to the Stakeholder Committee at its meeting on 20th January 2009.
[114] Association of Police Authorities (June 2008). The police authority role in neighbourhood policing. Ensuring sustainability. London, APA, p6.
[115] BTP does not currently measure this outcome but is working to develop a similar metric to that included in the British Crime Survey

Initial evaluation of BTPA oversight of Neighbourhood Policing (completed November 2008)

1. Strategic direction					
Consideration	**Current position**	**Risks**	**Action**	**Timescale**	**Outcome**
Do your force's priorities include neighbourhood policing (NP)	Yes, NP is featured in our current three year strategic plan and all BTP Areas also had NP targets in both 2008/9 and BTP also has an NP strategy.	The Authority needs to ensure that activities used to capture NP targets/priorities are fit for purpose.	This is considered by the policing plan sub-group on an annual basis and should continue.	Annually ongoing	Force's priorities include NP.
Are NP outcomes measured?	Yes, performance against strategic and policing plan targets is monitored via the Strategy Committee and the full Authority. The NP evaluation project is also assessing what NP has delivered for rail staff and passengers in terms of personal security and engagement with BTP.				NP policing outcomes are measured
Have you actively engaged with the LAA process and does it include outcomes promoting neighbourhood policing?	N/A. However, NP has been considered in both Force and Authority discussions with national and local stakeholders about medium and long term policing priorities. This is done annually as part of the policing plan process and three yearly as part of strategic planning arrangements.	The Authority needs to regularly review engagement activities to ensure they are still capable of delivering the outcome required.	This will be considered as part of the ongoing planning for any regular or one off discussions about annual and strategic planning.	Annually ongoing	N/A

Does your force have learning and development arrangements in place to support NP? How effective are they?	Yes, the Force refers to training arrangements for NP within its NP strategy including training for student officers, specialist training and provision of manual of guidance around NP activity. The Force is currently developing an NP training strategy which was due to start piloting in March 2009. However the authority currently does not have formal oversight of the delivery and effectiveness of this oversight beyond receiving the outputs of HMIC inspections of NP.	Without an effective evaluation process, the Authority cannot be sure that training arrangements are fit for purpose. The Force is currently developing a quality assurance SOP for training the outputs of which can be used as evidence for evaluating the learning and development arrangements for NP.	SR&CS to consider training plans for NP (with support from HR&R?)	tbc	A mechanism for monitoring delivery and effectiveness of NP training is developed and implemented.

2. Performance

Consideration	Current position	Risks	Action	Timescale	Outcome
Do you routinely monitor force performance on NP?	Yes both operationally via oversight of delivery against strategic and policing plan targets and strategically via SR&CS monitoring of the roll out of NP and evaluation of benefits delivered. Members also liaise with their local Force and stakeholder contacts on a variety of issues including NP.				Force's performance on NP is monitored.

Do you compare BCU performance?	The authority compares performance of Areas as part of wider performance monitoring against policing plan targets. Detailed consideration of NP performance at an Area level is not done in isolation from other policing plan targets by the Authority.	Ongoing variation in Area performance may not be picked up unless this is considered in isolation.	SR&CS to periodically consider NP performance at an Area level.	Tbc – suggest at each quarterly meeting or biannually.	The Authority has a process which regularly reviews Area performance against NP targets.
How do you secure improvement?	Monitor and challenge performance against policing plan targets. Monitor the outputs of formal inspections and evaluations for recommendations and actions arising.				Improvement is secured.
Does your force have an abstraction policy and do you routinely monitor abstraction rates?	Yes this is set out in the Force's NP strategy at paragraph 10.4. This is not routinely monitored by BTPA to date.	The Authority may not be fully sighted on individual teams regularly not meeting abstraction targets.	SR&CS to monitor abstraction rates.	Tbc – suggest at each quarterly meeting or biannually.	Abstraction rates regularly monitored and any action points followed up.
Do you monitor the continuity in post of BCU commanders, neighbourhood managers and neighbourhood staff? (or BTP equivalents)	No.	Turnover of NP team staff may be an indicator of a dysfunctional team and the potential for a team to under deliver.	SR&CS to monitor the continuity in post of neighbourhood teams	Tbc – suggest at each quarterly meeting or biannually.	Authority monitors the continuity in post of Area commanders, officers other and neighbourhood staff?

3. Community engagement

Consideration	Current position	Risks	Action	Timescale	Outcome
Does your force profile neighbourhoods and how does it use this information to set priorities and allocate resources?	Yes but in a different way to territorial forces. BTP works with local partners to identify priority areas where NP can be introduced or expanded.				Neighbourhoods profiled and used to set priorities and allocate resources.
How do you determine local priorities and how is your community engaged in this?	We identify priorities in two ways, nationally via the National Passenger survey and locally via Area Commander consultation with stakeholders as part of agreeing the annual policing plan. NP teams engage separately with local contacts to identify priorities & solutions.	There is some evidence to suggest that passengers are not routinely engaged in identifying local priorities for NP teams.	SR&CS to work with the NP project board and NP evaluation team to identify ways in which the Force and/or Authority can further develop engagement with passengers.	Following publication of NP evaluation.	Local priorities are determined with engagement from the community.
How actively do you ensure all voices in the community are heard?	The Authority receives updates on general community engagement through attendance at the Stop, Account & search Group meeting and via updates during the Policing Plan process. The Stakeholder Committee is also overseeing development and implementation of the BTPA communications and consultation strategy. This committee also receives regular updates on the work of the BTP IAN and IAG.	We do not currently regularly monitor Force community engagement activity in relation to NP for frequency or extent of coverage.	SR&CS Committee to receive regular updates on community engagement generally and specifically in relation to NP. This includes inputs from IAN and IAG related activities. BTP CEPU may be able to provide further information on NP activity for us.	At each SR&CS meeting ongoing.	The Authority is regularly updated on the nature and scope of community engagement both generally and in relation to NP. This update will consider an overview of both Force and Authority activity.

How do you ensure information is shared between the force, partners and the authority to identify local priorities and deliver community safety?	The Authority Policing Plan Working Group oversees development of the annual Policing Plan which includes identifying local priorities and agreeing local targets in relation to NP teams. This includes updates on consultation with passengers and between Area Commanders and TOC representatives. The Force has developed an extranet facility for PSA holders which includes crime and performance data.	The Authority is not well sighted on how effective processes are for partners to provide information for the Force.	Outputs from the current evaluation of NP will provide further evidence of the effectiveness of arrangements for sharing information with partners.	Following NP evaluation.	A process for ensuring sharing of information exists and is monitored.

4. Value for money

Consideration	Current position	Risks	Action	Timescale	Outcome
How do you assess if your force is delivering value for money on NP?	We regularly monitor performance against NP Policing plan targets. We have carried out a Force led evaluation of NP which has considered both qualitative and quantitative evidence from a range of stakeholders of the costs and benefits of NP.				We have assessed whether BTP is delivering value for money on NP

10.3   Recommendations

R10.1: The Authority to develop a mechanism for periodically monitoring the delivery and effectiveness of NP training – this will fall within the remit of the Authority's Stakeholder Relations and Communications Strategy Committee (SR&CS)

R10.2: Also to consider NP performance at an Area level via the SR&CS committee in addition to general oversight carried out by SB&PM and the full Authority

R10.3: The SR&CS Committee to routinely monitor abstraction rates for NP teams

R10.4: Also for the SR&CS Committee to monitor the continuity in post of neighbourhood teams from time to time

R10.5: The SR&CS Committee to receive regular updates on community engagement generally and specifically in relation to NP

R10.6: The Authority to also regularly review partner perceptions of NP

R10.7: The Force and Authority to consider options for more effective partnership working

11. Conclusions

11.1 Key successes: what has BTP NP delivered to date?

11.1.1

This evaluation of the delivery and benefits of a Neighbourhood Policing style on the rail network has identified some initial evidence both of what has been achieved at this early stage and what challenges still remain. Of particular note is evidence of the following sucesses;

- An NP approach for the railways has been defined and is well understood by BTP officers and industry partners at most locations
- An NP strategy is in place and supporting guidance and processes have been developed
- There is increased and more effective partnership working at all sites – particularly that between BTP and industry partners at a station/security manager level
- Industry partners now feel they have a relationship with BTP and mutual understanding of roles has improved
- A more robust and better understood process for identifying and addressing local issues is in place and is being used effectively
- BTP officers report greater job satisfaction and better co-operation between staff within a team
- The approach allows for more innovative solutions to be explored
- Visibility of BTP officers (and to some extent the wider policing family) has improved
- There is some initial evidence of a reduction in priority crimes such as ASB and an increase in detection rates
- There is some evidence of an improvement in perceptions of the crime levels at NPT sites
- There is emerging evidence of an improvement of rail staff and passenger perception of personal security at NPT sites
- There is some early evidence of a positive impact on TOC revenue and footfall at one site

11.1.2

A set out in more detail in section 2 of this report, the main evaluations of Home Office Neighbourhood Policing appear to be inconclusive in terms of what benefits the approach has actually achieved. However, evidence from the earlier evaluation of reassurance policing suggested that the following were achieved and therefore might be expected outcomes from NP in the future[116],[117];

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[116] Quinton, P & Morris, J (2008) 'Neighbourhood Policing: the impact of piloting and early implementation'. Home Office Online Report 01/08.

- Increased public confidence in the police which is a sustainable effect in the medium term

- Reduced levels of self reported victimisation within the neighbourhood which are again sustained in the medium term

- A reduction in the perception of the levels of crime and antisocial behaviour

- Perceptions of increased police visibility, familiarity and levels of engagement with local police teams

11.1.3

Clearly this demonstrates that BTP has experienced some of the same successes as Home Office forces, for example in successfully increasing visibility and improving perceptions of levels of crime. Research on the NRPP pilots also suggested that these effects were consistent across the all the pilot sites and could be explained by reassurance policing activity which had taken place; that is, the impact of other variables/effects on the results could reasonably be discounted based on the data gathered. Whilst the scope of the BTPA evaluation has illustrated potential benefits in a far wider range of indicators than for Home Office forces it does not allow us to draw such certain conclusions from the evidence gathered to date. However, it does provide a baseline against which future evaluative work can be planned and prioritised.

11.1.4

In terms of ongoing challenges for the Force, the following emerge as the main issues to be addressed;

- Awareness of BTP NP is generally poor amongst rail passengers
- Engagement with rail passengers and some rail staff (in particular train crew) is inconsistent and difficult to achieve
- Passengers from all sites stated that they did not have a relationship with their BTP NPT – it may be worth considering in more detail whether this is actually a desirable aim
- The use of passenger communications and marketing materials is not consistent and where used has generally not had the desired effect
- Industry engagement can be variable and the relative influence of some partners can be disproportionate
- Increasing abstractions emerge as a potential risk at some locations
- Visibility of NPTs is low at times and locations when staff and passengers feel most at risk (evenings/weekends and on trains/unmanned stations)

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[117] Tuffin, R; Morris, J & Poole, A. (2006) 'Home Office Research Study 296: An evaluation of the impact of the National Reassurance Policing Programme'. Home Office, London.

- A system for baselining NPTs is not yet in place although BTP is now piloting the development of some possible indicators at the most recently introduced NPTs
- The use and quality of the PACT process has only recently been audited and monitored centrally
- It is not clear how closely corporate guidelines for proposing and ratifying new NPTs are being followed

11.1.5

Home Office evaluations of NP revealed that the most persistent challenge for NPTs outside of the railways was that levels of fear of crime did not appear to have been significantly reduced and any effect achieved was not sustained in the medium term. However, these evaluations also identified that fear of crime tends to lag crime reduction, so this may be something that will improve in the longer term. The most recent (2008) HMIC thematic inspection[118] also seems to have found evidence of improved public perceptions of the standard of local policing and the effectiveness of policing in terms of addressing ASB and local priorities. However, evidence of significant increases in public confidence was less consistent and was found in only one third of Forces. Whilst there is some evidence of BTP having an impact on fear of crime and perceptions of personal safety this will need to be evaluated over a longer period.

Again this evaluation seems to have provided more detailed initial evidence of a range areas requiring future focus than did the previous evaluations of Home Office NP. However, the limited scope of the Authority's evaluation means that some caution should be exercised around the applicability of the findings to those sites not specifically included in the case study. However these findings do provide a useful starting point for planning future work.

11.1.6

Evidence from a number of evaluations of community based policing initiatives suggests that three common themes emerge as particular barriers to delivery of neighbourhood policing. [119,120,121,122]; These are organisation/cultural; implementation and community barriers. There is some evidence to suggest that BTP has encountered some of the same problems, of particular importance for the Force are the barriers to be overcome in engaging with key sections of the railway community, such as rail passengers.

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[118] HMIC (2008) Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary – serving neighbourhoods and individuals. A thematic report on Neighbourhood Policing and Developing Citizen Focus Policing.
[119] Myhill, A (2006) 'Community engagement in policing. Lessons from the literature'
[120] Coquilhat, J. (2008) 'Community Policing: An International Literature Review'. New Zealand Police.
[121] Mastrofski, S; Parks, R.B; Worden, R.E (1998)
[122] Sadd, S. & Grinc, R.M. (1996) 'Implementation Challenges in Community Policing'.

11.2   Follow-up work

In addition to the activities suggested in recommendations arising from this evaluation the following pieces of work emerge from the evidence collected and analysis gathered to date.

- A more detailed (and ongoing) analysis and monitoring of crime trends at NP sites; this should involve both descriptive and inferential statistical analysis and comparison with non-NPT sites

- A review of confidence measure data (from both industry staff and passengers) following ongoing work by the Quality of Service team to develop baselining practices

- Continue to regularly monitor partner views about the quality (and outcomes) of partnership working

- Research the view of TOC MDs to identify any future opportunities for NP and/or to identify potential barriers to implementation.

- An evaluation of the impact of implementing the recommendation for the Force to continue to focus its engagement and communications activities with train crew and passengers

- The Authority to monitor and evaluate the impacts of the Force's ongoing work around communications and marketing

- The Committee to receive and consider the outputs of the Force's work to baseline and monitor the impact of NP on perceptions of fear and risk

- A more detailed investigation of the causes of abstraction from NP duties

- The Force and Authority to monitor and evaluate the impacts of new guidance on proposing and ratifying new teams and subsequent performance management

- The Force and Authority to also work together to consider developing a process for reshaping or refocusing existing NTPs

- The Authority to periodically monitor the decision making processes (and documentation to support) the introduction of new NPTs or reshaping of existing teams to assess the impact of and compliance with new guidance on proposing new teams

- The Force and Authority to monitor and evaluate the impacts of the implementation of the recommendations arising from this review.

- The Authority to look in more depth and the interaction between local targets for NPTs (as agreed via PACT), their contribution to Area performance via their local NP targets in the annual Policing Plan and the contribution NPTs make to BTP National Policing Plan targets

- The Committee to work with the Force to agree a set of actions around NP demand management/resource deployment following the outputs of the Force's current scrutiny of demand management force-wide later in 2009

11.3   Recommendations arising

The main recommendations arising from this evaluation are presented at the end of each of the analytical chapters, 6-10. All of the recommendations are also listed in section 12.

12.   Summary of recommendations

R6.1: The Authority, with support from BTP to review success/workability of the current evaluation framework, with the aim of developing a formal NP evaluation framework for use across the Force

R6.2: More detailed work should be done on analysing trends in crime data to establish the impact of NPTs on this indicator

R6.3   The Force's guidance on stakeholder engagement should be updated to include good practice advice

R6.4: FHQ's Quality of Service team should continue to support NPTs in identifying and trialling passenger engagement methods

R6.5: NPTs to work with BTP Media & Marketing Department to make best use of NPT marketing materials

R6.6: Feedback about tensions between delivering against NPT priorities and local/national policing plans to be fed into strategic level discussions on planning

R6.7: Any follow-up NP evaluation work to consider abstractions challenges and solutions

R6.8: Any follow-up evaluation work to consider internal attitudes around the current approach to NP on the railways

R6.9: NP Strategy to be refreshed to include a revised definition of an NPT 'territory/geography'

R6.10: The Force and Authority to consider how to best promote and evaluate NP as an avenue within BTP for personal development

R7.1: The Force to continue to focus on exploring ways in which to engage with passengers and develop guidance about what could and should be delivered by each team. Given the nature of its operating environment. It may be that the Force and Authority will want to take a more considered view about what it is realistic for the Force to achieve in this area of work and to develop some further guidance and recommendations in the future. It is likely that engagement methods will need to vary between NPTs and depending on the topic of engagement

R7.2: Also to ensure that mechanisms exist for evaluating and sharing good practice between NPTs in relation to passenger engagement methods

R7.3: The Force to continue implementation of its NP Communications Strategy with a particular focus on the use and evaluation of marketing materials

R7.4: The Authority to receive and review an update on the outcomes of the implementation and evaluation of NP marketing materials

R7.5: The Force and Authority to research ways to baseline passenger views (as part of a wider set of indicators) for each team to allow for monitoring of progress. Again both will need to consider in more detail what can realistically be achieved in this respect. This may include considering existing external data collection mechanisms; exploiting existing data sources, both internal and external and trialling new engagement methods.

R7.6: The Force and Authority to receive and consider the findings of the Force evaluation of demand management and its implications for deployment of NPT resources

R8.1: The Force and Authority should monitor ongoing abstraction and turnover levels and work with the Force to evaluate the ongoing impact of actions taken by the Force to minimise abstractions

R8.2: The Force and Authority to receive and consider the findings of the Force evaluation of demand management and its implications for deployment of NPT resources

R8.3: The Force must carefully manage the expectations of industry partners at both existing and future NP sites about what NPTs can actually deliver for them

R8.4: The Force and Authority should from time to time seek feedback on the nature and extent of industry involvement in NP

R8.5: The Force should consider how to raise the profile of NPTs amongst frontline staff and help to develop understanding of the role of NPTs amongst train crews

R8.6: The Force and Authority should monitor for evidence of displacement of criminal activity from NPT sites to other areas

R8.7: The Force should continue work to ensure that appropriate/proportionate baselining and monitoring of industry perceptions of NP forms part of the process for establishing new sites and evaluating existing sites

R 9.1: The Force and Authority to develop and agree a meaningful but appropriate baselining process to allow the Force to clearly evidence the improvements it has achieved – this is implied by the qualitative evidence gathered in this evaluation but it is not possible to support this with quantitative data to date

R9.2: The Force and Authority to monitor and evaluate BTP's general and local approaches to problem solving - including development and use of PSPs

R9.3: The Force and Authority to work together to ensure that appropriate mechanisms are in place to allow the passenger voice to be heard more clearly

in the PACT/PSP process (clearly in some areas regular structured staff and passenger engagement is not possible or wanted – how do we gather data to evidence why we don't engage with particular stakeholders in certain places)

R9.4: Similarly the Force should continue explore ways to better engage with train crew

R10.1: The Authority to develop a mechanism for periodically monitoring the delivery and effectiveness of NP training – this will fall within the remit of the Authority's Stakeholder Relations and Communications Strategy Committee (SR&CS)

R10.2: Also to consider NP performance at an Area level via the SR&CS committee in addition to general oversight carried out by SB&PM and the full Authority

R10.3: The SR&CS Committee to routinely monitor abstraction rates for NP teams

R10.4: Also for the SR&CS Committee to monitor the continuity in post of neighbourhood teams from time to time

R10.5: The SR&CS Committee to receive regular updates on community engagement generally and specifically in relation to NP

R10.6: The Authority to also regularly review partner perceptions of NP

R10.7: The Force and Authority to consider options for more effective partnership working